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Abstract
This thesis is an investigation into infectious disease prevention in British ports in the 
latter part o f the nineteenth century and the introduction of medical restrictions to 
immigration at the beginning of the twentieth century. It examines the processes 
which led from the imposition of human quarantine toward the implementation of 
sanitary inspection at British ports. Central to this development was the influence of 
international pressures and demands and their incorporation into British domestic port 
policy. These pressures and demands resulted from the differing systems of 
prophylaxis and related medical theories favoured by other European imperial 
powers. They were discussed at the numerous International Sanitary Conferences of 
the nineteenth century and related particularly to shipping and commerce.
British use of quarantine for the prevention of the ‘exotic’ diseases, cholera, yellow 
fever, and plague was brought to an end with the repeal of the Quarantine Act in 
1896. However, exclusionary methods were not banished from the ports but remained 
in place for the prevention of diseases introduced by foreign migrants. The prevention 
of disease among immigrants, as a distinct process in port health, increased during 
and after the cholera epidemic of 1892, and was largely a reaction to American port 
health measures.
Immigration restriction appeared to contradict the general opposition to exclusionary 
prophylaxis at British ports. However, the fundamental difference between the 
exclusion of immigrants who were regarded as a potential health risk and the 
temporary exclusion of a vessel through quarantine, was that the detention of an 
immigrant vessel, and exclusion of immigrants, was not disruptive to trade.
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P U N C H , OR T H E  LONDON CHA RIV AR I.— S e p t e m b e r  10, 1892.
U BACK !
IN TRO D U CTIO N
“Back!”, cries Britannia, holding up her trident and blocking with outstretched arm 
the progress of the approaching figure. The cadaverous apparition of cholera moves 
across the gangplank followed closely by a wretched mass of people pushing their 
way off the ship and into England. A deep chasm between the ship and the dock 
separates the two figures, articulating the distance between that which is British and 
that which is foreign. Britannia, standing in front of the viewer, as he flicks through 
the September 1892 edition of Punch,’ forces the disease back, preventing it from 
making the final step onto British soil. The disease and the racially stereotyped people 
with whom it has shared the voyage cannot advance. This encounter between 
Britannia, who here represents the gatekeeper to Britain and the public health, and the 
figure on the gangplank, attempting to slink through the defence, is the subject of this 
thesis.
By the late nineteenth century Britain’s imperial prosperity and power were at their 
peak. The empire stretched around the globe, sustained militarily, by the wealth 
accrued through trade, and through British maritime superiority. Steam and sailing 
ships departed and arrived into British ports daily, loaded with goods from around the 
world. By the 1870s an estimated 25,000 vessels entered the Port of London each 
year, which was said to be ‘the wealthiest, most populous, and worst arranged port in 
the world’." The ports and harbours of the late nineteenth century were not the run­
down terminals of today, where freight-ships and ferries pass by the many empty 
docks of Liverpool, London, or Glasgow, overseen by a skeleton staff of customs and 
port officials. Victorian ports were a picture of industry and commerce, of heaving 
docks and busy waters, swarming with vessels large and small. Yet, they also 
harboured disease. Sanitary conditions in the ports and on board vessels were often 
appalling, with little regard given to even the most basic standard of modern 
cleanliness; and along with the wealth of imported goods which arrived on each tide
' Punch. Sept. 10, 1892, p, I 15. 'I’he cartoon was drawn by .fohn 'I'cnnici, 'larst' cartoonist to the 
maga/.inc, f 1864-1901 ).
f l ii lf  Yearly Report of the Medical Ofjicer. Port o f  London, Dcccinber I 87.L p. 4; and Lancet. \ ol. 2, 
( I 87 I ). p. 270, quoted in A. Hardy, ‘Cdiolera, Quarantine atul the Lnglish Preventative .System', 
Medical Htslorx (199.2). 250-269, p. 257.
were often diseases, silently travelling'^ among the merchandise, sailors and 
passengers who entered the bustling ports.
Although much scholarship has been devoted to maritime history and the history of 
public health in Victorian Britain, there has been, surprisingly, very little written 
about the important link between these two subjects. It has long been acknowledged 
that devastating epidemics of diseases such as cholera were imported into Britain and 
subsequently killed large numbers of the population in the most painful and degrading 
fashion. But, most scholarly investigations which have been undertaken into the 
effects of imported epidemics have focused upon the spread and consequences of the 
diseases after they had taken hold within the country.'^ Public health developments in 
the prevention and control of infectious disease have been studied in relation to 
sanitary reform and vaccination, and through the examination of medical innovations 
in the understanding of disease aetiology. The work of Medical Officers of Health has 
also been given increasing attention. Yet, the policies and practices which operated to 
intercept the importation of infectious diseases at the ports have attracted little more 
than passing remark and a handful of articles and sections of book chapters.^ These 
texts have contributed to the basic understanding of port health in late nineteenth 
century Britain, showing that the sanitary system of public health extended to the 
ports, that the health of the ports was, in the last quarter of the century, overseen by
' Alan Kraut, Sileni Travelers: Genus, Genes, and the Tnunigrant M en ace’, (Baltimore; .lohns Hopkin.s 
Univcr.sity Prc.s.s, Î994).
' I-or example, Michael Durey, The Return o f  the Plague: British Society and the Cholera, 1831-2, 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1979); Norman Longmate, King Cholera: The Biography o f  a Disease,  
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966); R..f. Morris, Cholera, J832: The Social Responses to an Epidemic, 
(Groom Helm, 1976); M. Felling, Cholera, Fever and English Medicine 1825-1865,  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); and William Coleman, Yellow Fever in the North: The Methods o f  Early 
Epidemiology,  (Madison: University o f  Wisconsin Press, 1987), pp. 139-167.
P. Baldwin, Contagion an d  the State in Europe, 1830-1930, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Jeanne L. Brand, Doctors and the State: The British Medical Profession and  Government  
Action in Public Health, 1 8 7 0 -  1912, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1965): G.C. Cook,  
From the Greenwich Hulks to Old St Paneras: A History o f  Tropical Disease in London, (London: 
Athlone Press, 1992); A Hardy, 'Public Health and the Expert: London Medical Officers o f  Health. 
1856-1900’ in: R. MacLeod, (Ed.) Government and Expertise - Specialists, Administrators and  
Professionals, 1860-1919,  128-142, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Hardy,
‘Cholera’; J.C. McDonald, ‘The History o f  Quarantine in Britain in the Nineteenth Century’. Bulletin 
o f  the History o f  Medicine , ( 195 I ), 22-44.; D. Porter, The History o f  Public Health and the Moden]  
State. (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 1994).
Other less scholarly accounts include: “Waterman”, ‘Guardians o f  the Port's Health. Part I : I he 
Defence Against Communicable D isease’, The I3L.A.Monthly: Being the Magazine o f  the Port of 
London Authority, ( 1964), 402-405; E.W. Hope, Health at the Gateway: Problenis and Internatioiud 
Oblig(aions o f  a Seaport City, (C’ambridge: Cambridge University Press, 193 I ); P. O'Dnscoll ,
' ' \gamst Infection and the Hand of War..." The Early Years of the Port Health .Ser\ ice ’. Port ot 
I ondon: Magaznie of the Port o f  London Authority. ( 199 I ) . 65-69.
medical officers similar to those who worked in towns and cities, and that quarantine 
was widely detested and rarely used in the latter half of the century. However, no 
scholarship has to date focused singularly on late Victorian and early Edwardian port 
health as a separate phenomenon within the development of public health and 
infectious disease prevention. It is this deficit which I will endeavour to remedy in 
this study.
The realisation that this important aspect of British public health had attracted so little 
attention from medical historians came about while I began to investigate the original 
focus of this thesis -  the medical examination procedures and restriction of 
immigration at the ports in the period between 1881 (the beginning of large-scale East 
European migration) and 1905 (the passing of the Aliens Act, Britain’s first 
immigration law). Historians of late-nineteenth-century immigration into Britain^ 
have tended to concentrate more specifically on the economic effects, responses, and 
restrictions to immigration. There has been an increasing amount of scholarship 
addressing issues of immigration and health in Britain in this period, but these studies 
have focused on the health of immigrants after arrival and during residency in Britain. 
Historians such as Lara Marks and Bernard Harris have examined comparative infant 
mortality rates, life expectancy and instances of disease.^ However, these studies have 
not been concerned with the medical inspection of immigrants as they arrived into 
British ports or how perceptions of risk, relating to immigration, affected existing 
practices in port prophylaxis. Studies relating to the medical reception and infectious 
disease screening of large numbers of migrants and refugees have been undertaken in
G. Aldennann and C. Holmes, Outsiders and Outcasts - Essays in Honour o f  William J. Fishman,  
(London: Gerald Duckwortli & Co, 1993); G. Aldermann, London ,/ewry and London Politics 1889- 
1986, (London; Routledge, 1989); K. Collins, Second City Jewry: The Jews o f  G lasgow in the o f
Expansion, 1790-1919,  edn., (Glasgow: Scottish Jewish Archives, 1990); Cecil Bloom, 'The 
Politics o f  Immigration, 1881-1905’, Jewish Historical Studies -  Transactions o f  the Jewish Historical  
Society o f  England, vol. xxxiii, (1992-1994), 187-214; D. Feldman, Englishmen and Jews: Social 
Relations and Political Culture 1840-1914,  (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994); .LA. Garrard, The 
Efiglish and Immigration 1880-1910,  (London: 1971); L. Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England  
1870-1914,  (London: 1960); C. Holmes, John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society 1871- 
1971, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988); P. Panayi, Immigration, Ethnicity, and Racism in Britain 
J 8I5-I945 ,  (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994); K, Lmnn (Ed.). Hosts, Immigrants and  
Minorities: Historical Responses to N ewcom ers in British Society, 1870-1914, (Folkestone: Dawson.  
1980); Aubrey Newman (Ed.), The Jewish East End, 1840-1939, (London: .Icwish Historical Socictx' ot 
England, 1981)
W. Ernst and B. Harris, Race, Science and  Medicine, 1700-1960, (London: Routletlge. 1999); H 
Harris, ‘Anti-Alienism, Health and Social Reform in L.ate Victorian and Edwardian Britain', Patterns 
of Prejudice  ( 1997), 3-34; L. Marks, ‘Ethnicity, Religion and Health Care', Socicd History o f  Medicine  
. ( I 99 I ), 123-128; L. .Marks and M. Worboys, Migrants. Minorities and H adth  - Historical and  
Coniempona-y Studies, (t.ondon: Routledge, 2000).
relation to United States public health. Recognising a conspicuous lack in the 
equivalent British history, 1 endeavoured to take up the task embarked upon by 
various historians of American immigration who have examined medical reactions to 
immigration in ports such as New York.^ In the United States medicine and public 
health at the ports were closely linked with the policies and ideologies of immigration. 
As Alan Ki'aut remarked, ‘reliance on quarantine, coupled with an innate distrust of 
foreigners, suggested to the native-born that regulation of immigration was crucial to 
safeguarding the health of the nation’.^  Similarly, Howard Markel has written that 
immigration and medical restrictions at United States ports were reflections of both 
medical and nativistic concerns.
In many respects, the movement to restrict immigration to the United States 
during this period was a call for quarantine in its broadest sense against 
undesirable immigrants. The reasons for such a call were not always 
specifically stated using the language of disease and medicine, but its results 
were remarkably similar to the medieval quarantines against plague;
Foreigners perceived to be dangerous to the community were prevented from 
entry.
Although 1 had not expected British responses to immigration to exactly mirror those 
in the United States, which received over ten times more migrants than settled in 
Britain, 1 anticipated a similar reaction more comparable with the scale of 
immigration in Britain.
Kraut, Silent Travelers', Kraut, ‘l^lagiie.s and Prejudice: Nativisni’s Construction of iJiscasc in 
Nineteenth- and Twentieth -  Century N ew  York City’, Rosncr (Ed.) Hives o f  Sickness: Public Heolth 
and Epidemics in N ew York City, (N ew  Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 65-90; A. E. Birn. 
‘Six Seconds Per Eyelid: The Medical Inspection o f  Immigrants at Ellis Island, 1892 -1 9 1 4 ' ,  Dynamis  
, ( 1997), 281-316.; D. Hoerder and H. Rdssler, Distant Magnets: Expectations and Realities in the 
Immigration Experience !840-1930,  (New York: Holmes & Meire Publishers, Inc., 1993); H, Markel, 
‘Cholera, Quarantines, and Immigration Restriction: The View from Johns Hopkins, 1892', Bulletin o f  
the History o f  Medicine  (1993), 691-695; H. Markel, ‘"Knocking out the Cholera": Cholera, Class, and 
Quarantines in New York City, I 892 ’, Bulletin o f  the History o f  Medicine  ( 1995). 420-457; H.
Markel, Quarantine! East European Jewish Immigrants and the New York City Epidemics o f  1892, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); H. Markel, and A. M. Stern, ‘All Quiet on the 
Third Coast: Medical Inspections o f  Immigrants in Michigan', Public Health Reports. ( 1999), 178- 
I 82; J. Parascandola, ‘Doctors at the Gate; PHS at Ellis Island', Public Hccdth Reports. i 1998). 8 V86;  
('.E. Rosenberg, The Cholera Years - The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866. W'lih a Ne\\
I-or ward edn., (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1987); R.T. Solis-Cohen, ‘ i'he Exclusion ol 
Aliens Prom the United States for Physical Defects’, Bulletin of the History o f  Medicine.  ( 1947 ). 1 ^
50.
Kraut, Silent Travelers, p. .30.
' Markel. Qma'antine!. p, 5.
However, I was initially dismayed to discover that only a relatively small amount of 
the vigorous debate surrounding immigration to Britain in the very last years of the 
nineteenth century was medical in content. The highly medicalised response to 
immigration in the United States and the inclusion in the British Aliens Act of a 
clause prohibiting entry to immigrants who ‘owing to any disease or infirmity were 
likely to become a charge upon the rates or otherwise a detriment to the public’, 
suggested that a medical panic had arisen in Britain in response to immigration. This 
did not appear to have been the ease. It was clear, through numerous articles in The 
Times, British Medical Journal, and Lancet, for instance, that there had been concerns 
about the role of immigration in the importation of cholera and other infectious 
diseases. The arrival of ‘Russian Jew s’, these publications declared in unison 
‘constituted a danger to public health’.' * Yet, these concerns were not echoed in 
parliamentary debates nor were they central to the demands of anti-immigration 
political groups. The cartoon in Punch, while indicating popular fears directly related 
to immigration and disease, also appears to be relatively atypical, and is the only 
example of such commentary in the magazine.
Unlike in Amer ica  the recept ion and transmigration across Britain of  thousands  of  
migrants in the per iod 1881-1905 was not answered with a call for strictly enforced 
medical  inspections or quarant ines  at the ports. The relative lack o f  medical  rhetoric 
in ant i -immigrat ion campaigns ,  particularly when immigrants  were clearly not 
d isassociated from disease importation,  suggested (hat something else was going on at 
the ports in relation to disease prevention.  It was at this point that it became  clear that 
there was very little writ ten about the policies and practices which operated to prevent  
the importat ion of  infect ious diseases at the ports; and that the ques tions  which 
needed to be asked were  not so much  about the medical restriction of  immigration,  
nor whether  there was a medical panic,  but what restrictions where in place more 
general ly for the prevent ion of  imported infections?
The focus o f  the thesis was gradual ly shifting from an investigation singularly 
concerned with the medical  inspection and restriction of  immigranis tow ai d a moie
’' /.f/z/ff'C l-cb. IS. 1X93. p. 375: see al.su. tor example, 'Dcsiiimc .lc\w'. .Scpi. 17. 1SX7.|1 suu;
/>.t/7. .Scpi. 1(1 Oci. 15. 1X 92 ;‘The Immigration o t  UiKlosirahIc . Mi e n s ' . / C l / , / ,  .\ug 22. I 9 0  g p I M 
I. l i m e s .  N o w  6,  1901 .  p. 121; ‘Trachoma Among Aliens'. I .ai ieci ,  .Itme v  1905,  p. I 53s.
general examination of port prophylaxis in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
What procedures were in place for the medical reception of vessels arriving from 
around the world into British ports? What role did the traditional method of infectious 
disease prevention -  quarantine -  play in late nineteenth century ports? And how did 
alternative systems work? The answers to these questions would help to answer the 
question I had initially posed -  why was immigration not responded to in Britain with 
the same medical rhetoric of exclusion as in America?
Suspecting, therefore, that immigration control was not as central a motivation in 
British port health practice and administration as it evidently was in the United States, 
it was necessary to examine what factors had influenced the development of British 
public health structures at the ports. Anne Hardy has argued, in her 1993 article for 
Medical History, ‘Cholera, Quarantine, and the English Preventive System, 1850- 
1895’, that in the final decades of the nineteenth century a system of infectious 
disease prevention was established at the ports based on the sanitary system of public 
health. This system, which differed from methods of disease prevention at European 
and American ports, was the Port Sanitary System, established under the 1872 Public 
Health Act. It was also called the 'English system’. Although it was called the 
‘English system’ the term also applied to Scotland and Wales. It differed from other 
methods of port infectious disease control by taking the monitoring and isolation of 
infectious cases away from the port (which I have called sanitary surveillance), 
through its reliance on the sanitary condition ol' the ports, as well as its 
interdependence with inland sanitary districts.'^ It was developed with the dual motive 
of preventing the introduction and spread of cholera, which had been pandemic in 
Europe in 1830-2, 1847-9, 1853-4, 1865-6, 1873, 1 884 and 1892-3, and to provide an 
alternative to quarantine, which had proved incompatible with Britain’s political and 
economic commitment to free trade. The success of this system -  the Port Sanitary 
System -  was, Hardy explained, 'widely admired by contemporaries', and was 
responsible, in addition to the general sanitary improvement of British towns, for 
'holding repeated cholera attacks at bay’. S h e  argued that (he success and 
■professional cohesion' of (he sanitary system at the ports, led to 'public
' fur conleinc)(irai'\ ikc ol this icrin see. for example. W, (' iilimgndge. The .Milrnx' I eel mes. On 
( hiaiMiiime". Pail II. BMJ, March 20. IS97. p. 71 V 
See ( 'h.iptei ( )iie 
I i.uih ■( 'hiilei.i', r 20S
complacency’, despite greater awareness, about repeat attacks of cholera in the 
closing decades of the nineteenth century. This reflected a public ‘confidence in the 
sanitary service’ even though the disease remained of grave concern to medical 
officers.'"’ By the 1880s this concern about a possible return of cholera was beginning 
to be linked in the medical press to the large number of migrants who passed through 
British ports each year, and calls were made to provide special arrangements for the 
arrival of migrant vessels. Hardy’s article runs for only nineteen pages and covers a 
period of nearly fifty years. She therefore only manages to draw brief attention to the 
connection that was made between migration and disease at the ports, and similarly, 
outlines only the major developments in the creation, and consequences of the 
‘English System’. However, she emphasises the belief in and assertion of security 
provided by the Port Sanitary System. This is a significant point which will be 
developed and analysed in this thesis.
Before the introduction of the ‘English system’, quarantine was employed in response 
to certain imported diseases. It was imposed in European and American ports until the 
end of the nineteenth century, and was based on the principle of complete non- 
intercourse with infected cases. This extended to anyone or anything which had 
contact with the disease. Any vessel which had a case of infection on board or had 
been in contact with an infected person or place was prohibited on arrival at a port 
from any contact with the shore. The period of non-intercourse varied from the 
original forty days -  from where the word quarantine originates -  to a period of 
around five days at the end of the century.
From early in the century the severity of quarantine restrictions was berated in Britain 
as ‘anti-commercial, anti-social, and anti-Christian’.'^ ’ By the 1870s quarantine was 
widely opposed primarily for economic reasons - it was ‘regarded as a mere irrational 
derangement of com merce’.'^ It was also opposed on the basis that it did not appear 
to prevent disease, but rather encouraged its spread. Furthermore, it was argued that 
the diseases it was directed at were not contagious and therefore could not be 
prevented by the physical separation of quarantine. The ‘English system', on the othci'
iliui . [). .BvV
I  I t i i i s d i i l .  1 X 2 5 ,  \ , i ]  1 1 , p , 9 9  V  q i i o k s i  1 1 1 , - \ t c l ) i u i ; i l ( . l ,  ' T h e  I l i s i u i  \  o i  ( J u a i  a n i  i i i i . ' ' .  p  2 ( i
It.MJ. ( X t  X, j xs 'g  p “ “ X
hand, was heralded as a more  ‘ra l ional ’ approach to the problem of imported 
infectious disease. It was  argued that
quarantine is condemned not merely, and not ehiefly, because it is injurious to 
trade, but because it has been proved again and again, in almost every country 
which has resorted to it, to be not only useless but mischievous, whereas the 
system of medical inspection and isolation [the ‘English system’] has been 
found almost uniformly effective.'^
Despite these arguments, what emerges from a closer examination of the development 
of the ‘English system’ is that it was not, as Hardy indicated, a mere extension of the 
internal sanitary system. Nor, as most previous scholarship has indicated, was 
quarantine simply discarded with the emergence of a more politically and 
economically exigent system. In chapter one I discuss the establishment of the Port 
Sanitary Authority and its relationship with quarantine. Much of the chapter is 
devoted to outlining the administration, personnel, and particular duties of the two 
authorities. It serves to provide the structural background of infectious disease 
prevention at the ports, which, while elaborated in other parts of the dissertation, sets 
the scene for later chapters, and adds to previous scholarship relating to late 
nineteenth century port health. Slight variations occurred in the administration of the 
Port Sanitary Authority in England and Wales, and in Scotland. However, quarantine 
was applied under the same law throughout the kingdom, and the Port Sanitary 
Authority in Scotland was based on the same principles that were applied to the 
relevant Public Health Acts of England and Wales. While 1 draw upon examples from 
individual ports, this thesis represents a national approach to the history of port health. 
Variations will doubtless appear in more detailed local studies.
Quarant ine regula tions  remained on the statute books  until 1896 and retained a 
s ignificant inPuence over  the operat ion o f  port health until the end of  the century.  Yet. 
throughout  the h is toriography of  public health and infectious disease prevention in 
Britain there is a re sounding unanimity  about British opposi tion to quarant ine from 
the early nineteenth century.' '^ This is echoed in many contemporary  sources."" Why
BMJ. May 23, IXS3. p. iOUX. 
See huilnole .5.
then did quarantine remain for so long on the statute books when there was, as Hardy 
points out, such official and public support for the ‘English System”? And, to what 
extent did the mere legal retention of quarantine actually impact upon day to day 
practices at the ports? Quarantine represented a principle of intervention and 
exclusion that was rejected both by the British economic and political commitment to 
free trade, as well as by the new ‘rational’ system of sanitary inspection. The 
contemporary term, the ‘English system’, defined the sanitary system of disease 
prevention at the ports as something particular to Britain, as something which could 
be defined merely by reference to England. Quarantine, on the other hand could more 
easily be universally applied. This reflects the suggestion made by historians such as 
Erwin Ackerknecht and George Rosen that the heavy-handed intervention of 
quarantine corresponded to the authoritarian political instincts maintained on the 
Continent, while sanitation conformed with the liberalism of Britain.
Understanding the reasons behind the retention of the unpopular and seemingly 
redundant quarantine system in Britain exposes the particular circumstances of the 
ports which distinguished their methods, policies and theoretical background to 
disease prevention, from the public health authorities inland. The particular location 
of the ports geographically and in relation to British political and economic interests 
differentiated them from the practical and theoretical models of public health inland 
and placed their development on a slightly divergent trajectory. It was these 
differences which allowed for the anomaly of retaining, even minimally, what was 
almost unanimously referred to in Britain as the ‘antiquated’ and 'unnecessary’ 
system of quarantine. Quarantine Officers and the Port Sanitary Authority were 
Britannia in the Punch cartoon - the gatekeepers of the internal public health system, 
ensuring that no diseases were introduced from beyond British shores. What this 
meant was that the systems which operated at the ports were as much outward, as
E'or example. Report on the Mortality  o f  Cholera in England, IH4H-49, (London: HMSO, 1852). p. 
c.; Lancet, Sept, 16, 1882, p. 473; Tinie.s, .Tune 2, 1885, p. 9; Med. Times A Gaz..  .1 une 20. I 885. p. 820: 
.lohn Chapman, Cholera Curable: A Denwnstration o f  the Cattses, Nott-Cotttagiottsttess at\d Successful  
Treatment o f  the Disease, (t.ondon: .1, & A. Churchill. I 885); Latieet, I-eh. 20. I 886. p. 367; RM4. Oct 
8, I 887. p. 778; John Sykes, Publie Health Problems,  (London: Waller Scolt. Ltd.. 1892). pp. 171 I 85: 
William Collingridge. ‘Practical Points in the Hygiene ot Ships, and Qiiaraniinc', Ship Mastci s Soi ici\.  
Lotuloti. .Li. ( 1894).
Opposition to quarantine from the lieginning o f  the nineteenth century is discussed in Chapter ( )ne 
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inward looking. While disease prevention relied upon Ihe health and conditions of 
people and the environment within the nation, so that any imported disease which did 
penetrate the ‘first line of defence’ would be less likely to spread inland, it was also 
dependant upon the health of ports and cities beyond Britain. With the arrival and 
departure of vessels from around the world, the prevention of infectious disease at the 
ports - particularly the traditionally ‘quarantineable’ diseases of plague, yellow fever 
and cholera - was essentially an international issue. It required international 
communication and a level of internationally standard or recognised methods of 
prevention. Port prophylaxis, while developed and administered domestically by 
British trained medical practitioners, lawyers, politicians, clerks and so on, could not 
be done entirely intramuraily. As ships which departed British ports would soon dock 
in a foreign port, or vice versa, it was necessary to know not only of the presence of 
infectious disease in any port but also the method by which an attempt had been made 
to arrest its progress.
This tension between conditions outside and inside the country, of foreign ports and 
domestic ones, and of foreign people and foreign vessels confronting British 
practices, is a central theme of this thesis. The interaction between British agendas, 
medical theories and practices, and the policies, demands and perceptions of other 
countries has become a primary component of this study. Unlike other spheres of 
medical practice and government policy where an awareness of international affairs 
was useful, but not essential, the ports, as the geographic and often political meeting 
point between foreign and domestic, were inextricably linked to issues of disease 
control beyond British shores. It is for this reason that, although the Port Sanitary 
System was closely connected with the internal sanitary system, it occupies a different 
place in the history of public health in Britain.
To elaborate this point and to explain the most  significant aspects of  this di fference 
between the internal and port sanitary systems,  I have focused primarily,  in this thesis, 
on cholera. Al though the particular catalytic effect of  cholera on nineteenth century 
society has been quest ioned by historians such as C’haries Rosenberg"'  it was.  as 
Richard Thorne  Thorne ,  Medical Off icer to the Local Cîovernment Boartl, said in 
18HS 'very int imately associated with the story of progress in the depar tment  o f  public
health and of sanitary medicine’."'' Richard Evans argues that in Hamburg ‘the shock 
of cholera in 1892 ... generated massive social pressures lor social and political 
reform’. T h e  same was not the case in Britain, which avoided any significant 
invasion of the disease in 1892. Nonetheless it did have some important implications. 
Its effect at the ports was particularly apparent.
Infectious diseases were divided into two categories in port prevention. The first 
category referred to ‘exotic’ diseases, also called ‘exoteric’,w h i c h  referred 
specifically to plague and yellow fever. These diseases originated outside Britain and 
could only occur when imported. Quarantine was the traditionally applied method of 
prophylaxis when there was a risk of ‘exotic’ disease being imported. The other 
category of disease was ‘indigenous’ disease, which was also called ‘esoteric’ disease. 
These were diseases which were endemic to Britain, ‘in other words, which are 
commonly about everywhere, varying simply according to the health for the time 
being of the neighbourhood’.^  ^They included, for example, smallpox, typhoid, and 
scarlet fever. These diseases were not traditionally prevented by quarantine measures. 
Although cases of smallpox or scarlet fever, for instance, could be brought on vessels 
into British ports and consequently spread throughout British towns and cities, they 
continued to be categorised as ‘indigenous’ diseases. The terminology which was 
used to delineate the categories varies in contemporary texts. Throughout this thesis I 
will use the terms ‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’. I will also employ the terms 
Tjuaranlincable’ and ‘non-quarantineable’, which were used by contemporaries in 
reference to the distinct methods of prevention used for the two categories of disease 
at the ports.
Cholera, because it only occurred in Britain when imported, was an ‘exotic’ disease. 
The way it was approached politically and medically therefore was different from 
diseases which were deemed ‘indigenous’. It penetrated the ‘lust line of defence' m 
numerous epidemics during the nineteenth century, ravaging British towns and cities.
t ’. Rosunlicrg, ‘C'luilera in Ninetcentli C'en tin y lùinipe: .A 'I'nol (or .Social aiui Economic , \n a l \ s i s ‘, 
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The local public health authorities were at this stage responsible for the control and 
treatment of the disease. Yet prevention of cholera epidemics was initially always the 
task of the port authorities, whose duty it was to hinder the disease from progressing 
inland from the ports. Plague and yellow fever were also categorised as ‘exotie’ 
diseases, and were, as such, traditionally associated with quarantine. However, in the 
period after the introduction of the Port Sanitary Authority and before the repeal in 
1896 of the Quarantine Act of 1825, cholera was the only ‘exotic’ disease to have 
threatened invasion o f Britain. Before the Port Sanitary Authority was created, 
prevention of ‘exotic’ diseases at the ports was solely under the administration of 
quarantine. Yet, once the Port Sanitary Authority was established, responsibility for 
preventing the introduction of cholera was shared between the two systems. This was 
the result of both ambiguities in the law and the external demands of other maritime 
nations. The latter were voiced at the International Sanitary Conferences, ten of which 
were held between 1851 and the turn of the twentieth century. Although yellow fever 
and plague were discussed at the conferences, particularly with reference to the 
Mecca pilgrimages and after 1900, the primary focus of the conferences was cholera 
and the appropriate methods which should be adopted in order to control its spread. 
This generally amounted to a discussion about quarantine. As W.F. Bynum remarked,
despite the title of the series of eonferences, the first seven or eight could have 
been called International Quarantine Conferences, as they were primarily 
concerned with quarantine, and overwhelmingly about cholera.
Although these conferences have been extensively reviewed by Norman Howard- 
.lones in a series of artielcs for the WHO Clironiclo'^ and arc the subject of other 
historians’ work, 1 discuss them, in chapter two, from the particular perspective of the 
British and the development and application of preventive systems in British ports. In 
particular I address the presentation of British medical theories of cholera aetiology as 
they applied to the ports. These theories, while not always consistent with general
- ilkd.
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trends in British disease theory,'" were particularly applied in relation to the economic 
and political exigencies of the ports as essential mechanisms within the machinery of 
imperial trade. In this chapter I examine the relation between British trade and 
imperial interests and the medical theories of disease aetiology which supported 
British policy regarding infectious disease prevention at the ports. These interests and 
disease theories, maintained by British, and later Anglo-Indian,^' delegates to the 
eonferences identified and defined the ‘English system’ as particularly British. It was 
these interests and theories which supported British opposition to quarantine, and 
which separated it from the majority of other nations at the conferences. I propose to 
examine how European responses to the singularity of British methods of port 
prophylaxis, within international discussion and the necessity of international 
conformity in respect of disease prevention, influenced the maintenance of quarantine 
in Britain. As Evans wrote, ‘no system of rule is ever free from contradictions; nor 
has any capitalist society, not even that of Victorian England, ever existed in isolation 
from the forces of the world economy and the international diplomacy of the states 
surrounding it’.
Another reason why I place a particular importance on cholera, although obviously 
other diseases were cause for concern at the ports, is because it played a particular 
role in immigrants becoming a growing focus of port health. Although there had been 
some attention to immigrants as disease carriers earlier in the century, emphasis on 
the entry of this particular group into the ports massively increased during the 1892 
cholera epidemic. In chapter three I examine responses to the perception of 
immigrants as a primary factor in the spread of cholera from Eastern to Western 
Europe and America. Britain responded by implementing inspection methods 
specifically focused on steerage class migrants, which, as was commented outside 
Britain at the time, constituted in some ways a level of immigration restriction. This 
chapter links the first two chapters which concentrate entirely on the Port Sanitary 
Authority and Quarantine, with the final two chapters which focus on the 
development of medical restrictions to immigration at the ports. The temporary
Becll’ellows: Science and Politic.s in llic Refutation o f  Koch's itacierial Theoi \ <il C'lutleia', liiillcnn <>i 
the History o f  MeJicituo 74, (2000), 67 I -707.
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measures which were put in place to monitor and prevent cholera among immigrants 
in 1892 continued until 1895 but had far reaching implications. Yet, even though 
immigrants were seen as a source of infection, the ‘proper’ implementation of a 
tightly operating and efficient sanitary system was all that was deemed necessary to 
protect British public health from this ‘alien menace’. A Justice of the Peace wrote an 
article for the very respectable Gentleman's Magazine in 1892, in which he 
highlighted the popular confidence attached to the ‘English system’.
Another question closely connected with the cholera epidemics, and 
demanding attention, is that of the immigration of foreign pauper aliens. With 
a relaxation of the strict rules enforced during the cholera visitation the danger 
will return in full force, and the crowding together of these foreigners, with 
their dirty habits and horror of soap and water, in our large towns, especially 
in London, increases the risk of cholera, and most certainly intensifies the 
attack when it com es.... A better argument in favour of rigorous sanitary 
inspection cannot be desired. W ithout giving further details the writer trusts 
that he has proved this case in support of preventive measures, and that his 
readers are satisfied beyond doubt that a proper system of sanitary precautions, 
worked by capable medical officers who are neither hampered by want of 
means nor thwarted by conflicting authority, can successfully prevent the 
importation of cholera from foreign countries.''
How far does the w riter’s proposition go toward explaining British attitudes to the 
medical restriction of immigration? Did public confidence in the port sanitary system, 
re-enforced by Britain’s virtual avoidance of cholera in 1892, reduce demands for a 
restriction of immigration on medical grounds?
Britain had been highly critical of the European and American application of 
quarantine during the epidemic, particularly the imposition of twenty-days quarantine 
on all immigrant vessels arriving in New York. Yet, despite British criticism about 
preventive methods in New York during 1892, medical inspection policies for 
immigrants at American ports were beginning to draw the attention of Medical 
Officers' and government departments in Britain. In chapter four I discuss British
attitudes toward American immigration policy and practice. The international 
obligations and influences on the ports whieh are examined in chapter two in relation 
to quarantine and the Port Sanitary System, are also examined in chapter four. In this 
chapter 1 discuss the influences of American port immigration controls on the 
introduction of medical restrictions to immigration in Britain. The majority of 
migrants who entered British ports were what is referred to as transmigrants. That is, 
they transited in Britain on their journey west to America. Scrupulous American 
medical inspections and application of the right to refuse entry had particular 
ramifications in Britain. This was primarily because migrants who were rejected by 
American immigration officers could be returned to British ports. Others also 
temporarily remained in Britain en route to America in order to seek medical attention 
for ailments which would prevent entry into the United States.
The number of references which were made to the United States in discussions about 
the health of migrants in Britain indicates that American port immigration controls 
were a major factor in the inclusion of medical restrictions in the 1905 Aliens Act.
The events which led to the passing o f  the Act are the subject of  chapter  five, as well  
as how the clauses  relat ing to medieal  inspeetions at the ports were implemented once 
the Act came into operat ion in 1906. After  the Act was passed,  the Port Sani tary 
Authori ty took on the additional role o f  immigrat ion medical inspection and ensured 
its role as sole authori ty responsible for the prevention of  infectious diseases  at the 
ports. Economic concerns  were the pr imary impetus to the final introduction of  
Britain's  first immigrat ion Act, and al though par liamentary debates,  ant i -immigrat ion 
propaganda,  and invest igat ions into immigrat ion all centred around its economic  
consequences,  what  medical  concerns  were voiced referred, in general,  to the effects 
and example  of Amer ican  policy. Yet, as the author of  the 1892 Geiuictttan's 
Magazine article explained,  it was bel ieved that 'proper  sanitary precaut ions '  were 
adequate to prevent  impor ted disease,  whatever  the source. I 'he opinions  of  the 
medieal professionals who gave evidence to the Royal Commiss ion on Alien 
Immigrat ion in 1903 will be examined to determine whether the desire o f  the anti- 
alienists to restrict immigrants on medical grounds was shared by the pi'ofession. I low 
did .Medical Officers of  Health respond to these e.xclusioiiai'v m e a s u r e s ,  w hich e c h o e d  
the lesii' ictions and hea\-y-handed intervention of i |uarantine ? Was the medical
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re s l r id ion o f  immigration so ciiiTcrenl lo (he imposit ions of  quarantine,  and how was 
it integrated into the sanitary sys tem at the ports?
As the Aliens Act was introduced primarily in response to the immigration of East- 
European Jews anti-Semitism was, not surprisingly, also a conspicuous element of the 
anti-immigration campaign. Ideas of race and disease were certainly a component of 
the debate, and it is not possible to discuss the introduction of the Aliens Act without 
reference to anti-Semitic motivations. The Punch cartoon I have used at the beginning 
of this thesis -  which depicts obviously racially stereotyped Jews crowded behind the 
figure of cholera - immediately identifies the association which was drawn at the time 
between Jewish migrants and disease. Yet, although anti-Semitism was a conspicuous 
element in the anti-Alien debate generally, and was particularly apparent in 
discussions focused upon the East End of London, it was not as central to the medical 
discourse within these debates. The cartoon in Punch, while indicating an element of 
racial prejudice in ideas of disease importation is, surprisingly, unrepresentative of 
British responses to the public health threat posed by migrants. Certain diseases were 
identified particularly with Jewish migrants, however, these associations were less 
inspired than other parts of the debate by anti-Semitism specifically. I am aware that 
these prejudices were an important aspect of the general call to restrict immigration in 
this period, but in my more focused study on the introduction of medical restrictions 
to immigration, I have avoided, for these reasons, participating in much discourse 
about nineteenth century British anti-Semitism. Not only would I not do it justice 
within a study which is primarily focused on developments in port health, but 1 also 
feel that it is a subject which has already been competently addressed.'’
This  thesis in no way represents a comprehensive  analysis of port health in the late 
nineteenth century,  but examines  the central development  of the Port Sanitary 
Authori ty as the 'first line o f  de fence ’ in the prevention o f  imported infectious 
disease. I have not examined the additional duties undertaken by the authority,  such as 
the sanitary inspection of  the ports with regard to houseboats and barges,  nuisances.
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sewerage outpours and so on. These duties, while an essential component of the 
‘English system’ were primarily the responsibility of the Port Sanitary Officer, as 
opposed to the Port Medical Officer, who is a focus of this study. Similarly, I have not 
explored the extensive examination and disinfection of rags, livestock and produce, 
which constituted a large amount of their work. Similar debates and struggles to those 
concerned with human quarantine occurred in respect of animal inspection and 
quarantine. Quarantine for animals was deemed more desirable than it was for 
humans and was more strongly supported by veterinarians than human quarantine was 
by physicians. While presenting many interesting parallels and contrasts, particularly 
with regard to aetiological theories of infectious diseases, animal quarantine is beyond 
the scope of this thesis and is not discussed in reference to human q u a ra n tin e .T h e  
operation of the port and floating hospitals, while discussed briefly, has not been 
given a great deal of attention. Furthermore the separate operation of the seamen’s 
hospital, discussed by G.C. Cook,^^ and naval health measures have been avoided. 
This study is more specifically concerned with the driving forces behind the 
development of the Port Sanitary Authority, including its interaction with quarantine, 
and the introduction of medical restrictions to immigration. Although the inquiry is 
national, and I discuss various ports such as Liverpool, Glasgow, Hull and 
Southampton, I have concentrated particularly on London partly due to the sources 
available to me and also because it was the largest and most international port in 
Britain. It was also the focus of the anti-alien campaign.
riie primary sources that inform this study are many. They include; medical and 
medical society journals; newspapers; the annual and monthly reports of Medical 
Officers of Health and the Local Government Board; contemporary treatises and 
pamphlets; parliamentary papers and debates; and the reports of specially 
commissioned investigations. Letters and memoranda from and between government 
departments have been extensively used to complement official documents. The 
archives of the Poor Jew s’ Temporary Shelter and the Board of Guardians of British 
Jews provide a balance with anti-immigration texts and a number of individual 
government reports concerned with immigration and transmigration. Personal letters
Scini!l.\in m British Sociciw I B 7 6 - (Lnndnii; Iklwarti Ariioki, 1979); Ikdiik's. M<isc[ih 
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from Richard Thorne Thorne at the 1885 International Sanitary Conference have been 
used in conjunction with official, press, and other personal accounts of the 
conference. One of the most utilised sources is the rarely examined minutes, letters 
and papers of the Port Sanitary Committee, which oversaw the administration of the 
Port Sanitary Authority. This enormous, uncatalogued archive at the Corporation of 
London Records Office includes letters between the Committee and government 
departments, charitable institutions, Jewish groups, shipping companies, and 
embassies and consuls. It has allowed an insight into the operation of the Port 
Sanitary Authority which has enabled me to reveal the particular professional interests 
of the Port Medical Officers of Health, as well as the recondite relationship between 
the Authority and the quarantine service in the period 1872 to 1896.
This thesis examines the way the ‘English System’ of disease prevention advanced 
and supported the commercial interests of the ports, while at the same time securing 
the public health. British opposition to exclusionary practices at the ports, motivated 
primarily by commercial concerns and validated by theories of infectious disease 
aetiology, is a central theme; as is the examination of external influences on the 
development of policy and practice at British domestic ports. The ‘exotic’ disease 
cholera is also a focus of this study. I will examine both the amalgam and the conflict 
hetween external and internal factors as a primary influence in the way port health 
was shaped during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. These factors arc 
summarised in the table below which is divided under the headings ‘domestic’ and 
‘foreign’.
TA B LE  I:
FOREIGN DOMESTIC
‘Exotic’ Disease -  cholera, yellow fever, 
plague
‘Indigenous’ Disease -  smallpox, scarlet 
fever, typhus, trachoma etc
Quarantine -  concerned only with 
‘exotic’ disease; based on the condition 
of foreign ports; supported by the 
majority of states represented at the 
International Sanitary Conferences of the 
nineteenth century -  except Britain; 
(contagion)
Port Sanitary Authority -  concerned 
only with ‘indigenous’ disease (prior to 
1896); reliant upon domestic sanitary 
conditions and co-operation with internal 
sanitary authorities; (anticontagion)
Immigrants Native Population
Essentially this thesis is a discussion about the interaction of these factors. It examines 
the development of the Port Sanitary Authority within established systems of disease 
prevention at the ports and the development and import of ideas which encouraged the 
introduction of medical restrictions to immigration as one feature of disease 
prevention in late nineteenth century Britain. Ports were the focus of international 
commerce, the movement of large numbers of people, and the transmission of 
infectious diseases. The protection of political, commercial, and public health 
interests, both nationally and internationally, converged at the ports. This littoral 
meeting place is the central focus of this thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE: ‘The First Line of D efense...’
Throughout the nineteenth century quarantine was an issue which roused an enormous 
amount of debate and discussion. It was closely associated with trade and the empire 
and with the contentious medical theories of contagion and anti-contagion. It also 
through the century distinguished Britain from other Continental powers by the 
strength and consistency of the opposition it invited. The policy of isolation and 
exclusion which quarantine demanded - prohibiting people and goods on board 
infected vessels from any intercourse with the shore for up to thirty days' - was 
declared to be in conflict with British liberal principles.
England imposes no restrictions upon intercourse between one and another 
community -  town and town, nation and nation...She would dispense, in land 
and sea traffic alike, with those detentions known as quarantines, having found 
them in practice to result rather in hazardous concealments and evasions than 
in any effectual exclusion of [disease].^
The apparent inability of quarantine to prevent the importation of disease and its 
obvious interference with maritime trade led to a general and growing resistance 
towards it, which was manifest from the early decades of the century through to the 
last.
More sympathetic to British requirements was what hecame known as the ‘English 
System’ of disease prevention, administered by the Port Sanitary .Authority. This 
system, established in 1872, required that only those ships with \ isihle signs of 
disease on hoard, as determined by a medical inspector, should be disinfected, the sick 
removed to an isolation hospital, and other crew and passengers who displayed no 
symptoms of disease be monitored after disembarkation. Unlike under the quarantine 
system. Bills of Health' (upon which pratique, or freedom of mo\cment was granted)
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were issued on the basis of the presence of disease on board a vessel, rather than on 
the presence of disease in the port horn which it had last departed. The English 
System also, importantly, combined the medical and sanitary regulation of shipping 
with ‘internal’ sanitary regulations -  urban and rural public health. Within an ever- 
developing public health system, professional groups and particular expertise were 
formed. The most important for the prevention of imported infectious disease were 
the Port Sanitary Authority and the Port Medical Officers of Health. Yet until 1872 
quarantine had been the only official nation-wide system of prevention and regulation 
for the import of infectious disease. Although often widely arraigned both for its 
inability to check the spread of disease, and for the costly interruptions it inflicted on 
maritime trade, quarantine remained in the statute books and continued to be 
practised, albeit rarely, for over twenty years after the establishment of the Port 
Sanitary Authority - this apparently favourable system for preventing the importation 
and spread of infectious disease.
Quarantine in the nineteenth century
As contemporary commentators insisted, before embarking on any discussion of 
quarantine systems, the term must be properly defined. Indiscriminate usage of the 
word can he, we are told, troublesome. As an account in The Practitioner of 1873 
suggests, 'the evil arising from this growing loose use of a defined term was very 
aptly illustrated at the discussion of the Epidemiological Society; for the vague and 
inaccurate use of the word quarantine at the commencement of the discussion caused 
a loss of time which could not he recovered’. ’
Two  definitions from the late nineteenth century should serve this purpose. The first 
was written in 1873, immediately following the estahlishment of the Port Sanitary 
Authority, and provides the more technical meaning of quarantine; while the second, 
written immediately following the repeal of the Quarantine Act, defines qutiranlinc in 
contrast to the English System, as less discriminating and less 'scientific'.
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Quarantine is a technical term having a precise well understood definition, and 
it is desirable that it should be limited to its proper meaning. Quarantine, the 
noun, according to the last edition of Websters, signifies -  ‘specifically, the 
term, originally of forty days, but now of undetermined length, during which a 
ship arriving in port, and suspected of being infected with a malignant, 
contagious disease, is obliged to forebear all intercourse with the shore; hence, 
restraint or inhibition of intercourse to which a ship is subjected, on the 
presumption that she may be infected’. Quarantine, the verb, according to the 
same authority signifies -  ‘to prohibit from intercourse with the shore, to 
compel to remain at a distance, as a ship from the shore when suspected of 
having contagious disease’.^
[Quarantine comprises] ...preventative measures designed to prevent the 
importation of disease into a country by means of maritime commerce, it may 
be defined as ‘the enforced detention and segregation of vessels arriving in a 
port, together with all persons and things on board, believed to be infected 
with the poison of certain epidemic diseases for specific periods’ .... The 
essential point of quarantine at its earliest inception up to its fully developed 
existence at the present day is that it estimates the danger, and thereupon the 
precautions to be taken, according to the state of health of the port from 
whence the vessel has arrived, and has no reference to the condition as regards 
health or sickness of the vessel and its inhabitants.^’
Quarantine was imposed on ships which were deemed either 'infected' or 'suspected’. 
Suspected ships were those which had proceeded from an 'infected' port, or which 
had had some contact with the infection. They did not necessarily have any cases or 
suspected cases of the disease on board yet were quarantined in the same way as a 
vessel with an infectious cases on board. Because the essential act of maritime 
quarantine was to detain and isolate ships with little discrimination hcing made 
between the sick and the healthy, it was both feared and resented. It was feared 
because it could mean that healthy passengers were confined on hoard a vessel with
ihtU
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palicnls infected with eontagious disease; and it was resented for the costly delays 
enforced on ships involved with trade. By the early nineteenth eentury the latter of 
these two vexations had taken over as the primary concern associated with quarantine. 
Shipping was an essential instrument in Britain’s growing empire, generating 
enormous wealth and securing British dominance. Quarantine was a problematic 
factor within British maritime trade, potentially adding by the turn of the nineteenth 
century over thirty days onto the duration of a journey. During this month of detention 
another trip might have been completed (depending on where the ship had travelled 
from), perishable goods may have decayed, if not been destroyed, and a hefty 
quarantine duty had to be paid. The imposition of quarantine was accused of being ‘a 
barbarous encumbrance, interrupting commerce, obstructing international intercourse, 
periling life, and wasting, and worse than wasting, large sums of public money’ J
However, the fundamental principle upon which quarantine rested was the idea of 
contagion and until, at least, the mid-nineteenth century this essentially outweighed 
the grievances uttered against the cost. If a disease could be communicated from one 
person to another, the only way to stop it was to ‘break chains of transmission, 
interrupting the circulation of carriers by means of cordons, quarantines and 
sequestration’.'' By isolating or excluding the infection it could be excluded from a 
community. The traditional period of forty days initially would have covered the time 
needed to ensure that the disease was neither incubating or still extant in any virulent 
form. With changing understanding of different diseases, this period of confinement 
was brought by the end of the eighteenth century down to around twenty to thirty 
days. While a disease was considered to he contagious, quarantine was the only 
method that could be applied against it. However, if a disease was not considered to 
he contagious, but rather was generated and contracted by people by some means 
other than person to person (or object to person), quarantine would he of little use. It 
was this theory, called ‘anticontagionism’, which gained much support in Britain 
throughout the nineteenth century and was a primary tool used in arguments opposing 
the institution and practice of quarantine.'' However, it was not until the middle of the 
century that anticontagionist theories began, in Britain, to significantly threaten the 
conceptual basis upon which quarantine had been built. Until then quarantine
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maintained a secure plaec in legislation and as a prophylactic strategy, relied upon by 
the nation to protect it from invading infections.
The first quarantine act of the nineteenth century (40 Geo. III. c.80) passed in 1800, 
called for the building of a lazaretto (maritime quarantine station) on Chetney Hill 
near Dart ford, and required ‘that the cost of Quarantine be borne by incoming ships’. 
The building of the lazaretto was unduly prolonged due to a variety of practical 
problems, and within a few years of its completion it was found to be ineffectual. Yet, 
smaller quarantine stations were maintained in the major ports, and a special lazaretto 
was constructed at Milford as ‘a foul Bill [of Health] station -  for ships to the western 
part of the Kingdom’.”' Another ‘Foul Bill station’ in Liverpool served the ‘eastern 
part’. Goods which arrived on an infected ship were aired on deck from three to six 
days before being removed to the lazaretto. ' ' There bales and packages were opened 
and the process of airing was eontinued for up to a further 40 days. Passengers and 
crew were required to remain on board the vessel for up to 30 days after all the goods 
were removed. The whole process, for a ship arriving with a foul Bill of Health, could 
take up to 60 to 65 days.'^
It has been argued that Liberal ideas in England following the defeat of Revolutionary 
France in 1815 formed the initial bases of the two main objections to quarantine:'"' 
firstly, that quarantine imposed unnecessary and costly constraints on the free flow of 
commerce; and secondly, that the theory of contagion, the fundamental principle 
underlying quarantine, was unfounded.''’ At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
the main opponent of quarantine, on the grounds of the anticontagious nature of 
disease, was Charles Maclean (1788-1824). Maclean was a physician who had been 
employed for most of his career as a surgeon with the East India Company and (he 
Levant Company, and lectured to the East India Company on the diseases of hot
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climates.''' He was convinced that plague, the primary target at which quarantine 
measures were aimed, was not contagious but rather ‘dependant on atmospheric 
influences’. During the period 1817-1824 particularly he published a number of 
medical books and pamphlets in opposition to quarantine such as. Evils o f Quarantine 
Laws, and Non-Existence o f Pestilential Contagion Deduced from  the Phenomena o f 
the Plague o f the Lavant, the Yellow Fever o f Spain, and the Cholera Morbus o f Asia, 
(London, 1824).''' He argued, summing up the main points maintained in opposition 
to quarantine throughout the century, that quarantine was ‘really the cause of 19/20 of 
all epidemics by enforcing confinement in pestilential air; producing concealment of 
the disease, desertion of the sick, and deadly terror. Quarantines were amoral, 
ineffective, and the source of enormous gratuitous expenses and vexation’.'
In 1819 the government appointed a Select Committee, with not a little of Maclean’s 
influence,'^ to ‘investigate the validity of the doctrine of contagion in plague’. The 
Committee concluded that plague was indeed contagious, passing directly from 
person to person and thus that there was no reason to question the principles upon 
which quarantine was based. Another Select Committee in 1824, this one employed to 
consider how foreign trade might be improved, concluded that as quarantine and 
contagion were inseparable, all information on the subject, as prudence dictated, 
should be taken from medical witnesses with known contagionist leanings. Not 
surprisingly, they all concluded that the present quarantine regulations were sufficient 
and that quarantine was necessary for preventing the import of epidemic disease.
(The) Committee have called before (hem several medical men of eminence, 
whose opinions appeared the best calculated to assist them in pursuing the 
object of their inquiry, and coming to a satisfactory conclusion. In making
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their selection ... they have confined themselves to those whose attention had 
not only been directed to this subject, but whose opinions were understood to 
be in favour of the received doctrine of Contagion: their reason for this was, 
that it being their object to ascertain the degree of relaxation in the present 
regulations that might be safely adopted, consistently with the experience of 
danger, no advantage could arise from having recourse to the opinions of those 
who entirely disbelieve the possibility of Contagion, and considered every 
precaution to guard against it misplaced and unnecessary.”"^
While the Committee were somewhat critical of a few of the European methods and 
regulations for quarantine, it recommended that ‘ships with foul or suspected bills of 
health should unload into a lazaretto in Stangate Creek, and there undergo a 
quarantine of 21 days; ships with clean bills should await permission for free pratique 
in the lower Thames; all quarantine charges should be borne by the public; and all 
existing laws repealed and incorporated in a single act’. '^' A Bill was drawn up which 
embodied the recommendations. Maclean petitioned the government complaining that 
the ‘anti-commercial, anti-social, and anti-Christian quarantine laws’ should be 
rejected'^'. He and other anti-eontagionists vehemently objected to the Bill on the 
grounds that neither the 1819 nor the 1824 Select Committee had taken evidence from 
any supporters of anti-contagionism, despite the fact that this theory of disease was 
continuing to attract the support of a growing number of medical men. However, the 
government was determined to err on the side of caution and despite the objections 
concluded that it was more prudent to continue with the Bill. Furthermore, in terms of 
trade, when, at this stage, the rest of Europe, if not the world, were firmly in favour of 
quarantine, Britain could ill afford the loss of trade incurred if her ports were deemed 
dangerous because of an absence of quarantine laws.
llius, in 1823 the Quarantine Act (6 Geo. Ill c.78) was passed. '" The Act applied to. 
‘all vessels, as well as His Majesty’s Ships of War... coming from or having touched 
at any place from whence His Majesty, his Heirs or Successors, by and with the 
ad\'icc of his or their Privy C’ouncil, shall have adjudged and declared it probable that
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the Plague or other infectious disease or distemper highly dangerous (o the health of 
His Majesty’s subjects may be brought.’ as well as ‘the Yellow Fever or other highly 
infectious distemper [which] prevails on the Continent of America, or in the West 
Indies ... No..person, goods, wares, or merchandise, or other articles as 
aforesaid.. .shall, either before or after the arrival of such vessels or boats at any port 
or place in the United Kingdom, .. .come or be brought on shore, or go and be put on 
board any other vessel ...in order to .. .be brought on shore,’ and that they ‘be obliged 
to perform Quarantine in such place ... for such time, and in such manner as shall 
from time to time be directed by His Majesty, his Heirs or Successors, by his or their 
... Orders in Council’.^ "'
The Quarantine Act was placed within the authority of the Privy Council. Its 
implementation at the ports was placed within the duties of the Customs Service, and 
it was not long before the new law was put to the test. In 1830-31 western Europe was 
confronted with its first epidemic of Asiatic Cholera - the ‘exotic’ disease originating 
from India - which had been brought west with growing European mercantile and 
industrial development. It flourished in the expanding urban environment of 
industrialisation and in the exceptionally warm summer of that year.^'’ In April 1831, 
after learning that cholera had arrived in St Petershurg and was slowly pushing 
westward, the Admiralty ordered in anticipation of the approaching disease that a 
strict quarantine of at least 14 days be imposed on all ships arriving from foreign 
p o r t s . B y  June the Privy Council moved to temporarily include cholera under the 
existing quarantine laws and a consultative Central Board of Health was established to 
oversee its implementation. The Privy Council then issued regulations in October 
183 1 in which strict quarantine was to be imposed on both sea and land. However, on 
October 9 the first case of cholera was reported in Sunderland."'’ Not only did the 
disease claim thousands of lives in its first great scourge of the United Kingdom in 
183 1-32, hut its \ iolence and rapidity were almost unprecedented. Richard Evans 
details the horrific course of the disease which, unlike other epidemic diseases such as 
tuberculosis (which Evans describes as spreading ‘at a leisurely pace'), whirled 
through towns and cities with devastating effect.
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Il began to affect the victim through a vague feeling of not being well, 
including a slight deafness. This was followed fairly quickly by violent spasms 
of vomiting and diarrhoea, vast and prolonged in their extent, in which the 
evacuations were usually described as being like ‘rice-water’. In this stage up 
to 25% of the victim’s body fluids could be lost. This led, not surprisingly, to a 
state of collapse in which, in effect, the blood coagulated and ceased to 
circulate properly. The skin became blue and ‘corrugated’, the eyes sunken 
and dull, the hands and feet as cold as ice. Painful muscular cramps convulsed 
and contorted the body. The victims appeared indifferent to their surroundings, 
though consciousness was not necessarily lost altogether. At this stage death 
would ensue in about half the cases from cardiac or renal failure, brought on 
by acute dehydration and loss of vital chemical and electrolytes, or the victim 
would recover more or less rapidly. The whole process of the symptoms from 
start to finish could take as little as 5 to 12 hours, more usually about 3 to 4 
days.^^
Local boards of health were instructed to ensure the administration of the Act, and 
record all instances of infection. Infected towns were quarantined, and individual 
houses marked with signs of ‘CAUTION’ or ‘SICK’. The quarantine period was not 
less than 20 days, and applied to the sick, those who had been in contact with them 
and those who had any ill-timed bouts of quite harmless diarrhoea. All incoming ships 
from foreign ports were also placed in quarantine for not less than 20 days. Infected or 
suspected ships were moored to floating lazarettos, where all goods on board were 
aired and treated with chlorine fumes; passengers and crew were lb iced to remain on 
board. The sick and the healthy were confined together, often without any medical 
assistance."’' Although a variety of problems were associated with the quarantine 
regime, a great reliance was placed on it for assuring the safety of Britain.
To the quarantine now in operation we last week adverted, and we again recur, 
as affording the only hope which remains of excluding the disease from 
England; and if the regulations could be rendered as complete in practice as 
they are in theory, our hopes would he by no means faint; hut with so
l - \ : in s .  Dcdlh in Ilanihnrip p. 227 .
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extensive a coast lo act upon, with so many temptations, and so many 
opportunities afforded by smuggling, of evading the sanitary precautions, we 
fear that much reliance is not to be placed on their efficiency. While, however, 
a chance of success remains, it behoves the press to co-operate with the 
government in carrying those measures to effect. True, they are injurious to 
trade, but what of that? the profits of the merchant must give place to the 
safety of the public: true they are detrimental to the revenue; but surely it 
would be better, if need be, to levy a tax upon the purses of liege subjects than 
upon their lives. Besides, the period of doubt cannot last long: i f  the disease 
come, why then farewell to further quarantine, at least by sea: if it be kept out, 
then the measureless benefit o f its exclusion will reconcile the most prejudiced 
and discontented to the temporary inconvenience}'^
Yet, despite the extent and rigours of quarantine measures which were put in place, 
cholera did arrive on British shores and continued to spread inland throughout 1832. 
This was, as the author of the above statement feared, partly due to the fact that 
smuggling had increased with a gusto to match the rigidity of the quarantine 
regulations, and also because, particularly during this first epidemic, the disease was 
so little understood. The rapidity and violence of the new disease, along with its 
mysterious aetiology, terrified the public and sent the medical profession into a frenzy 
of observing and theorising, As the disease appeared to follow neither the ‘normal’ 
paths of human intercourse nor any patterns of climate,"’ methods of prevention for 
plague were applied. Methods of treatment varied greatly. One Dr. Knapp of 
Mus.sclburgh wrote a letter to the editor of the London Medical Ciazette, during the 
epidemic, detailing ‘ghastly' cases of the disease he had attended.
In the worst cases of cholera, where the disease comes on so suddenly as 
almost instantly to threaten annihilation, it has occurred to me that the Spiritus 
Ammoniac Succinatus might be the best stimulant, reasoning from its well 
known efficacy in rousing dormant vital powers aftci' the injury sustained by 
them from the bite of the rattle snake.''
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The containment of cholera was largely unsuccessful, and during 1831-2 it was 
estimated that 30,900 people died from the disease in England.'" It was this failure of 
quarantine procedures to protect the British public from the importation of cholera 
during this first epidemic and those of the following two decades, which encouraged a 
more widespread opposition to the system. It was a combination of this and 
developing sanitary reforms from the 1840s that also led to precocious suggestions of 
an extension of sanitary methods to the ports.
It does not appear that the Quarantine has been of any avail in cholera.... A 
sanatory [sic] maritime police is therefore indispensable; into which it would 
be advantageous to convert all the quarantine officers of Europe. The futile, 
superstitious practices of the lazarettos are as contemptible in the eyes of 
science as they are injurious to commerce."
In the General Board of Health’s 1849 Report on Quarantine, there was a clear 
opposition to quarantine. It also displayed and advanced growing support for anti­
contagionist theories in respect of quarantine. The importance of this report was 
emphasised by Margaret Pelling who noted its effect in ‘arousing the latent opposition 
of the medical profession’.''’ Co-written by Carlisle, Ashley, Chadwick and 
SoLithwood-Smith. the report set about proving through accumulated ‘evidence’ and 
‘experience’ that not only were ‘epidemic’ diseases not contagious but also that 
quarantine had failed to prevent imported infection. It sought to reveal ‘whether 
quarantine can prevent the extension of epidemic diseases, whatever may be their 
nature, whether contagious or no t '."  Essentially the report was a manifesto on the 
non-contagious nature of epidemic disease, and the subsequent importance and 
superiority of sanitary methods over the misinformed and ineffectual practice of 
quarantine."’
The substitution of general sanitary regulations to ships in port, for the 
existing quarantine regulations, would far more effectually extinguish
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epidemic disease, and afford better protection to the uninfected on ship board, 
whilst it would relieve passengers and crew from grievous inconvenience, 
abate the motives to concealment of sickness and to false representations as to 
its nature, greatly lessen commercial expenses and remove obstructions to the 
free transit of goods and uninfected persons which the existing system of 
quarantine occasions."'
Quarantine, however, was still widely in use for the reception of cholera patients, and 
it continued to display its devastating deficiencies. In William Farr’s 1850 Report on 
the Epidemic Cholera o f 1848 and 1849, there was a noted disparity in the morbidity 
and mortality of the 1831-32 and 1848-49 epidemics. The significant increase in the 
late 1840s epidemic was, however, not attributed to any relaxation of quarantine, but 
as support for more miasmatic theories of disease aetiology grew, to the worsening of 
conditions in industrial towns and cities.'’' ‘Miasma’, disease poisons found in 
conditions such as overcrowding, dampness, lack of ventilation and drainage, and 
filth, were beginning to be held to blame as both the exciting and predisposing causes 
of the disease, rather than strictly contagion.'”’
Little was still known about the cause of the disease. By the late 1850s the waterborne 
theory was given some support, others favoured miasmatic theories, while numerous 
variations on these were also used to account for its transmission.’” Meanwhile, 
quarantine was losing widespread support, both because of its failure to prevent the 
1832, 1848 and 1854 epidemics -  ‘it does not appear that the Quarantine has been of 
any avail in cho lera '"  - and its incompatibility with Britain’s commitment to the 
ideology o\' laissez faire. The latter was the main point which distinguished Britain 
from other European countries in formulating preventative measures against the 
disease. In the second half of the nineteenth century Europe responded to repeated
Ri’pifrr on Quarantine. 1849,  p. 126.
Report  on the Mortal i ty o f  Choiera,  p. xlvii. Sec al.so, Uhri.stupher Hamlin. Ihihlie Health and Soci(d 
Jit.stice in the Ap,e o f  Chadwick: Britain, / 800 - /854 ,  (Camliridge: Camlrridgc Univcrsily t r^e.ss. 1998).
’ ' ‘Tiic term ‘miasmatic' js one of  the most ambiguous terms in the history of nsnetcenth eentury 
medicine’. Worboys. Spreading: Certus,  pp. 38-42; see also. Margaret Pelling. ‘C'ontagion / Cierm 
Theory / Speciticity', W'.P'. Bynum and R. Porter (Eds. ). Companion Rneyelopedia of'the History <d 
Medieine,  \'ol. 1. 31)9-31 y  (London: Roulledge. 1993),
' " See C hapter Two.
" See Baldwin, CVaift.cion and the State,  pp. 147-49; Worboys, Spreadinsi (ivrins.  pp. Cs-42 & 11' IS; 
Pelling, Cholera. I'exi r and English Medicine,  pp. 48-63: and ('hrislo[rher 1 lamhn. .4 Srienrc <d 
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cholera epidemics by organising a number International Sanitary Conferences aimed 
at colleetive prevention. The first of these was held in Paris in 1850-51. Britain, at the 
time of greatest national support for anti-contagionist theory, was unable to persuade 
the other nations to reject quarantine and a policy of uniformity was adopted which 
fixed a minimum and maximum period for the quarantining of cholera, plague, and 
yellow fever."
Britain was obliged to conform somewhat with international requirements but 
continued to develop an approach to cholera prevention which was more compatible 
with the doctrine of free trade, so important to her economic and political structure. 
Throughout the 1850s and 1860s Britain responded to the threat of cholera with 
sanitary improvements and increasing professionalisation and legislation in the area of 
public health." By the mid-1860s Britain had effected considerable advancements in 
the general sanitation and sanitary organisation of London and other major cities. 
However, in 1866 epidemic cholera struck Europe yet again, this time originating in 
Egypt. The epidemic was the last to have any significant effect in Britain -  killing 7 in 
every 10,000 of the population" - and demonstrated that British defences were 
lacking in two key areas, the cleanliness of the water and the sanitary regulation of 
shipping."
From the beginning of the 1860s there were further enquiries in Britain into the 
efficacy of employing quarantine as the chief method of cholera prevention. In 1861 
(he ‘Social Science Quarantine Committee’ submitted a report, published by the 
Board of Trade, recommending, importantly, that when a vessel arrived in a port and 
had been inspected by the Quarantine Medical Officer any cases of illness should he 
removed to hospital but ‘the healthy should not be detained’.'" Similarly in 1868 ‘a 
strong deputation, representing the medical profession, presented a memorial to the 
Privy Council, in which they urged that the subject of quarantine had for the past 
twenty years been under the notice of the public, and that the present system had
"  S e e  C l n ip l c r  T w o .
'* C'lirisioiilier Hamlin. ‘.Slate Medicine in (neat  Britain‘, Porter ( lùl . ). 7iic Ili\iiir\ <>l I’uhlir Ileiilili. 
1.32-164: and I), t^orter. t^utilic Health’. W. tîynum & Roy Porter (Eds. ). ( 'niiipanion làu xclo/xicdid 
Ilf the l/tsiiiry of Mi’Jicine,  vol. II. (London: Roulledge. 199.3 ), I 23 I -1 26 I.
R. Thorne 4'horne, ‘On Sea-Borne Cholera: British Measures of Prex ention \ . E.iiropean Measures ol 
Restriction'. BMJ.  .August 13. 1887, p. 340.
'' l lariE. ‘Cholera. Quarantine and tlie Englisli Preventative .System', p. 253.
( 'olhnyridge. ‘On (Quarantine’, jlAirt I), p. 648.
32
utterly failed during its trial in 1832, and had moreover been productive of great 
inconvenience’.'”'
The development of the country’s national sanitary system of public health provision 
and monitoring was, from the 1850s, well underway, and Medical Officers of Health 
had overseen the public health of a number of local areas since the passing of the 
1848 Public Health Act. However, the role of the Medical Officers of Health whose 
districts touch upon rivers, ports and harbours was, from the late 1860s, beginning to 
be questioned. This issue was raised at the 1869 Royal Sanitary Commission and it 
was revealed that ships lying within a harbour were ‘considered under no sanitary 
authority’. "  While giving evidence, the Medical Officer of Health for Southampton, 
J.R.Slebbing, informed the Commission of particular difficulties associated with 
cholera prevention at the ports. He explained that because the disease did not fall 
strictly within the wording and possible remit of the Quarantine Act -  being neither 
plague or yellow fever - the landing of a case of cholera had proved to be highly 
problematic. Firstly, while the ease was on board a vessel within the harbour it was 
not within the boundaries of either a sanitary authority or parish or borough, therefore 
it was unclear under whose responsibility and, importantly, whose expense, it should 
fall. If, on the other hand, the case -  while within the quarantine period - was landed it 
would, under international agreements relating to the definition of an ‘infected port’, '” 
mean that any ship subsequently sailing from the port would not be granted a clean 
Bill of Health.
The present law imagines that those who arc well and have undergone a 
medical examination may be landed, and those that arc sick should be placed 
in some hospital. But the moment we land a person with cholera we place 
every ship from Southampton in quarantine ail over the world, and very 
seriously affect the packet service of the country... [ However], you cannot put 
them in quarantine; it is a very unsafe thing to land the passengers, and it is a
illRi.
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serious thing to keep them out in the water with the germs of the disease on 
board."
Southampton illustrated the problem that although, as Slebbing pointed out, ‘we have 
sometimes upwards of 1,000 emigrants that come on board foreign ships into our port 
in a week’,'^ no official means existed for ensuring a thorough medical examination 
of each ship; there was also no means for dealing with any illness found on board 
which was not specified under the Quarantine Act. Vessels could be detained by 
Customs only if a case of plague or yellow fever was suspected, or if a cholera 
epidemic threatened and a General Order had been issued with specific regard to 
vessels arriving from infected ports. Otherwise, the Customs Service was not 
responsible. Yet, ships infected with non-quarantineable disease (‘indigenous’ 
disease) also lay beyond the jurisdiction of the local urban sanitary authority and the 
local poor law parishes or boroughs. The Harbour Commission which governed 
various aspects of the Port of Southampton, like similar bodies in other ports, did not 
employ a medical member and its ‘jurisdiction in sanitary matters would be a very 
questionable thing’. "  Thus, in effect no authority had jurisdiction over or 
responsibility for cases of non-quarantineable disease which was brought on board a 
ship into a British port.
Subsequently, and in response to these difficulties, the Commission recommended 
tiiat any urban or rural sanitary authority adjacent to a harbour should extend its 
powers and those of its representatives to act 'for sanitary purposes in the harbour’.^  '
It was also recommended that the sanitary authorities which incorporated the harbours 
should work co-operatively with the quarantine service and attend to ships which 
carried on board cases of infectious disease not touched by the Quarantine Act -  
‘indigenous’ disease.
Quarantine has hitherto been imposed and administered by the Privy Council, 
with the assistance of the local Custom House staff. It is looked upon in this 
country mainly as a subject connected with trade or political considerations.
E \  i J c n c c  g i v e n  b >  .I.R.Slcbliing, |59 I I ]. / •V/ -. s7 Report of the Rovo! Soiiltco y ( 'oinmiwioii wiih the 
Minutes o f  Evidence hjt to 5'’’ /\up,nst, /A6V. (t.nmton: HMSO, 1870). ]('. 281]. p .330. 
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We make the following recommendations, with a view to bringing quarantine 
arrangements ... into harmony with the future general sanitary administration 
which we have proposed.
Should our recommendation that there should be a Local Authority, with a 
health officer in and for every place or district of England and Wales, be 
carried out, all adjacent British waters should be declared to be within the 
district of such Authority, who could carry out quarantine regulations either in 
case of emergency, or systematically when quarantine is enforced for political 
or other reasons."
These recommendations were incorporated into the Public Health Act of 1872, which 
required the appointment of a Medical Officer of Health to each of the newly 
established urban and rural sanitary districts which covered the entire country. Among 
these districts were port and riparian sanitary districts to which the local authority 
appointed sanitary and medical officers -  the Port Medical Officers of Health.
The Port Sanitary Authority and the application of sanitary methods of prevention at 
the ports thus became the basis of the ‘English System’. This system and the 
professional groups established for it were developed both as a means to providing a 
more comprehensive system for the reception of infected vessels and as an alternative 
to quarantine. Quarantine was more widely arraigned in the second half of the century 
than in Maclean’s day and was, among a range of other indictments, condemned as 
‘injurious to t r a d e ' .B r i t i s h  commitment to free trade could not sustain a system 
which enforced the periodic restriction of movement on all incoming shipping. It was 
the pressures which prolonged detention and isolation of vessels placed on 
commercial interests that was at the core of British opposition to quarantine, 
particularly with regard to vessels travelling between Britain and various parts of the 
Empire. Whenever quarantine was raised in discussion, whether in parliament, 
general or medical periodicals, newspapers, or international conferences, the impact 
of quarantine on trade was never far from consideration. Quarantine, which isolated 
(he sick and healthy alike, was deemed to he more of a hazard in the spread of disease 
than a solution, but even this persuasive argument seemed to he made with 
commercial interests very much in mind. However, whilst conflicting with the
i t k C  p  i n
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interests of many, quarantine continued to he supported well into the nineteenth 
century.
Bringing Port Health Within the Sanitary System: The Establishment of the Port 
Sanitary Authority (with special reference to the Port of London)
The Sanitary Commission and the 1872 Public Health Act provided the legal 
requirement and foundations for a sanitary system of prevention and offered an 
alternative to quarantine. The deficits in ‘indigenous’ disease control at the ports was 
also rectified.
But what is our alternative system? Having deliberately abandoned the system 
of quarantine,'^ we began, many years ago, to organise the system of medical 
inspection with isolation. The medical inspection comes first into operation on 
our coasts.. .The medical inspection is thus followed by isolation of the sick. 
Unlike a quarantine system, this process does not interfere with the healthy, or 
expose them to risk by herding them together with the sick, but the names of 
the healthy and the places of their destination are taken down, and the medical 
officer of health of the districts in question are informed of the impending 
arrivals. This part of our system has been named our first line of defence..
This first line of defence brought together the independently operating, localised 
authorities which dealt with cases of imported ‘indigenous’ disease prior to 1872. 
Although remaining within local administration, disease and sanitary control of the 
ports was brought under the central, standard agency of the Local Government Board. 
For example, before 1872 a selection of independently operating ad hoc authorities 
protected the Port of London from the introduction of sea-borne infectious diseases, 
rhese included: the Thames Shipping Inspection Committee, representing riverside 
parishes in the prevention of cholera; forty-six individual riverside authorities; the 
lltames C’onserwincy; and Her Majesty’s Customs Service. Similar joint authorities
BML  Ma\ 2.3. 1885, p. 1068.
(Quarantine wax actually still operational both in law and in practice. Iiowexer lareK. when t h i s  quoie 
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I lutrne I hoi ne. '(hi Sea-liorne Cholera', j). 3-10.
36
operated in other ports around the country although no organised system consolidated 
the methods of prevention practised around Britain’s coastline.'” With the passing of 
the 1872 Public Health Act ‘the Local Government Board constituted certain of the 
Customs ports, or parts of such ports, into Port Sanitary Districts, appointing the pre­
existing local sanitary authorities (urban or rural, as the case might be, and singularly 
or in combination)' Port Sanitary Authorities for the administration of business 
appertaining to health’. ”^ The effect was to standardise the approach to port 
prophylaxis and, as Anne Hardy has pointed out, bring a ‘systematic supervision of 
entry to the country’.”' Generally, the port authorities were modelled on the existing 
structures of urban and rural sanitary districts. The Port Medical Officer of Health was 
usually a part-time post undertaken in addition to other employment. Very often in 
smaller ports the Port Medical Officer became an extension of the role and duties of 
the position of Medical Officer of Health for the local sanitary district. London and 
Liverpool were exceptional in that the Port Medical Officer was employed on a full­
time basis. In London, due to the size and heterogeneous nature of the business of the 
port, various medical and sanitary officers were employed to oversee the health of the 
port. Yet, both the smaller more remote ports and the sixty-nine mile jurisdiction of 
the Port of London Sanitary Authority
had for their object the twofold purpose of -  (1) forming in concert with the 
Customs authority the first line of defence against the introduction of and 
spread of dangerous infectious disease, and (2) (he preservation of the health 
of crews and passengers by securing that vessels should he kept in a 
wholesome condition.”^
Port of London Sanitary Authority was established in 1872 under the local 
administration of the Corporation of London. The London Port Sanitary Committee 
was appointed by the Court of Common Council ‘to make the necessary arrangements 
to put in force the Public Health Bill when the same shall have received the Royal
i'or arrangcmenls durIo al individual ports in anticipation ol cholera in I 87 I scc. . \p|R'ndi\ -17. l-nsi 
report ol' the Local Cjoxerntiient Board, 1871-2', British Barlidiiiciitary Papers Ihn iseo l  Comnians 
/'S'72. .36296, \o | .  x.wiii .  p. 3.34 -  336.
‘Report h\ Dr. Blaxall on the Sanitary Survey ol' Port and Principal Riparian Saniiarx I )istncis.
I 88,S-6‘. l-'Hieeiah Annual Report o f  the IXiB. IHH5H). Appendix No. 8. p. 1 29 
' l laidy.  ‘Public Health and the Expert’, p. I 35.
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assent’.”'  The Committee first met on July 29, 1872 and Royal assent for the Act was 
issued in late August 1872. It was a full year later when the committee advised the 
Corporation to appoint a Port Medical Officer of Health and Sanitary Inspector.
During the eleven intervening months, the committee worked through the various 
logistical requirements of putting the Act into practice.
One of the first achievements of the new Sanitary Authority in London was to acquire 
a hospital ship to receive cases of infectious disease as they arrived in the port. The 
old man o ’war hulk H M .Ship  Rhin, which had already been used by the Seamen’s 
Flospital Society for the hospitalisation of cholera patients, was acquired with ease 
from the Admiralty. Prior to 1872, cases of cholera, arriving into London, were sent to 
the Hospital Ship Dreadnought'^'^ which was maintained by the Metropolitan Asylum 
Board.”'  On the establishment of the Port Sanitary Authority, the Metropolitan 
Asylum Board relinquished this responsibility and handed it and the ship over to the 
Port Sanitary Authority. The Admiralty granted Sanitary Authority permission to take 
the ship for isolation purposes. However, the decision was made to abandon use of the 
Dreadnought, and acquire the Rhin}^ Alterations were made within it, and a 
permanent mooring, with the ascent of the Thames Conservancy, was established for 
it at Gravesend.”  ^The ship was provided with two shipkeepers who were required to 
live on board the vessel with their wives, who acted as nurses to the patients and 
cleaners of the six bed hospital.
Months before the appointment of the first Medical Officer of Health for the Port of 
London, the committee employed a medical officer to run the Rhin, care for the 
patients, and oversee the maintenance of sanitary conditions on board the ship. The 
man appointed to this position was Dr Philip Whiteombe, a 'medical gentleman’”''
'’'CLRO,/^5C/W, vol. I, ‘Commencing 21 Aug. I 8 7 2 -End ing  1.5 0c! .  I87.T. Aug. 21. 1872 
The Dreadnought  had begun as a war ship, and had been used in (he Battle of Trafalgar. It was pul in 
(he service o f  the Seaman's Hospital Society in 183! and was used as an isolation ship by the Central 
Board of  Health during the cholera epidemic of  183 1-32. It was used for the same purpose in I 848-9  
and 1853. Cook, From the Greenwich Hulks to Old St Paneras,  pp. 39-54.
‘The Metropolitan Asylum Board had been set up in 1867 to provide, and maintain hospitals and 
institutions in London for many branches of  medicine, including infectious diseases‘,. ibid. p. 51.
CLRO PSCP, 1872.  Letters from the Metropolitan Asylum District to the Port Sanitary Committee.  
Cuiklhall -  dated 3 August,  1872, and 26 August,  1872,
Crax esend was the location o f  (he Customs Authority and, from I 872. tlie Port Sanitai \ .Authority It 
marked the furthest point on the River Thames to which a ship could sail on any tide.
Whitcomhe was licenced by the Society o f  Apothecaries, London, in I 839. and became a Member ol 
the Royal College of Surgeons, London, also in 1839.
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working and residing in Gravesend. Patients from vessels who displayed symptoms of 
‘indigenous’ infectious disease were referred by the Customs authority into his care; 
although from a report in the Port Sanitary Committee Minutes in mid-1873, it 
appears that the Customs service had, in these early years, required reminding of the 
co-operation necessary between the two authorities.
a reply [was] sent to the... Secretary to Her Majesty’s Customs stating that the 
ship Rhin has been placed at Gravesend for the reception of cholera, small-pox 
and other patients suffering from contagious disease. Also that the Port of 
London Sanitary Authorities will feel obliged by instructions being given to 
the Officers of H.M.Customs at Gravesend to communicate with Dr 
Whiteombe should any of the contagious diseases be found on board any 
vessel arriving at Gravesend in order that the necessary steps may be taken for 
the prevention of the spreading of contagion.””
Whiteombe also filled the role of Port Medical Officer until the position could be 
otherwise filled -  the cut off date for which was originally March 25, 1873. However, 
it was not until July 1, 1873, that the committee resolved to advise the Corporation of 
London,
to appoint a Medical Officer to take charge of the whole of the Port of 
London, including the Hospital Ship Rhin al Gravesend. Under the Public 
Health Act of 1872 until the 25'” of March next -  that the salary be al the rate 
of £400 per annum and that this Committee do select three qualified persons 
from which the Court of Common Council shall elect such Medical Officer. 
Also that an inspector be appointed to act under the Medical Officer, to assist 
in carrying out the provisions of the Public Health Act I 872, and that he be 
paid a salary of £120 per annum.™
The Corporation of London instructed that the Port Medical Officer of Health should 
he a ‘legally qualified Medical Practitioner’, but that the Sanitary Officer, or Port
C I . R O .  r s C ' M .  vol .  1. . luly .3, 1873.  
ilxiti . .hitv I. ! 873.
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Inspector of Nuisances, was only required to be a ‘competent person '/ '  Thus, when 
the two positions were advertised the Sanitary Officer’s position appeared in the Daily 
Telegraph, Daily News, The Times, Standard, City Press and Shipping Gazette, while 
the Port Medical Officer of Health situation was also posted in the Lancet and 
Medical Times, (although surprisingly, not in the British Medical Journal). Interviews 
for both positions took place on July 16, 1873. On July 28 the Court of Common 
Council appointed Harry Leach, who had previously worked at the Seaman’s Hospital 
and as a medical advisor to the Board of Trade, as the first Port Medical Officer of 
Health and William Henry Lewis as the Port Sanitary Officer.
The duties of the Port Medical Officer of Health conformed from the beginning with 
the basic tenets of the ‘English System’. This system worked on the sanitary and 
hygiene principles of disinfection and isolation. In the Vide Report o f the Port o f 
London Sanitary Committee, 1873, the duties of the Medical Officer included:
To enquire into the water-supply of all vessels in the Port, and advise as to its 
proper sources and storage.
To superintend the immediate removal from a vessel of any person suffering 
from a eontagious or infectious disease to the hospital set apart for the purpose 
of the Sanitary Authority, or if the sick person is not in a condition to be 
removed, to isolate the vessel, (see 29''’ and 30”’ Viet., cap.90, sec 29.)
To superintend the disinfection of all clothing of seamen who have died from 
an contagious or infectious disease and to grant a certificate accordingly.
To inspect, before landing, all emigrants that arrive in the port from the 
Continent for purposes of transhipment, and to isolate all suspected cases.
To carry out. under the direction of the Port Sanitary Authority, all special 
Orders in Council relating to the prevention of cholera, or other epidemic 
diseases.
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To obtain all possible information as to, and keep a close aeeounl of, all 
foreign ports infected with, or suspected of, cholera, and with the aid of the 
Customs Officers, to inspect all vessels as they arrive from such ports.
To communicate and co-operate in all sanitary matters with officers of Her 
Majesty’s Customs, the Marine Department of the Board of Trade, the 
Harbour and Dock Authorities, the river Police, and all other authorities 
concerned in the official business of the port.^“
The duties of the Sanitary Officer related primarily to the inspection and maintenance 
of sanitary conditions on board vessels, such as ensuring the cleanliness of closets and 
latrines, that the crew and passenger quarters were sufficiently ventilated, and that 
adequate cubic space was provided per person on board. He was also responsible for 
carrying out disinfection, cleansing and fumigation on vessels, goods and clothing 
where instructed by the Medical Officer.^^ Both the duties of the Medical and Sanitary 
Officer were carried out in co-operation with the Quarantine Officer of the Customs 
Service.
U is evident from these duties that from the outset a primary responsibility of the Port 
Medical Officer of Health and his staff was to protect the ports from the importation 
of infectious disease. Co-operation with the Customs service was also emphasised in 
the duties, particularly in relation to cholera, while the position of the Port Sanitary 
Authority as a separate and important organisation within the port was also 
confirmed. However, what most clearly demonstrated the establishment of the Port 
Sanitary Authority as the new, additional and alternative system of disease prevention 
was the appointment of Whitcombe and the acquisition of the Rbiii as hospital to the 
Port Sanitary Authority. While the Sanitary Committee acted with a degree of leisure 
in appointing a Port Medical Officer of Health and Sanitary Officer to oversee the 
health and sanitary condition of the port, the same leisure was not afforded to the 
establishment of the infectious disease hospital or to the appointment of its medical 
officer. The ship was a physical presentation of the new authority in the port and
l.omloi), 7 Sept. IS72.  (.Misc. MS.S. 40. I ).
( ' I . l ^O.  Rcitini n( ('<‘rpnralion Appointinrnix. IS79.  (Loixldn:  C ha i i c s  .Skipper & Ikisl IS inlci s. IS70)
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demonstrated the Port Sanitary Authority’s appropriation of responsibility over the 
prevention of imported ‘indigenous’ disease. Located near the Customs Pier the Rhin 
displayed the new authority as a counterpart to the role of the Customs Service and 
Privy Council in disease prevention at the port. The Port Sanitary Authority co­
operated with the other authorities still operating in the port such as the Customs 
Service and Seaman’s Hospital Society. However, the appointment of Whitcombe and 
the massive display of the new hospital ship immediately represented the authority of 
the new Port Sanitary system and the distinctive methods it would employ.
After the appointment of Lewis and Leach as Port Medical Officer and Port Sanitary 
Officer, Philip Whitcombe was maintained as physician on board the Rhin'^ with the 
official title of Medical Ojficer o f the Rhin stationed at Gravesend fo r  the reception o f  
patients suffering from  contagious diseases. A summary of some of his duties upon 
the hospital ship further demonstrates the role of the Port Sanitary Authority from its 
inception. These duties overlapped with those of the Port Medical Officer particularly 
because of the delay which occurred between the appointments.
To inspect every vessel at Gravesend reported by the authorities of 
H.M.Customs as unclean or infected, and order the removal of all cases of 
contagious disease to the Hospital Ship ‘Rhin’ for medical treatment.
To give personal attendance to every case admitted on board the ‘Rhin’ once 
in every twenty-four hours, and at other times when specially summoned.
Upon admission of any case of acute febrile nature, or one in which the 
occurrence of delirium may be expected, to appoint a Resident Assistant 
Medical Officer to remain on board the ‘Rhin’ until such case or cases may 
become convalescent.^"’
' ' Thus the employees o f  the Port o f  London Sanitary Authority Irom 1X7^ were 
Medical OiTicer of Health, (from July, 1873)
Port Sanitary Officer, t from July, 1873)
Medical Officer of the Rhin. (from Sepiemlier, 1872)
Shi[ikeeper of the Rhin x2, ( tfom September. 1872).
' Rclnrn of ( 'orporaiion Apjxiintiiunifs'. p, 1 15.
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Although being subject to constantly changing General Orders, the basic duties of the 
three key occupations within the Authority did not alter much for the rest of the 
century.
The authority of the Port Medical Officers in overseeing the sanitary standards and 
reception of infectious diseases in the port and riparian districts was finalised with the 
passing of the Public Health Act 1875.
The Local Government Board may, by provisional order, permanently 
constitute any local authority whose district or part of whose district forms 
part of or abuts on any part of a port in England, or the waters of such port, or 
any conservators commissions or other persons having authority in or over 
such port or any part thereof, (which local authority conservators 
commissioners or other persons are in the Act referred to as a ‘riparian 
authority,’) the sanitary authority of the whole of such port or of any part 
thereof (in this Act referred to as the ‘port sanitary authority’) ..
Whereas the 1872 Act had bestowed the authority of assigning the powers and duties 
of the Port Sanitary Authority on the Local Government Board, the 1875 Public 
Health Act granted the separate Port Authorities greater autonomy, although they 
ultimately still remained within the mandate of the Local Government B o a r d . A  
particularly important aspect of the 1875 Act was Section 130 which permitted the 
Local Government Board to alter or revoke any regulations in order for the Port 
Sanitary Authority to prevent the spread of c h o le ra .T h e  powers of the Port Sanitary 
Authority were further extended by the Disease Prevention Act of 1883 which 
declared the Port of London Sanitary Authority to be an Urban Sanitary Authority, 
'and giving the Local Government Board the power of assigning to them any such 
powers, rights, duties, capacities, liabilities and obligations as might appear to the 
Board to be required’. T h e  Public Health (Shipping) Act 1885 extended this and 
enabled the Port Medical Officers to act with more autonomy. It also enabled them to
I’uhlie Health Act. 1875 |38 & .39 VtCT.],  Seclioii 287. 
ihid., .Sections 287-90.
'' ihid.. Section 1 30.
' William C'ollingriilge. The Duties o f  the Port Inspectors of Nui'tcinees, lor the .Association of  Ouhhc 
Sanilai \ Inspectors. (Whitechapel: 'I'hos. Potilter & Sons, 1887) p. 29.
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impose fines on shipping companies and captains who withheld information about 
possible infections.
On December 13, 1879, Dr Harry Leach, the first Medical Officer of Health to the 
Port of London, died at the age of 43 of tuberculosis after a long period of illness. He 
was replaced in 1880 by William Collingridge M.D., D.P.H., a physician who had 
been employed in private practice for the previous two years and had served as a 
volunteer surgeon with the Serbian army during the Turko-Serbian war of 1875.^^’ 
Collingridge also had a B.A., M.A. and LL.M. from Cambridge, indicating that the 
full-time position of Medical Officer to the Port of London was prestigious enough at 
this time to attract a man of Collingridge’s calibre.^' He remained in the post until 
replaced by Herbert Williams M.D., D.P.H. in 1901 who had been employed in the 
Port Sanitary Authority as ‘Medical Officer for Boarding purposes’ since 1892. An 
indication of the volume of their work, during the first twenty years of the Port 
Sanitary Authority, is evident in Table II, which shows the number of vessels 
inspected, cleaned, fumigated and the number of confirmed infectious cases received.
By 1883 it was beginning to become apparent that both a more permanent and more 
suitable port isolation hospital was necessary in London. It was put to the Court of 
Common Council in a report from the Port Sanitary Committee that not only did the 
poor ventilation on board the Rliin ‘retard recovery’, but that the old hulk was in such 
an unsound state of disrepair, ‘her upper works being so very rotten and defective’, 
that a lengthy and expensive period of dry docking would be required for the 
Admiralty to ‘put the ship in something like a serviceable condition’.F u r th e rm o re ,  it 
was argued that the Rhin incurred an unnecessary expense which a land hospital 
would avoid. The average annual repair costs of the floating hospital were over five 
times greater than they would be maintaining a land hospital, insurance premiums 
were more costly, while the Rhin incurred the additional cost of running and 
maintaining the boat required to take patients and the Medical Officer to and from the
■''"Sec also. O ’Driscoll.  'Against Infection and the Hand of War.'., p. 68.
Collingridge was paid £500 per annum wlien appointed in 1880. His pay was increased to £700 per 
annum in I 884. When Williams was employed his salary began ai £65(1 per annum. This was increased 
to £800 per annum in 1906,  CLRO, Return o f  Corporation Appoiniiuenis. /RRC>, (l .ondon: Charles 
■Skipper & b.ast Printers, 1886)' Return of Corporat ion Appoiniincnis. CJdR, (London: Chat les Skipper 
& I List 15 inters. 1908).
Cl R(). I{ospiia! at ( t i t ivesend ~ Report to the Court oj Coiunion Cou/n il Irani the Ron of l.oiulon 
Sanihn \ Connuittee.  .April 26, 188.3, Printed Reports Index, A/I 14P. p 4.
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hospital ship. Finally, if and when it became necessary to replace the Rhin another 
hulk, with the cost of purchasing and then adapting it for the requirements of a 
hospital, would amount to significantly more than the cost of acquiring the desired 
land and erecting a new h o sp ita l .T h u s ,  with the advice and supervision of the 
Medical Officer of the Loeal Government Board, the Corporation of London 
purchased a piece of land on which the hospital was built. The site lay at Denton, 
close to Gravesend and the old Customs House and covered one and a half acres, with 
a river frontage of 100 feet. The new hospital, whieh contained an administration 
block, one ward for ten patients and a small single ward for ‘better class patients or 
other specific purposes’,^^  was formally opened on April 17, 1884. •
Putting the Port Sanitary Authority into Practice and the Problems of Dual 
Authority
In late July, 1873, almost immediately upon the appointment of Leach to the position 
of Medical Officer to the Port of London, a vessel arrived in the Port of London full 
of European emigrants en route to New Zealand. It had two cases of cholera on board. 
This was the first case of infectious disease since the establishment of the Port 
Sanitary Authority. The ship Iris had taken on board emigrants from Hamburg, Kiel, 
and Copenhagen, and arrived in London with the appearance of a clean Bill of Health. 
However, six to eight hours after the emigrants reached their respective temporary 
lodgings in Whitechapel, two of the ship’s passengers, a man and child, were attacked 
by the ‘undoubted’ symptoms of cholera. The child died not long afterwards and the 
man was immediately isolated. The remaining 80 emigrants were temporarily 
removed from their lodgings, with the assistance of the Whitehall and Whitechapel 
‘local authorities’, to the Rhin for isolation and observation. The healthy were 
separated from the sick and were accommodated on board the S.S. Osprey, chartered 
by the emigration agency in charge of their passage to New Zealand. They remained 
on the Osprey until August 17 when they were released back to the emigration 
agency. During this period, seven more emigrants developed symptoms of the disease 
and were admitted to the Rhin. When the infection was first detected the Ins  w a s  
placed in selected moorings off Deptford Creek. It was disinfected by the Port
i 1i k 1 p p . s  n .
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Sanitary OiTicer and released again within a lew hours, causing ‘a minimum of
distraction to commercial interests’.^ '"’
In response to the Iris case and the possibility of further outbreaks of cholera, a 
‘temporary arrangement [that] all vessels that arrive from ‘suspected’ ports shall be 
systematically examined at Gravesend’ was put in place. However, despite the fact 
that a German line of passenger steamers had decided to ‘make London their port of 
call instead of Harve (sic) where the authorities have established a three day 
quarantine’, t h e  only other cases of suspected cholera which were referred to the 
Rhin that Summer were two seamen in mid-August and late September (only one of 
whom was recorded as suffering from cholera, while the other turned out to be merely 
a bad case of diarrhoea).
The Iris was the first case of imported infectious disease dealt with by a Medical 
Officer of the Port o f London. It marked a departure from procedures previously 
employed at the port and demonstrated a number of features particular to the ‘English 
System’. The two most characteristic of these features were the co-operative working 
of the Port Sanitary Authority with local, inland, sanitary authorities; and the 
separation of the sick, as well as passengers believed to be at risk, from the ship on 
which they arrived. A peculiarity of the ‘English system’ was that the health of the 
port was not separated from internal health - that is, the provision and administration 
of health and prc\'cntative systems in localities outside port and riparian sanitary 
jurisdiction. The 'English system’ depended on communication and co-operation 
between port, riparian, urban and rural sanitary districts. Each separate branch of the 
sanitary system, although under local administration, operated within a national 
framework overseen by the Local Government Board. Throughout the century these 
relationships became increasingly complex but were based from this early stage on 
the idea of sanitary surveillance. The idea was that if individual cases of disease could 
be monitored within and between localities, and the sanitary conditions of these 
localities were maintained at a high standard, the disease could not spread.
IkUricia O ’Dnscoll .  '.Against Inlection and the Hand of War,',, p. 67.
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What was particularly important in distinguishing the ‘English system’ from other 
preventative systems was that the isolation of infectious cases, as well as suspected 
cases (where there had been some contact with the disease but no manifestation of it) 
did not occur on board the vessel upon which they arrived. Infectious cases were 
removed as soon as possible to the isolation hospital maintained either by the port or 
riparian authority or local urban or rural authority. The sick were separated from the 
healthy, who were observed elsewhere. The vessel they arrived on was not detained 
for a period any longer than it took for it to be thoroughly disinfected, including, 
importantly, its bilge-water which was subsequently discarded. It was of great 
importance, as the case of the Iris demonstrates, that the presence of infection on 
board any vessel should cause only a modicum of delay to maritime traffic, and thus,
‘a minimum of distraction to commercial interests’. This also explains the importance 
attached to maintaining high levels of co-operation between the port and internal 
sanitary authorities. Usually, the infectious disease hospitals provided or used by the 
port authority accommodated only those who displayed symptoms of infeetious 
disease. Yet, until the incubation period of the disease had elapsed,^^ other people on 
board the vessel could still be regarded as ‘at risk’. The ‘English system’ insisted on 
the separation of the sick from the healthy and rejected the notion of incarcerating the 
healthy during this period. It was generally only the sick who were kept and isolated 
by the Port Sanitary Authority. Anyone who did not manifest symptoms indicating the 
presence of disease was free to disembark once details of his or her intended residence 
over the following days were recorded. These details were dispatched to the relevant 
local sanitary authorities who, for the known incubation period, observed the health of 
the passengers and crew of the vessel. The detention of the Iris passengers on board 
the Osprey for 18 days was thus not representative of the 'English System'. No 
separate vessel or large lazaretto, such as those provided at Pisa, Marseilles, and 
Venice, was maintained at the port to house shiploads of people for a period of 
observation. Their health was monitored by the relevant local authority and required 
only a minimum extension to the duties of the local medical and sanitary officers.
This allowed the Port Sanitary Authorities to conduct their duties in such a way as to 
maintain the efficiency required at a busy and congested port, such as London.
p e r i o d s  t o r  d i l ' t e r e n t  r i i s c a s e s  p a r l i c i i l a r l y c l i o l e i a  r e m a i n e d  \ a n a l i l e  I m t n u e l i  o l  t h e  
t e s t  ol  t h e  e e n l u r s ' .
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However, from very early in the history of the Port Sanitary Authority, the efficacy of 
the system was called into question. It was a problem that ensued for twenty years and 
yet was at the heart of the Port Sanitary Authority’s role. Essentially, the predicament 
was that quarantine remained a legal obligation for the reception of vessels carrying 
plague and yellow fever and, as the law ambiguously stated, fnher infectious disease 
or distem pe/^  highly dangerous to the health of His Majesty’s subjects’. This meant, 
in practice, that the Customs Service was legally obliged to approach the master of 
every ship entering a British port and make enquiries into the health of all persons on 
board.
The primary duty of the Customs officer is to guard the revenue; but he is 
further required to exercise certain functions in respect of the health of ships. 
Besides such duties, hardly more than nominal, imposed on him by the 
Quarantine laws, he has more important duties in respect of indigenous 
infections and cholera. He has to make inquiry as to the health of the port 
whence the vessel has come, and as to the health of the crew and passengers 
during the voyage home, and at the time of arrival. In the event of infectious 
sickness being reported to him, he is, in compliance with instructions from the 
Commissioners of Customs, to acquaint the local authority (Port or Riparian as 
the case may be) of the circumstance. Upon this authority will then devolve 
the responsibility of taking steps to prevent the introduction and spread of the 
disease.
Thus, the first boarding authority on all ships was the Customs Service, operating 
under the Quarantine Law of 1825. The Port Medical Officer of Health did not 
examine the passengers or crew of a ship unless the Quarantine Medical Officer 
referred him to the ship. The Quarantine Officer questioned the master of the vessel 
and only sent for the Port Medical Officer if he discovered that an infectious disease, 
beyond the jurisdiction of the Quarantine Law, was present. It was only then that an 
employee of the Port Sanitary Authority boarded a ship unless, as shall be 
demonstrated, particular circumstances prevailed. The Port Sanitary Authority had 
jurisdiction only over those diseases deemed to be 'indigenous' to the British Isles.
.\1> lUiiics.
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Diseases which were  classified as ‘exo t i c’ were the responsibil i ty of the Customs 
Service.
A Quarantine Medical Officer did not always board vessels with the Customs 
Boarding Officer. If a Customs Officer, while boarding a vessel alone, discovered a 
disease which was thought to be ‘exotic’, the Quarantine Medical Officer was brought 
to the ship to examine the case. In clearly ‘indigenous’ cases the Port Medical Officer 
would be summoned. Sometimes the nature of the disease was unclear and it was only 
after the arrival of the Quarantine Medical Officer that the Port Medical Officer was 
summoned. The length of time this naturally took compounded the problems of dual 
authority.
The precise meaning and limits of the term ‘other infectious disease or distemper’ was 
what proved most problematic. When the Quarantine Act was passed in 1825 the only 
‘exotic’ diseases at risk of being imported into the UK were plague and yellow fever. 
The first occurrence of cholera arrived some six years after the passing of the Act, in 
1831. Subsequently, it was unclear exactly how the disease was to be dealt with.
While the Quarantine Act remained the sole national system of port health, cholera 
was entirely the responsibility of the Customs Service -  as during the epidemics of 
1831-2 to 1866. However, responsibility and jurisdiction over cholera infected ships 
became an increasingly complicated issue after the establishment of the Port Sanitary 
Authority.
Reduced  to its most simplist ic terms, cholera could not be regarded as ent irely wi thin 
the jurisdict ion o f  the Quarant ine Service because it was not specifically named under  
the law, as plague and yel low fever were; and it was unclear whether  it could  be 
included under  the provis ions  o f  'other infectious disease or disteinpe.r\ If cholera did 
not fall strictly wi th in  the Quarant ine  Act,  was it within the remit of  the Sani tary 
Authori ties? This was  one of  the predominant  difficulties which the two authori ties at 
the ports faced - who  was  responsible for dealing with the arrival of  a cholera infected 
vessel ? Charles Follet,  o f  His Majes ty’s Customs Solici tors’ Department ,  when 
wri ting to Mr Suft at the Privy Counci l  later in the century,  claimed that ' taking the 
I Quarantine I Act as it stands by i t se l f . . .  that word (ic. ' i n fe c t ious '1 has only,  in my
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opinion, the limited meaning of quarantineable disease’'^ ' - by which he meant 
specifically plague and yellow fever. Yet, Customs impressed upon the Attorney 
General that the ‘diseases intended to be touched by the Quarantine Acts’ relate to 
‘plague and yellow fever because those are the diseases against which the Act was 
intended, but not meaning to exclude any other infectious exoteric [ie. exotic] 
diseases, as for instance, Asiatic Cholera’ This problem of jurisdiction remained 
until the repel of the Quarantine Act in 1896. Until then cholera infected vessel 
generally required clearance from the Customs Service to enter a port and isolation 
and medical treatment of cholera cases was the responsibility of the Port Sanitary 
Authority. However, this process altered at different times and sometimes in different 
ports making it impossible to define a single procedure for cholera in the period 1872- 
1896.
The problem of dual authority at the ports, shared between the Port Sanitary Authority 
and Customs Service, was not confined to the ambiguity of jurisdiction over cholera. 
Difficulties were also encountered with regard to the identification, notification and 
inspection of other diseases. While the Customs Service, for example, had the 
authority to detain vessels with an actual or suspected case of plague, yellow fever or 
cholera on board, it did not have the power to detain any other vessel. Even if, for 
example, a vessel was found by a Customs Boarding Officer to have a case of 
smallpox on board, the Officer could not legally order the detention of the vessel. This 
meant that the vessel could not be forced to remain at Gravesend by a Customs 
OiTicer while the Port Medical Officer of Health was informed of the presence of the 
disease and was brought to the ship to undertake his own inspection. Subsequently a 
vessel which carried an infectious disease could sail beyond Gravesend and into 
London, taking the disease with it. In 1882 the Port Sanitary Committee in London 
sent a letter to the Marine Department of the Board of Trade to express their concern.
The Port o f  London Sani tary Commit tee  have recently had under  serious 
considerat ion the question o f  the existing quarant ine protection o f  the Port of  
London and have arrived at the conclus ion (hat in one point the defence of  the 
C’iii/.ens of  London against that importation of  infectious disease is in some 
dearee defective.
\>. \  l . sni , )'R{) iX's I 17/67807
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u appears thaï when a vessel has on board a ease of in lee lions disease (other 
than cholera) and such case has been reported to the Medical Officer of Health 
of the Port of London, the Officer of H.M.Customs has no power to detain 
such vessel, until the arrival of the Medical Officer.
As the Port Sanitary Authority have not only a Medieal Officer stationed at 
Gravesend (Dr. Whitcombe) but also a hospital ship, (the 'Rhin’) it seems to 
them most undesirable that such cases should be allowed, under any 
circumstances, to pass up the River, increasing thereby, as it necessarily must, 
the danger of the importation of disease.^'^
This was not the first complaint of this nature that had been forwarded by the Port 
Sanitary Committee to the Board of Trade. The Committee offered solutions in order 
to improve the situation, including a serious recommendation for an extension to the 
powers of the Quarantine Officers. They suggested, in late 1882, that the Quarantine 
Boarding Officers should have the power to detain vessels which carried any 
infectious illness for a ‘reasonable period (say, six h o u r s ) t o  allow time for 
communication with, and the arrival of, the Medical Officer. The reply from 
Whitehall was negative, stating firstly that the laws of Quarantine were not eause for 
concern at the Customs Office, and secondly that it was not the place of the Sanitary 
Committee to 'take the initiative in proposing any alteration in the law ..., that in the 
opinion of (he Board of Customs any further restrictions than those at present in force 
would cause very serious inconveniences to the shipping in te re s ts ',T h e  Local 
Government Board supported this view and correspondingly sent a letter to the 
Committee. They agreed that any alteration to the law which increased the amount of 
time and number of vessels detained in the port would cause signit'icanl and unwanted 
'inconveniences’ to maritime traffic ‘and, as the Board understand, the Medical 
Officer of Health is promptly informed by telegraph of any case of infectious disease 
on board ship which comes to the knowledge of the officers of Her Majesty’s 
Customs. The board may add that they are advised that coasters and river vessels, 
which arc not boarded by Customs Officers, arc probably more likely to introduce 
infection than \ csscls from foreign p o r t s 'S o m e  serious issues were raised here in
’ N o \ .  1X91,  | ) R 0  C T  S T 4 6 / 9 5 / 2 . 5 3 0 8 .
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relation to the limitations of the Customs Service and the effectiveness of disease 
prevention under dual authority. However, because the suggested solutions would 
cause delays in maritime traffic the issue was dismissed.
The key problems in defining the respective roles of the Port Sanitary Authorities and 
the Customs Service continued to relate to the ambiguous position of cholera and the 
notification of disease between authorities. The effectiveness and role of the two 
authorities remained ill-defined well into the 1890s for two principal reasons. The 
first related to whether or not the failure of a master to report a case of ‘indigenous’ 
disease to a Customs Officer could result in prosecution. A master was required to 
give information about ‘any sickness’ which had occurred on board during the 
‘homeward’ passage. Although withholding this information would mean 
‘indigenous’ cases were not referred to the Port Sanitary Authority, Customs Officers 
were only concerned with quarantineable diseases. Masters could be prosecuted under 
the Quarantine Aet if they failed to report an ‘exotic’ disease to the Customs Officer, 
but not if they withheld information about an ‘indigenous’ disease. The second reason 
related more specifically to cholera. To which authority should cholera be assigned? 
Although it was classified as an ‘exotic’ disease, cholera had not been specifically 
named under the Quarantine Act. Could the Act be applied to cholera infected vessels; 
or should a Customs Officer refer cases of cholera to the Port Sanitary Authority?
The first of the two problems came to the attention of both authorities with the arrival 
into the East India Dock in May 1887 of a ship called Sfar o f Austria. An inspector 
from the Port Sanitary Authority examined the vessel having received information 
about a fatal case of remittent fever that had occurred on board during the voyage 
from India. On arrival at Mauritius the ship was placed in quarantine for three days 
and the quarters of the deceased crew mem her were thoroughly cleaned and 
disinfected with sulphur. However, a case of cholera also occurred on the vessel while 
it was still in Calcutta. Before the vessel departed the man was removed to hospital 
and his belongings were destroyed. When the vessel arrived in London the master of 
the vessel omitted to give the Customs Boarding Officer information either about the 
case of remittent fever or, more importantly, the cholera.
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Although the vessel is not liable to Quarantine, the master would have to 
truthfully answer the preliminary verbal (sic) questions as to ‘whence from’, 
‘state of health’, ‘any infectious illness during voyage’, and the like. And he 
could be prosecuted under the Quarantine Act for untrue answers to these 
questions.
If he had a case of cholera during the voyage or, as the words are, ‘in the 
homeward passage’ I should not hesitate to advise his prosecution, but his 
cholera case was all disposed of, bed and bedding and all, at Calcutta, with a 
clean Bill of Health there -  while the case ‘on the homeward passage’ was 
only a feverish attack.
It was argued that the master had not broken the law either by omitting the case of 
cholera, or by failing to inform the Customs Officer of the fatal case of fever which 
had occurred in the ‘homeward passage’. The case of cholera occurred before the 
vessel undertook the voyage and thus the master was not required to declare it. It was 
also questionable whether the case of remittent fever was ‘infectious’. Either way it 
remained uncertain whether the master had broken the law. If it was an infectious 
disease it was regarded as an ‘esoteric or indigenous disease’ and therefore not the 
responsibility of the Customs Service. As Collingridge wrote in a report to Customs, 
the Quarantine Act only related to exoteric diseases and especially plague and yellow 
fever’. I f  the case of remittent fever was not infectious, the master was not 
compelled to report it. Collingridge explained that there was neither any actual 
evidence ol the infectiousness of the fever, nor was it considered to have posed any 
‘serious’ threat to the public h ea lth .H o w ev er, the important point to be extracted 
from the Star o f Austria was the ambiguity surrounding the conditions under which a 
master was required to declare an illness to the Customs Boarding Officer and 
subsequently which authority then took charge of the case.
1 know that the preliminary questions, often put in the wind and rain and with 
some difficulty are not put very formally, and the question, ‘have you any 
infectious disease & c’. (sic) has grown into the question, ‘any sickness', but
(Jiuinintiiu’ Repulauons -  l i islmclioiis to Service, IHH7-ISRS. PRO ( 'lJS't'46/9.5/127 17
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the question is more or less a statutory one and the master is only bound to 
answer it truthfully according to its statutory limit.
This 'statutory lim it’ was at the heart of the ambiguity. The law was particularly 
unclear regarding the absolute boundaries of these ‘limits’. The problems of infectious 
disease categorisation and the boundaries of Port Sanitary and Customs authorities, 
which the Star o f Austria exposed retreated from discussion for a few years, but came 
to the fore again in 1891 with the arrival of another ship, the S.S. Memphis. This 
vessel presented a similar array of problems to those encountered in 1887. In this case 
the diseases involved were enteric fever and typhoid fever. Again the problem lay 
primarily in the question of whether or not a master was obliged to declare cases of 
‘indigenous’ diseases, such as these, to the Quarantine Officer.
It is very doubtful whether there could be a prosecution in this case as it is 
doubtful whether the Preliminary Quarantine Question as to ‘infectious 
disease’ can be held to apply to esoteric or indigenous diseases, and whether 
even an infectious disease other than plague or yellow fever need be 
mentioned in answer to these questions ... the Solicitor refers to an opinion 
given some years ago by the Law Officers of the Crown that ‘infectious’, in 
deciding the question of Quarantine or not, means foreign and not indigenous 
disease, and considers that it may be doubted whether a master would be liable 
if his answer made no mention of an indigenous disease which happened to be, 
or have been on board.
In this case it was feasible that unless changes were made in the law, or with regard to 
the Port Medical Officers of Health as a boarding authority, imported cases of 
‘indigenous’ di.sease could pass through the ‘first line of defence’. The problem was 
put to the Solicitor’s Department of Her Majesty’s Customs yet no definite solution 
was forthcoming.
 itiid.
"" PRO  C‘US't'46/95/l 1940.
Pan ol this draft letter was crossed out but remains legible. It displays some disagreement abotii the 
inleetious nature ol' some 'indigenous' disease
. .I it is understoodj that Dr Collingridge is prepared to gi\'c ;m o[miion that typhoid lexer is 
mieelious,  although it is believed to be the opinion ol certainly the great ma(orii\ ot médical 
men that this illness is not infectious, and that it prevails only epidemicallv in certain localities 
b\ each ease hav ing its origin in the same evil cause.
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As a matter of fact, my view has been this, viz. -  that under the Quarantine 
Act it is exceedingly doubtful whether any sickness of an indigenous character 
need be mentioned in answer to the [quarantine] questions, even if it is not 
perfectly certain that they need not; but that it is very probable that the scope 
of the Quarantine Act, in this respect, is altered by some references to it in the 
Public Health Acts, and that is why I say that T am disposed to think’ that any 
infectious disease should be mentioned.
However, this did not clarify the position of the law on what diseases should be 
mentioned in reply to the Quarantine questions, nor the responsibility under the law of 
the Customs Officers in determining the presence of disease, as the first boarding 
authority, for the officers of the Port Sanitary Authority. The solution became even 
less clear with receipt of a second letter from the Solicitor’s Department five days 
later.
When, in a question under that Act [Quarantine Act, 1825], you ask a man if 
there is any infectious disease on board his ship, he is entitled to understand 
the word in the meaning which that Act gives to it. If he does, he is answering 
truthfully; and, in that respect, is bound to answer truthfully, just in the same 
way as you say he is bound to answer truthfully when he is asked where he has
r lO’icome from.
The lawyer dealing wi th the case at the Sol ic itor ’s Department  of' Customs,  Char les  
Follctl,  was unable to decipher  what  specifically was meant  by ‘other infectious 
disease or d is temper  highly dangerous  to His Majes ty’s subjects’ . He asked the 
At torney General  what  these diseases referred to in relation to the practical 
application of  the Quarant ine  Act and the Public Health Act. According to the Privy 
Counci l,  Follett expla ined,  quarantineable  diseases rcf'crrcd only to plague and yel low 
fewer, al though he mainta ined that these diseases were only the principal d iseases  
against which the Act was aimed,  and that the Act was ‘not meant to exclude an\  
o ther infectious, exoter ic disease, as for instance, Asiatic ( ' h o le ra ' . ' " '  He suggested
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lhal (he ‘other infectious disease]s| or distemper]sj’ could be a reference to ‘infectious 
diseases placed under the charge of the Public Health Act’. This would solve the 
problem of what diseases masters were obliged to report. It would require ‘an 
extension by Parliament of the meaning of the word ‘infectious’ in the Quarantine 
Act’ and would ‘enlarge its meaning beyond what has, for many years been attached 
to it’.'"^ However, the reply from the Royal Courts of Justice, did little more than 
bring the problem almost full circle -returning it to the point from which it had begun.
We have considered the points which you suggest, but we still think that if in 
fact there exists on board the ship a disease or sickness which would fall 
within the plain language of the questions addressed to the master, he is liable 
to a penalty if he does not answer them correctly.
Again, the problem was what was meant and what were the legal obligations within 
the ‘plain language of the questions’? Another problem associated with the 
Quarantine Questions was the necessity it placed on laymen to diagnose illness if 
there was no surgeon on board. The master of a vessel, with no medical knowledge, 
informed the Boarding Officer of any disease on board. Being a layman, incorrect 
statements about the nature of the disease often occurred. This ignorance of medicine 
was, however, also used as an excuse to conceal infectious diseases which, if 
discovered, might cause costly delays.
The main object  to the provision as to ‘any i llness’, which the Privy Counci l  
were so s trong for, was to prevent a serious illness on board being, for the sake 
of  keeping the ship unfettered,  called intentionally and decept ively something 
which it was  not -  something,  neither fever, or contagious , nor infectious;  as 
for instance scarlet fever might  deceitfully by the master  be called del i rium 
tremors,  and no notice be taken of  it. There have been instances where masters  
had tricked the health requirements in this way, and yet where it was hard to 
penalise them,  for they could always plead, (if they had no surgeon on board) 
that they really d id n ’t know,  and believed the illness to be what they said.'*'
ibi J.
P R O  Ct PS  IOb/PS/ : . ^  >f)V.
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The use of Quarantine facilities by the Port Sanitary Authority in cases of cholera was 
also problematic. As the disease was ‘exotic’, could quarantine hospitals be used by 
Medieal Officers of Health; and what authority did relevant sections of the Public 
Health Acts have over Quarantine for the reeeption of this disease?
In 1887, for example, the Privy Council on behalf of the Local Government Board 
appealed to the Law Officers’ Department of the Royal Courts of Justice, requesting 
advice as to whether or not the two quarantine hulks, moored in the Motherbank at 
Southampton, could be used, ‘for purposes other than strictly quarantine purposes, 
viz. For the reception of cholera patients’. The reply from the Law Officers’ 
Department was negative, suggesting only that, either a new order be formed under 
the Public Health Act or the quarantine laws should be reassessed with the purpose of 
broadening the scope of quarantineable diseases. As cholera was not strictly a 
‘quarantineable’ disease, use of facilities maintained specifically for such diseases 
was not, under the law, allowed. ‘In our opinion,’ they replied, ‘the Loeal 
Government Board have no power under the existing laws, to make the orders 
proposed .. .It seems to us that the order proposes to mix up the functions of the 
Customs Authorities, under the Quarantine Act, and of the local authorities under the 
Public Health Act, and we doubt very much whether Section 130 [of the Public 
Health Act 1875] or any other sections of the Public Health Act, would justify the 
provisions of the order’. ( S e c t i o n  130 referred to the power of the Local 
Government Board to alter or revoke any regulation in order to prevent the spread of 
cholera.) Interestingly, the letter demonstrates that not only were the powers of the 
sanitary authorities, under section 130, insufficient in allowing them to utilise 
quarantine facilities in the prevention of cholera, but also that cholera was considered 
sufficiently beyond the jurisdiction of the Quarantine Act for any of its facilities to be 
used in the prevention of the disease. Yet, although it may appear clear here that 
cholera was no longer felt to be the responsibility of the Customs Service, the 
example cited of the problems caused by the Star o f Austria along with various others 
demonstrate that the nature and definition of cholera under the law remained 
ambiauoLis.
ihu
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The Port Sanitary Authority was established alongside an existing system of 
prevention at the ports which was very specifically focused in law and practice on one 
tightly defined category of disease. Adding the sanitary system for the prevention of 
‘indigenous’ disease at the ports meant, however, a necessary level of accommodation 
by the quarantine authorities which was difficult to achieve within the constraints of 
the law. Dual authority did not merely mean the addition of the Port Sanitary 
Authority as a separate entity within disease prevention but required mutual co­
operation and compromise where there was an overlap in the function of the two 
authorities. As seen the overlap in the boundaries and jurisdiction of the two 
authorities was an area which lacked legal clarity. On the whole this did not 
ultimately cause great problems in the actual implementation of prophylaxis but 
caused an expense and waste of time which could not be accepted at the ports.
What was not ambiguous was that plague and yellow fever remained solely within the 
jurisdiction of the Quarantine Act. In June 1889 the S.S.Neva arrived in Southampton 
from Brazil. On board was the body of one of three deaths from yellow fever which 
had occurred on the homeward voyage, as well as a further surviving acute case on 
board. On arrival the Customs Officer and Quarantine Medical Officer came 
alongside, and learning of the cases ordered the vessel back out to sea to bury the 
body and then to return to the Motherbank in quarantine. Under orders from the Privy 
Council the infected man, with the ship’s surgeon and two attendants, was removed to 
another vessel, the Menelaus, while the remaining passengers and crew were confined 
upon a third vessel, the Edgar. The Neva was disinfected with ‘nitrous fumes’ after 
which the crew was returned to it in order that it remained on its moorings. A special 
night watch was established to ‘prevent intercommunication with those in quarantine’, 
while precautions were made to ensure that personal contact was avoided when letters 
and provisions were delivered to each of the three vessels. Letters which were passed 
from the ships were fumigated before being despatched. The infected man -  Andrews, 
the waiter - died two days after the vessel arrived in Southampton on June 13. No 
further cases were reported on either the Neva or Edgar and on June 19 the passengers 
and crew were released ‘with great rejoicing, cheering, guns firing, and the like'. I'hc 
surgeon and attendants were released from the Meneiaus on .lune 21,"*'
" "  Bla.xal i ,  ' R e p o r t  o n  t he  .Sleani .ship NEVA in Q u a r t m t i n e  at  t he  M o i l i c r b a n k .  . lone IHHV, o n  .Account  
o f  Y e l l o w  b'ex'ci ' .  N i n c t c c n t h  A n n i i d l  R e p o r t  o f  t he  I . CB.  IHHV-VO S u p p l e m e n t  C o n i a t n i n p  t he  R e p o i i  
ol  t h e  M e d i e a l  O f l i m  r. ( l . o n t l o n :  H M S O .  1890) ,  | C .  6 141  I f  A p p e n d i x  A No .  15. p. 1.36 4 I
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Although isolated, this case not only demonstrates the procedures which were carried 
out on quarantined vessels in the late nineteenth century, but also indicates that the 
practice had not entirely ceased to exist in British ports. Had more cases of yellow 
fever, or indeed plague, oceurred prior to 1896 and after the establishment of the Port 
Sanitary Authority similar procedures would have been employed. Yellow fever and 
plague remained firmly under the Quarantine Act and, as the Neva demonstrated, the 
act was still enforced in the (rare) occurrence of these diseases during this period. 
Where Britain differed from other nations was that it did not apply the same 
quarantine procedures in instances of cholera infected vessels.
The only two published texts which deal specifically with the demise of the 
quarantine system in Britain in the late nineteenth century and the rise of the Port 
Sanitary Authorities are by J.C. McDonald and Anne H ardy." ' While providing a 
thorough outline of the key events and debates in this history, both imply a fairly 
linear progression from the rise of the ‘English System’ to the subsequent dissolution 
of quarantine. They imply that the quarantine system faced an inevitable fall in the 
face of the successes of public health reform and that any problems faced by the 
English preventative system were smoothly and efficiently remedied once it had 
achieved the consensus of government and medical opinion. They ignore the fact that 
the respective roles of Quarantine and Port Sanitary Authorities remained ambiguous 
into the middle of the 1890s, and that despite opposition, the role of quarantine 
remained prominent within the operation of port prophylaxis. Hardy, for instance, 
argues that ‘the procedures for the detention of imported disease on incoming ships 
continued unsatisfactory (sic] until the Shipping Act 1885’.' However, as the above 
examples illustrate, this was not the case. Similarly, McDonald has suggested that the 
move to include cholera under the Quarantine Act in 1831 became a permanent 
arrangement,"'^ where in fact it was only a temporary measure.
Disease prevent ion at the ports remained ‘tw o-prong ed ’. W h i l e  Peter Baldwin,  in 
his extens ive book.  Contagion and the State in Europe, 1SS0-I9S0, recognises this
See. Hardy. 'Cholera', and MacDonald,  'The History ol Quarantine'. 
" Haidy, Cholera' p. 260 C' iny italics).
McDonald,  ' I'he History of Quarantine', p. 28.
' ' ' Baldwin, ('onla^ioi] diul the Stale,  p. 149.
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duality he underestimates the continuation of quarantine as a working component of 
prophylaxis. ‘The British did not abandon the protection of quarantine until they fell 
secure behind the bulwark of their hygienic reforms’. " '’ Baldwin dates this 
achievement around 1884, and although it might be argued that security in ‘hygienic 
reforms’, which Hardy also emphasised, had been realised by the 1880s, quarantine 
remained. Although it was an isolated case, the Neva exemplified the fact that the 
Privy Council still retained the power to enforce quarantine in cases of ‘exotic’ 
disease at least until 1889. Other factors also compelled Britain to retain the presence 
of quarantine authorities at the ports particularly in relation to cholera.
What none of these authors take into consideration in their assessments of port 
prophylaxis in this period was the international pressures which were exerted on 
Britain with regard to quarantine. Although Britain had established a system of 
sanitary control for infectious disease which enabled the country to be less reliant on 
quarantine as the first and only line of defence, British port prophylaxis could not be 
separated from contemporary quarantine policies, practices and theories which existed 
beyond British shores.
The way that Britain dealt with the arrival of vessels carrying infectious disease was 
greatly determined by the external pressures put on her by European powers and the 
large imperial shipping and trading companies. As 1 have indicated in this chapter, 
one of the key, if not most important, factors which influenced British opposition to 
quarantine was its effect on trade and commerce. While the enormous expense caused 
by quarantine and the apparent futility of the system as an effective method of 
prophylaxis were weighty reasons for Britain to abolish the use and legal obligation of 
the practice particularly from the 1870s when an apparently superior method of 
prevention had been established, external pressures to maintain quarantine at any cost 
were such that the difficulties of dual authority continued in the ports into the middle 
of the 1890s. Hardy, McDonald and Baldwin, in overlooking the importance of 
international opinion and other external pressures, have been unable to account for the 
continued presence of the Customs Service in port prophylaxis into the 1890s and 
ha\e subsequently ignored the complexities and ambiguities which the continued thial 
authority entailed.
i bkl  p 15(1.
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TABLE Hi
Return o f Vessels Inspected, Cleaned, Fumigated and Number o f  Infectious 
Disease Cases Dealt With -  Port o f London, I873-I893
Year Number o f  
Vessels 
Inspected
Number o f  
Vessels 
Cleaned
Number o f  
Vessels 
Fumigated
Number of 
Infectious 
Disease Cases 
Dealt With
1873 1,999 338 9 83
1874 13,846 2,330 10 54
1875 14,847 1,788 5 120
1876 13,839 1,384 4 1
1877 14,310 754 10 3
1878 13,463 407 12 1
1879 14,804 516 6 -
1880 16,341 563 9 4
1881 22,315 428 30 28
1882 22,333 506 29 36
1883 26,833 1,102 22 19
1884 25,333 1,598 24 48
1885 24,327 1,819 33 32
1886 23,207 1,670 21
1887 21.855 1,744 23 1 10
1888 19,743 1,005 25 82
1889 19C^6 606 19 36
1890 15,446 679 37 85
1891 15,341 402 27 76
1892 14,472 426 54 1 14
1893* 8 J 7 3 341 42 82
Total 362,823 20,416 451 1,057
'■■ (to end of  July)
Si ni rcc ;  C I R O .  R<i\al  ( n in n u s s in i i  I S V J  C i t \  o f  L o n d o n  : S io l c iu c n l  o \  lo d ie  O i i t t in .  l \>.\it ion.  
L o u  f j  \ . D u t ie s ,  on t !  /■ i n o n c e  o f  th e  ( ' o r p o r o t io n  o f  L o n d o n .  (( iuikl luil l :  1 89,3 ). p. 2 11 2
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CHAPTER TWO; ‘Theoretical O pinions...’: Contagionisni/Anticontagionism, 
Cholera, Bacteriology and Empire
The Contagion / Anticontagion Debate
The medical theories of contagion and anticontagion have long been associated with 
the policy and practice of quarantine, forming an essential part of any debate 
concerning the implementation of various methods for the prevention of imported 
infectious disease. Although the origin of the debate between anti-quarantine 
anticontagionism and pro-quarantine contagionism (to begin with a simple 
dichotomy) predates the particular period to which my work refers, I will necessarily 
have to rely upon some of this earlier material to inform my discussion. Much has 
been written about the contagion/anticontagion debate of the early nineteenth century 
and its relevance to quarantine. The key discussion concerning this relationship has 
been continued over a thirty-five year period, from Erwin Aekerknecht (1948), to 
Margaret Pelling (1978), and Roger Cooter (1982).* The first to draw attention to the 
association between contagionism and quarantine, was Aekerknecht’s publication, 
'Anticontagionism between 1821 and 1867’. This paper, a key text in history of 
medicine and social constructionism, argued that prior to Pasteur, Koch, and the germ 
theory, contagionism was devalued and widely rejected as a theory of disease 
aetiology, while anticontagionism was, particularly in the middle decades of the 
century, accepted and endowed with scientific respectability. Yet, this ascendancy of 
one theory over another did not relate merely to medical knowledge, but coincided 
with the rise of liberalism - as later the acceptance of contagionism did with the 
'victory of reaction’.^  As Cooter wrote in his critique of the paper, 'contemporary 
discussion was not, in Aekerknecht’s opinion, merely theoretical or even medical but, 
rather, was animated by “powerful social and political factors’’. In particular, 
contemporary discussion centred on contagionism’s material expression: the 
quarantines and their bureaucracy’.^
AckcrkncdH. 'Anticontagioni.sni'; Pelting, Cholera, h'cvcr and Cnv.lish iVIcdii inc. Cooler. 
A  n U e o n U i g i o n i s i n ’ .
A c k c r k n e c l u ,  ' A i K i c o n i a g i o n l s n i ’ , p.  . 589.
C o o l e r .  ' . A n t i c o n t a g i o n i s m ' ,  p. 89.
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Aekerknecht\s paper has been generally unquestioned by medical historians; indeed it 
has left a great body of scholarship in its wake, yet Margaret Pelling in her book, 
Cholera, Fever and English Medicine, J825-J865, challenged Aekerknecht’s 
association of anticontagionism and liberalism and even questioned the validity of the 
terms ‘contagionism’ and ‘anticontagionism’. She objected to Aekerknecht’s claim 
that anticontagionism was a dominant theory among medical men in this period, and 
to the suggestion that medicine was more politically than scientifically informed in 
this period than in any other. Her objections, as clearly laid out by Cooter, were 
threefold;
1) the epidemiological theory that was developing in the first half of the 
nineteenth century was no less ‘scientific’ than the germ theory that appeared 
later.
2) the majority of the English medical profession by the m id-1840s were not 
anticontagionists, but were contingent contagionists, holding that the cause of 
epidemic diseases were multifactoral, though related to the environment.
3) the terms ‘contagionist’ and ‘anticontagionist’ are entirely inadequate, for they 
misleadingly summarise the contemporary concern with epidemic diseases in 
terms of simple opposites when in fact medical reality was highly complex 
and multifaceted.'*
Cooter  acknowledged the value and scholarship  of  both papers but reduced Pe l l ing’s 
interpretation to a ‘d ichotomised posit ivist  f r amework’'' and argued that, ‘by  
conf la ting ant icontagionism with one  o f  its prime rationalisations (quarant ine 
abolit ion),  Aekerknecht  e l iminated the inherent status o f  the knowledge,  render ing it 
merely  an cp iphenomenal  reflex to socioeconomic  interest'.*’ That is, Aekerknecht ' s  
model  reduced ant icontagionism to merely a response to the interests of  quarantine 
abolit ion.  Instead, Coo ter  concluded that ‘ant icontagionism as a knowledge product 
can be seen as mutual ly  consti tutive with the historical condi tions  that gave rise to (he 
social context  in wh ich  the knowledge was called forth’.^
' ibid. p. 90.
 ^ ibid. p. 92.
'' ibid. p. 9.L 
I I n d .  p 100.
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Baldwin also entered into the debate in his 1999 monograph. Like Cooter, he 
challenges Aekerknecht’s model ‘that nations have chosen prophylactic strategies in 
line with their political proclivities -  for reasons ... that have as much to do with their 
nature as with the epidemic faced’.** His analysis of prophylactic strategies employed 
on both sea and land in Europe over the period of a century includes not only sanitary 
cordons but also vaccination and the regulation of prostitution. Baldwin argues that 
the simple model where autocracy and restriction, and liberalism and anti-intervention 
go hand in hand, and where ‘prophylaxis is a continuation of politics,’^  does not work. 
He argues that the ‘Ackerknechtians all-explaining single cause was doubtless 
important, but alone it is insufficient’.'** Although he concedes that a close connection 
did exist between prophylaxis and politics, other factors such as geoepidemiology 
need to be included within the model. However, although a broader approach is 
welcome, Aekerknecht’s model was not intended to apply to all prophylactic 
measures and all contagious disease. Rather, Aekerknecht discussed the particularly 
strong and inextricable link between politics, policy and the restraints quarantine 
enforced on free movement and trade.
These works offer a range of conclusions relating to the social construction of, and 
motivation behind, the theory of anticontagionism. Aekerknecht argued that 
anticontagionism, although ‘based on a wrong scientific theory’, was conceived not 
merely to deal with a medical problem but also social problems. He argued that 
‘anticontagionists were thus not simply scientists, they were reformers, fighting for 
the freedom of the individual and commerce against the shackles of despotism and 
reaction’."  It was the anticontagionsts’ association with social reform, Aekerknecht 
argued, that was as, if not more, appealing than its scientific merits to the large 
majority of the medical profession in the early nineteenth century. The social reform 
Aekerknecht particularly pointed to was the abolition of quarantine. Cooter, on the 
other hand, argued that anticontagionism was more of a general theory which 
supported an increased control over the new, industrialised urban environment. Rather 
than the randomness that contagion and the ‘contagious agent’ presented.
’’ Baldwin, Conlcipion and the Stale,  p. 24.
"  i h i d .  p .  3 5 .
ihid. p. 242.
" .Ackcrkneciit, ‘Aiiticontaginnisnr. p. 567.
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anlicontagion presented individuals with a means to lake control over their own health 
and existence. Anticontagionism ‘moralised’ that individuals could be spared the evils 
of disease through a purification of their environment.
Looked at this way, the knowledge of anticontagionism can be seen not as 
casually linked to the economy nor simply as a direct reflection of it, but 
rather, as a mystified mediation of the constitutive changes in social relations 
of production contingent upon the advance of urban industrial capitalism.'^
Similarly, Pelling criticised Aekerknecht for his over reliance on economic concerns, 
and for his dichotomised interpretation of nineteenth century disease theory. She 
concluded that:
the overriding crises of the nineteenth century were social and political, to 
which medical men, not as a single class, but as members of a range of classes 
in society, responded according to their different convictions and interests.
The intellectual response to crisis is not necessarily, or even generally 
dogmatic. In nineteenth century epidemiology the social and the scientific 
very plainly meet, and I would argue that the main product of mid-nineteenth 
century epidemiology was a kind of compromise; not essentially an area 
occupied by moderates and the non-committal, but an intelligent position 
consistent with interest, experience, and methodology alike.
Yet, despite Cooter and Pelling’s persuasive arguments and alternative models, 
Aekerknecht’s thesis should not be discounted. The principal premise of his paper that 
‘the whole discussion w as... never a discussion on contagion alone, but always on 
contagion and quarantine [his emphasis]’'"' appears to be well supported in the 
contemporary literature. As Richard Evans observed:
Polling disputes  the validity o f  the miasmatist  /  contagionist  dist inction; but 
while her object ions  may be justified in terms of  scientific theory alone,  the
('ot)tcr. 'AiUiconiayionism', p. 99.
' I ’ c l l i n p .  C lio lrn i ,  l-'i \ c r  a n d  fn ip t ish  M ed ic in e ,  p .  . 3 1 0 .  
‘ .Aekerknecht. .Anlieuntn^ionisni'. p. 567.
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distinclion was clear enough lo contemporaries ,  not least because it was 
always unders tood in terms o f  its implications for quarantine. '^
This is a key point which Felling, and to a lesser extent Cooler, ignores. In the earlier 
part of the nineteenth century to which their work refers, the terms ‘contagionism’ and 
‘anticontagionism’ were widely used especially by members of the medical 
profession. They were distinct labels applied by physicians to identify themselves and 
others, and as such, purposefully created dichotomies. Later in the century, as we 
shall see, the distinctions were not so frequently or directly used; yet they 
undoubtedly remained. Part of the distinction which identified those physicians who 
subscribed to contagionist, or anticontagionist theories of the spread of infectious 
disease, was without a doubt the position they adopted on the much discussed issue of 
maritime quarantine. Neither Cooler nor Felling take much time to address the 
important issue of quarantine in their review of Ackerknecht’s work, or in their 
analysis of medical theories of infectious disease aetiology. As Ackerknecht 
maintained, any attempt to discuss the various medical theories relating to quarantine 
cannot be done without considering their economic and political composition and 
implications. W hether the discussion is focused on the pre-germ theory period of 
contagionism / anticontagionism, or on the squabbles of the immediate post­
bacteriology period, this consideration remains the same.
By the last quarter o f  the century the terms ‘contagionist ’ and ‘ant icontagionist ’ had 
begun to take on slightly different meanings .  Being ‘contagionis t ’ meant  that one 
bel ieved in the theory o f  disease ae tiology which held that a specific d isease entity,  or 
‘g e r m ’, independent  o f  locality, was the causat ive agent of  disease,'^' and that this 
organism could pass f rom one person to another either though exhalat ions  or excreta.  
Al though in the ear ly  1880s these organisms had not all necessarily been specifically 
identified, they were  according to this theory nonetheless responsible for the spread o f  
disease. '^ The opposing  theoretical  camp,  no longer exact ly the ‘ant icontagionist '  
‘miasmat is ts ’ o f  earl ier  decades ,  were  called by contemporar ies ‘non-contagionis ts ’. 
Between these theories  lay, as Fel ling has shown,  the ‘cont ingent  contagionis ts ' .  
Theor ies  which occupied this ‘middle -ground’ generally did not dispute the
b\ans .  Death in Hamburg,  p. 26S ii. .'16.
Worboys. Sprcadinit (ienns.  p. 35-6.  
ihul. p I4X.
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possibility of an infective agent, but required for a disease lo take hold the 
predisposing factors of an individual’s general ‘sickly’ constitution and, most 
importantly, an environment of filth, bad ventilation, and general uncleanliness. It 
also depended upon meteorological and climatic conditions. Thus, essentially, the 
non-contagionists and contingent contagionists of the late nineteenth century shared 
with the anticontagionist of the early and mid-nineteenth century, the belief that the 
maintenance of a sufficient standard of cleanliness and sanitation was essential in 
protecting a locality from the ravages of infectious disease. The dominance of this 
‘middle ground’ is evident throughout the medical discourse of public health. In the 
Annual Report of the Local Government Board in 1885, for example, George 
Buchanan, Chief Medical Officer of the Board, wrote that ‘when a case of cholera is 
imported into any place, the disease is not likely to spread, unless in proportion as it 
finds, locally open to it, certain facilities for spreading by indirect infection’}^  
Ackerknecht, despite Felling’s criticisms, did discuss the role of a ‘large centre of 
moderates ... the so-called contingent contagionists’, in the period between 1821 and 
1867. Yet, although Ackerknecht accepts a wider interpretation of medical theories 
than the simple dichotomy of contagion and anticontagion, his argument, and mine, is 
that the polarisation lay not in medical theory but in the practical application of 
prophylaxis at the ports -  quarantine or sanitary inspection.''^
However, even this dichotomy may be challenged. Michael Worboys argues in his 
monograph. Spreading Genus, that the practical applications of disease theories In 
preventative public health were divided into ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ programmes. 
‘Inclusive’ practices focused entirely on prevention through environmental 
improvements and adhered to anticontagionist, miasmatic theories of disease. 
‘Exclusionary’ methods were any which aimed to prevent the transmission of disease 
from person to person, and used, for example, disinfection or isolation.”" The latter 
focused on individuals rather than the environment in preventing disease. As Worboys 
points out, historians generally place the transition of public health from 
environmentally centred policies to those focused more on individuals to around the 
late 1880s and 1890s. Yet he argues that increasing emphasis on the ‘exclusi\’c'
Ckorge Ikichanan, ‘Precautions Against Cholera', Ponrlcciiih A iiiiik/I Hcpori nj the iXiP.  ISbd  
Siipplciiicii! Coitlaiiii/ii^ the Report  of the Medical  Officer, (I.oiuion; iiyre am! .SpoiiiswiiiKle. IKSSi. 
Appendix A. p. 24, |C .45i6) .  (original emphasis).
.Ackerknecht, 'Anticontagionism',  p. 56V. 
" W o r h o y s ,  Spreadimt Oeritis. p. 109-] 10.
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methods of isolation, notification and disinfection through the 1870s, ‘shows that 
person-centred approaches were ... used much earlier’.”' Indeed, the duties assigned 
to Leach and Whitcombe in London at the inception of the Port Sanitary Authority in 
1873 were particularly focused on the use of disinfection and isolation of the sick. 
This example both further enforees W orboys's claim for an earlier introduction of 
these practices and also demonstrates that ‘exclusion’ was integral to the ‘English 
system’ through its incorporation of practices aimed at preventing person to person 
infection. However, the ‘English system’ also relied heavily upon the ‘inclusionary’ 
preventive methods of continuing and maintaining environmental improvements in 
the port, in internal sanitary districts and aboard vessels. The simple dichotomy of 
sanitary inspection versus quarantine at the ports as a divide between environmental 
sanitary methods and exclusionary quarantines, does not, therefore, work in 
W orboys’s model. The ‘English system’ sits therefore as a practical application of the 
same ‘middle ground’ occupied by contingent- (or non-) contagionist theories. 
However, although neither the medical theoretical nor practical prevention of 
infectious diseases can be easily dichotomised, for the purpose of both my argument 
and the argument o f those involved in the nineteenth century, some polarisation is 
necessary.
Ackerknecht’s model, in contrast to Cooter and Felling, argues that anticontagionism 
was a theory which was essentially and directly developed in response to 
socioeconomic concerns relating to ‘quarantines and their bureaucracy’. The origins 
of anticontagionism in the earlier part o f the century have been sufficiently explored 
by Ackerknecht, Felling, Cooter, and Baldwin. In the late nineteenth century 
contingent and non-contagionism was also, at the ports, interdependent with the 
economic and political interests of the maritime trade. Although there were shifts 
within the structures of publie health in the 1880s and 1890s in response to 
developments in bacteriology and laboratory medicine,”" the politically important 
implications of infectious disease aetiology at the ports maintained notions of non- 
contagionism well into the so-called ‘bacteriological era’. This allied the ports more
ihki. p. 131. 
thui. Chapter 7.
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toward the theories o f  disease t ransmiss ion maintained in I n d i a , t h a n  those which 
were developing wi thin  Britain.
This was most clearly demonstrated at the International Sanitary Conferences of the 
second half of the nineteenth century, where it was clearly illustrated that those 
theories exhibited by the British and Anglo-Indian delegates were those which 
unequivocally supported their economic and political interests regarding maritime 
trade and trade routes. Despite various developments in understandings of infectious 
disease aetiology made during the second half of the century, Britain’s political and 
medical position at the conferences was almost entirely without modification between 
the first conference held in 1851 and those held in the late 1880s and early 1890s. The 
non-contagious nature of cholera, and to a lesser extent plague and yellow fever, was 
the basis of Britain’s objection to quarantine at both a domestic and international 
level. Non-contagious disease theories, and those which were contingent on location, 
provided medical justification against maritime quarantine and were maintained 
unwaveringly by British delegates over five decades of international conferences, 
despite the often overwhelming resistance of other representative states.
The International Sanitary Conferences 1851-1881
To understand the s ignificance o f  contagionism, non-contagionism, or contingent  
contagionism in the deve lopmen t  o f  prophylaxis  at British ports it is essential  to 
examine how Britain responded to issues relating particularly to cholera,  as they 
occurred beyond her own  shores and those o f  her colonies.  It is also impor tant  to 
address the pressures  p laced on Britain by other states, such as France and Ge rm any ,  
in an analysis of the deve lopmen t  o f  British quarant ine policy and practice.  The 
International Sani tary Conferences  began in 1851 (see T A B L E  II) and were  the 
principal stage upon which international tensions concerning the scientific and 
political implicat ions  of  quarantine in relation to cholera were played out. It was  here 
that the importance of  international mari t ime sanitary cordons  were shown  to ha\  e 
direct bearing on the development  o f  policy and practice in Bri tain' s domest ic  ports,
Jcrcm\' Isaacs. I) IX C’unniiigliam and (lie Aetiology otCholera in liritish India. 1S6V-ISV7'. 
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and on the scicnlific theory of contingent contagionism maintained in Britain in 
relation to the ports.
The proceedings and scientific background to the conferences have been exhaustively 
covered in a series of papers written by Norman Howard-Jones for the WHO 
Chronicle in 1974. "^  ^Neville Goodman, W.F. Bynum and a subsequent World Health 
Organisation publication have provided small additions to Howard-Jones’s work,"'’ 
and I, like them, will not attempt to traverse all of the same ground so amply covered 
by Ho ward-Jones. However, as the period covered by, and the length and 
complexities of, the conferences are so extensive, I will rely on these previous works 
to summarise the early conferences before discussing the conferences from 1881 in a 
manner more directly related to my own research. It is important to recount some of 
the details of these earlier conferences in order to place British attitudes towards the 
end of the century within the context of three decades of conferences.
Britain was, until the closing decade of the nineteenth century, very much alone in her 
opposition to quarantine as an appropriate prophylaxis for cholera and similarly alone 
in her unerring adherence to a non-contagionist theory of cholera aetiology. As Joseph 
Fayrer observed in 1888,
measures of prevention and quarantine have been the subject of international 
conferences held at Constantinople in 1866, Vienna in 1874, and Rome in 
1885. The theories on which the measures recommended are grounded have 
undergone little change since the conference at Constantinople in 1866; the 
basis on which all conferences with regard to preventive measures are built is 
still, as it was then, the theory of contagion.""
Fayrer was President of the India Office Medical Board and medical delegate 
representing the government of India at the International Sanitary Conferece in
1-1(1 ward-Jones, 'The Scientific Background’, 1-5, WHO Chronicle,  2X (1V74).
Cioodnian, International Health Organisations',  Bynum, ‘Policing Hearls ol Darkness’; WHO, I'hr 
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1885.”^  He was particularly averse lo any theory or practice which even slightly 
resembled contagionism.^^ However, his assertion that ‘the theory of contagion’ was 
‘the basis’ of the early conferences did not constitute much of an exaggeration. It may 
be said, at the risk of generalising, that where cholera was concerned, most of Europe 
was unanimous in adhering to more contagionist theories - both in methods of 
prophylaxis and with regard to its origin. Nonetheless, the purpose of the conferences 
was to determine the present state of knowledge on cholera -  although some also 
included plague and yellow fever - and agree on the best means of preventing its 
spread. International opinion differed in these matters and political tensions filtered 
through the discussions, as for example between the German and French delegates 
following the Franco-Prussian War, and between the British and French after Britain’s 
unilateral termination of dual control of Egypt.^^ However, there remained an 
acceptance that cholera was an international problem which could only be dealt with 
by the arrival at some manner of international agreement regarding its prevention.
It was thus that, as The Times reported on September 20‘" 1851, the principal 
questions to be addressed by the first conference were;
Is the cholera contagious? Are the quarantine regulations against this disease 
necessary for public safety? In the case of plague, is it safe to adopt the system 
practised by Austria of allowing the quarantine to commence from the date of 
the sailing of the vessel from its last port, instead of that of its arrival at the 
port of destination? Is it advisable to form a general sanitary board 
representing all the maritime powers, and to appoint for each port where a 
quarantine shall exist a medical officer of health who shall represent not 
merely the country in which he resides but all the maritime powers, and whose 
declaration shall be conclusive, unless it be set aside by the decision of the 
board on the remonstrances to which it shall give rise. '"
tXiyrer (1824-1907) became President o f  the India Office Medical Board in 1872. He became 
personal physician tc the Prince of  Wales and president of  the bpidemiological .Society m I 879. He 
was made Companion of  the Order of  the Star of  India in 1868 and a baronet m 1896. I'or tiiore 
biographical information see, Harrison, Public Health in British India, p. 260, lU. 87.
ibid., p. 54-6 & I 11-2.
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’ Report Irom the Londofi Mediccd (iazette,  which appeared in. The Pinie.s, September 20. 1851. p 8e
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The first International Sanitary Conference was attended by representatives of twelve 
European stales (including Turkey), with the purpose of reaching international 
agreement on quarantine regulations and the contagiousness of the quarantinable 
diseases, plague, yellow fever and particularly cholera. There was a growing trend for 
international discussion on all number of relevant issues of the day such as the 
regulation of postal communications, patents and copyright, labour regulations and 
railway freight transportation. In the year of the first great International Exhibition 
held in London, international public health arose as an issue in response to the 
growing need for greater international co-operation which accompanied the 
improvements of industrialisation to transport and communieations. After a few 
abortive attempts by the British and French governments in the 1830s and 1840s, in 
the wake of Europe’s first encounter with epidemic cholera, to bring together an 
international conference on quarantine, the first conference was opened on July 23“' 
1851. The central agenda of the conference was to fix a minimum requirement for 
maritime quarantine in order, as the President of the Conference explained in his 
opening speech, to render ‘important services to the trade and shipping of the 
Mediterranean, while at the same time safeguarding the publie health’. '^
The conference, which was attended by a diplomatic and medical representative from 
each of the represented states, lasted six months and consisted of 48 plenary sessions 
and numerous committee meetings. By the close of proceedings on January 19, 1852, 
a convention containing 137 articles of international sanitary regulations had been 
pi'oduced in draft form and signed by all 24 delegates (two from each country). 
However, only four of the twelve states signed the final draft of the convention and of 
these only France and Sardinia ratified the agreement.'" Part of the problem was that 
voting was undertaken by individual representatives rather than by country. 
Fundamental difficulties resulted from trying to reconcile the opinions, not only of the 
different governments, but of the diplomatic representatives and the physicians who 
often disagreed on the efficacy of imposing sanitary cordons on infected or suspected 
ships.
' WHO. !1}C hirsi Ten i'ears, p. 6. 
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Whether cholera was 'epidem ic’, ‘infectious’ or ‘contagious’ was one of the most 
debated issues of the conference despite it having been agreed from the outset that 
‘scientific theories should not be discussed but practical solutions sought’,L o o s e ly  
defined in contemporary understanding of the terms, ‘epidemic’ disease was 
determined by particular meteorological conditions or conditions of the soil, striking 
large numbers of people but not transmitted from person to person. ‘Infectious’ 
disease was transmitted from one person to another through exhaled poisons or 
miasma; while ‘contagious’ disease was transmitted by ‘morbid matter’ from person 
to person directly or indirectly, or through fomites, either as a ‘living’ entity or not.^'’ 
Britain firmly maintained the position throughout the proeeedings that quarantine, for 
any of the three diseases categories, was unnecessary. For instance, plague was a 
modified form of typhus and both diseases arose from an ‘infected atmosphere’.^ " 
British opposition to quarantine as an unnecessary hindrance to commerce was firmly 
established from the beginning of the conference, and it was a position which was 
maintained throughout the century. ‘It follows that we propose the entire 
discontinuance of the existing quarantine establishments in this country, and the 
substitution of sanitary regulations’.^  ^Furthermore, the commitment to 
anticontagionist sanitary measures, which was at this stage of the century so 
significant in Britain,'^ also remained as the basis of the British argument in 
subsequent conferences.
In England it was widely believed, wrote Britain’s diplomatic representative to the 
conference, Anthony Perrier, that 'contagion is not a fact, but an hypothesis invented 
to explain a number of facts that, without this hypothesis, would be inexplicable’.'" 
France adopted a position more in favour of compromise, while the delegates of the 
remaining countries argued for a greater or lesser degree of some form of quarantine, 
depending very much on whether they were a medical or diplomatic representative.
As Goodman argues, regardless of whether or not the medical delegates had been able 
to reach some sort of agreement on the mode of cholera or plague transmission, each
Cjocuirnan.  hitcntaticnud Ucatlh Oryaniscitions,  p, 44.
W H O ,  The First Ten Years, p. lO; sc l*  a f so  Wo r bo y . s ,  Spreading (ierins.  p .  3S 
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of'lhc diplomatic representatives had been sent with the particular political and 
commercial agendas of their respective governments concerning quarantine. This 
neither necessarily accorded with current medical theories, nor the opinion of the 
medical representative. Thus, with no agreement reached after six months of 
discussion either on the mode of transmission, or the duration or conditions of 
quarantine, the conference ended without resolution. None of the regulations drawn 
up in the convention were either ratified or otherwise adhered to and so, despite the 
fact that the conference set a precedent for further international discussion and co­
operation, it was completely unsuccessful in achieving any of its initial aims. As the 
President of the Epidemiological Society of London, Professor J.L. Hotter, reminisced 
in an address to the Society in 1898,
for all practical purposes the results of this conference were unsatisfactory;
there was little unity of opinion, and no system of International control was
possible under the circumstances.'^"
The second conference, held again in Paris eight years later, was an endeavour to 
salvage some of the collaborative work of 1851. In an attempt to simplify the text and 
the proceedings of the second conference, and in order to try and reach a more 
mutually agreeable and manageable convention, only diplomatic representatives were 
invited to attend the conference. Surprisingly this did not prevent fierce debates 
dividing the contagionist and anticontagionist camps. Although the majority of 
discussion during the five months of the conference contained a minimal medical 
content, the general trend which followed was that those countries with Mediterranean 
shores tended to support strongly the establishment of sanitary cordons for cholera, 
based on contagionist reasoning; while those European states positioned further north 
argued that as cholera was not contagious, quarantine was an unnecessary precaution 
in preventing the spread of the disease. This point has been made by Baldwin who 
concluded that geography as well as politics played an important role in determining 
public health strategies. He argued that ‘those nations closest to the sources, perceived 
or real, of infection were more inclined to be quarantinist than those, especially 
Britain, whose greater remove allowed a degree of in so u c ian ce '.B ritish  altitudes lo
I.Lanv Noticr. 'liacvnatiojial Sanitary C'(mi'erciiccs of ihc Victoiian I a a . rniii\ lipid. S n r .  L o u d . .  
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European quarantines reflect Baldwin’s suggestion. As the British delegate explained, 
experience had
more and more shown that [cholera] is not contagious at all, and that, from 
another point of view, the development of European railway networks in the 
meantime today renders illusory any system of quarantine against arrivals by 
sea from cholera-infected places.''^
The conference again produced a draft convention, which attempted to consolidate the 
apparent impasse. Again, it was not signed or ratified and each individual country 
continued to protect its ports and frontiers in the manner which best suited them.
The next two conferences held in Constantinople in 1866 and Vienna in 1874 
followed a similar pattern to the first and second conferences. That is, the Vienna 
conference was essentially a review and reworking of the resolutions of the 
Constantinople conference. Both conferences were devoted entirely to the 
examination of cholera and the best means of preventing its spread. This meant that 
they were more medically based than the 1859 conference and that the current 
aetiological and epidemiological theories of the disease were more central to the 
discussion.
The third conference was held toward the end of one of Europe's worst encounters 
with epidemic cholera in 1865-66. The disease had for the first time arrived in Europe 
by sea from Egypt. Previous epidemics had arrived largely overland from Eastern 
Europe, brought west from India to the Middle East by HadJ pilgrims. One of the 
most significant resolutions of the third conference was the almost unanimous 
conclusion that cholera had originated in India, that man was the principal agent in the 
transmission of the disease and that, despite the fact that previous epidemics had 
almost certainly arrived in Western Europe via land routes, maritime communications 
were the foremost means of disseminating the disease, followed by railway contact. "  
The only abstention from this conclusion came from Dr. E. Goodeve, one of the 
British delegates. The Government of India was not permitted to send a représentâti\c
' i t i i i l .  p.  17 1.
' ' i loward-.loiics. ‘’I’lic Scientific BacTyi'ound oft l ie liiternalional Sanilarv t'oii leieiiccs,  1851 I9tx  
WHO Chronirle,  28 ( 1974), 229-247,  p .  236.
75
(ü the conference but ‘found a champion’ in Goodeve, who had held a senior position 
at Calcutta Medical College/'' Not surprisingly, he and the other British delegates 
were resistant to the implication of the resolution; that cholera had been brought to 
Europe on steamships travelling under the British flag. The suggestion that as India 
was the recognised origin of cholera an international medical team should be sent 
there to investigate the disease also met with British objections. The sovereignty of 
Britain in India was, according to the British, being questioned. Yet, they conceded 
that there was some British responsibility toward arresting the further spread of the 
disease and examples of sanitary work already underway in the ports of Bombay, 
Calcutta and Madras, were provided.
One of the strongest theories penetrating the discussion at both the third and forth 
conferences was that of Max von Pettenkofer (1818-1901). His theories at this stage 
suggested that the principal vehicle for the spread of cholera by man was the air, but 
that water was also a possibility. It was unanimously agreed at the conference that, 
‘the routes by which the toxic agent penetrates into the economy are principally the 
respiratory tract and very probably also the digestive tract’.'*" What was most 
appealing about Pettenkofer’s theory was that it stood mid way between a 
contagionist and anticontagionist understanding of disease transmission. He claimed 
that in order for cholera to develop, both the importation of the ‘germ’ into a locality, 
and particular local meteorological and soil conditions and constitution were required. 
He conceded that disease could be transmitted from one locality to another, but not 
IVom one person lo another. Pettenkofer’s theories clearly demonstrate the artificiality 
of rigid boundaries so often placed between contagionism and anticontagionism as 
mutually exclusive theoretical paradigms, and point more toward the ‘contingent 
contagionism’ spoken of by Felling.'*^ His proposals at this conference and later 
conferences, even after the publication of Koch’s finding’s in Calcutta in 1884, were 
successful because they in some way accommodated both the medical and political 
rationalisations for contagionism and anticontagionism. It was, thus, with much of his 
influence that the conference concluded that while a quarantine of up to ten days 
would be necessary for vessels with a foul Bill of Health, Cordons soniiaircs were
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pointless in highly populated, filthy urban areas (which might ha\e included most of 
the world’s major ports) and that improving the sanitary conditions -  provision of 
clean water and preservation of the purity of the air -  of ports and towns was an 
important determinant in the prevention of epidemic cholera.
In the eight intervening years between the third (1866) and fourth (1874) conferences 
Pettenkofer further clarified his theory of the aetiology of cholera. According to his 
theory, the interaction of three factors - x, y and z -  was the cause of epidemic 
cholera.'*^ These factors - the germ, the local and seasonal conditions and an 
individual’s predisposition - were all required in the development of the disease, but 
the most important, according to Pettenkofer, was the environment, particularly the 
condition of the soil. Theoretically, therefore, cholera could be imported but only if 
the seasonal conditions and soil, and the constitution of the local population, were 
such that the disease could ‘take hold’. The germ itself, Pettenkofer argued, was 
incapable of causing cholera.'*" However, although Pettenkofer had many followers 
within Britain at this time, theories with a more anticontagionist slant still carried 
great favour. (John Simon, Medical Officer of Health to the Privy Council, for 
example, attributed the propagation of cholera, and other ‘infectious’ diseases, to 
‘filth’ of all varieties).'" However, Pettenkofer’s abstention, at the Fourth 
International Sanitary Conference, from the same conclusion made at the third 
conference that cholera was always imported to Europe from India, won him much 
support in Britain and India. The political expediency of his theory meant that Britain 
and India adopted it at this conference and those which followed, providing the 
necessary scientific rationale and support of British maritime trade interests to and 
from India. As Harrison has argued in relation to the Government of India’s use of 
Pettenkofer’s scientific expertise, his ‘aetiological positions did not so much 
determine, as provide a justification for, existing sanitary policies'.^’ Pettenkofer 
argued strongly that local conditions were essential to the propagation of cholera and, 
such was the weight of his argument in Vienna in 1874, that the representatives of this
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largely contagionist conference voted unanimously on a resolution which took some 
account of Pettenkofer’s theories.
The Conference accepts the transmissibility of cholera by man coming from 
an infected environment; it considers man as able to be the specific cause only 
outside the influence of the infected locality; further, it regards him as the 
propagator of cholera when he comes from a place where the germ of the 
disease already exists.'^
As had been the result of the previous three conferences, there was no ratified 
convention signed at the end of the proceedings, despite very strong moves having 
been made toward establishing a permanent International Sanitary Commission in 
Vienna with the remit of studying epidemic diseases. What did come out of the 1874 
conference, however, was a unanimous resolution that, as no mutually acceptable 
agreement on maritime quarantine could be reached, each country would have the 
right to choose between either a system of quarantine or sanitary medical inspection. 
This was of great significance to Great Britain who had only just established the Port 
Sanitary Authority, based on a system of medical inspection. Richard Thorne Thorne 
(Deputy Chief Medical Officer to the Local Government Board and British medical 
delegate at the conference)" reminisced about the importance of this resolution after
ibiU. p. 244.
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I he Sixth Conference held in 1885, where the decisions had been 'of a retrograde 
character’ compared with the conference of 1874. He explained, 1 undertook to give 
the Commission some notion of the sanitary work that had been affected in this 
country since the system of medical inspection had, with the approval of the Vienna 
Conference in 1874, superseded all attempts at quarantine both on our shores and 
inland’.''*
Seven years later the fifth conference was convened in Washington, making a 
departure from the Eurocentricity of preceding conferences. Although the United 
States had been invited to the previous two conferences, they had declined to attend. 
This time they hosted the conference and it was attended by not only European states, 
together with Turkey and Egypt, but also several North and South American nations 
as well as China and Japan, making it one of the most internationally representative 
conferences of the nineteenth century. Although cholera and yellow fever had 
attacked the Americas during the century, issues regarding the quarantining of these 
diseases had been discussed at the first four conferences only with reference to 
Europe, the Middle-East (particularly in relation to the Mecca pilgrimages) and the 
Indian sub-continent. However, with the increase of trade and migration between the 
Old World and the New, the threat of these diseases taking hold in both hemispheres 
prompted the United States to enter into discussions concerning international 
quarantine procedures. A joint resolution of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives agreed upon America’s need to join an international sanitary 
agreement and submitted that America should host the fifth conference. The two key 
points to be discussed at the conference were
A. The establishment of a reliable and satisfactory international system of 
notification as to the existence of contagious and infectious diseases, more 
especially cholera and yellow fever.
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B. The establishment of a uniform and satisfactory system of Bills of Health, 
the statements in which shall be trustworthy as to the sanitary condition of 
the port of departure and as to the condition of the vessel at the time of 
sailing."
Further to the USA’s desire to include a greater representation of the world’s major 
trade routes in the pursuit of internationally agreed quarantine procedures, and to 
examine the possibility of reaching international agreement on the above, they 
summoned the assemblage for motives of more domestic importance. Howard-Johns 
asserts that ‘the sole objective of the USA in convening this conference was to obtain 
international assent to a piece of domestic legislation that would otherwise be 
unenforceable’. "  The National Board of Health Act was passed in 1879 to protect 
against ‘the introduction of contagious or infectious diseases into the United States’, 
and required specifically that ‘all merchant ships and vessels sailing from a foreign 
port where contagious or infectious disease exists, for any port in the United States, 
must obtain from the consul. ..at the port of departure. ..a Bill of Health’. "  The 
provisions of the Act were such that all ships departing from a foreign port bound for 
America were required to be in possession of a Bill of Health and ‘sanitary history’ 
endorsed by a United States Consular Official working in that foreign country. This 
required the Consular Official to inspect the ship, as well as the Port Officials of the 
counlry of departure. ‘It is hardly surprising’, Howard-Jones points out, ‘that 
difficulties arose in the enforcement of such a law, and it was evidently the realisation 
on the part of Congress that the Act must necessarily remain a dead letter unless other 
nations could be persuaded to agree to it that led to the idea of an international 
conference’.'** This motive for convening the conference was never disguised by the 
United States. In fact, the necessity for obtaining international co-operation in order to 
achieve the aims of a piece of domestic legislation was announced in the conference’s 
opening speech.
The action of the government in calling this conference was suggested by the 
practical difficulties encountered by the national sanitary authorities in their
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efforts to obtain, by the agencies of the American consuls in various foreign 
ports, such information as was necessary for the satisfactory administration of 
the law of June 2, 1879 [the National Board of Health Act], to prevent the 
introduction of contagious and infectious diseases into the United States from 
foreign countries.'"
The proposal was opposed by a majority of representative countries for numerous 
reasons including the belief, put forward by Italy and Spain, that a medical inspection 
and certificate of health provided by officials of the port of departure would be 
sufficient proof in assuring the absence of disease and that the request for independent 
examination suggested otherwise. Britain again raised the issue of sovereignty and 
rejected the proposal on the grounds that it would be both impractical and an 
infringement on sovereign power. The United States was not successful in attaining 
the international assent and co-operation required to fulfil the objectives of the Act."" 
The conference was, as a result, more concerned with managerial and administrative 
matters than with scientific concerns or the latest innovations in infectious disease 
prevention, although some discussion about the aetiology of yellow fever was 
conducted.
The Sixth International Sanitary Conference at Rome, 1885
It was, in part, due to the lack of scientific discussion at the Washington conference, 
that only four years later the next conference was held, again in Europe, this time in 
Rome. Again, at this conference the United States tried to pursue its agenda relating to 
the inspection of vessels by US consular officers in the country of departure.
However, again it was rejected by a majority vote."' There were other issues of much 
greater significance being discussed at the Rome conference. This conference was of 
extreme importance for a number of reasons. As the British Medical Journal reported, 
‘there will be a great temptation to some of the other Powers to introduce political 
questions into the discussions. If the conference is to be of any scientific value
Pr<iccc’dinr,s of the huernatiofud Sanitary Conference Provided for 1>y Joint Resotniion of the Seiiau 
and House of Representat ives in the Early Part o f  IHHI, ( W a s h i n g t o n :  ( i o v c i  n i n c n i  R n n t i n g  ( ) U  i c c .
1 8 8 1 ) .  p .  1 6 ,
( i o o i l i n a n .  International lleidth Organisations,  p .  6 2 ;  s e e  a l s o  d i a p l c r  l o u r  
' Med. 'Pinies A- Oa:..  t L o n d o n ) .  M a y  . 3 0 ,  1 8 8 5 ,  p. 7 3 4 .
81
whatever, it will be needful that these should be rigidly excluded from the 
beginning’."" However, more than any previous conferenee the sixth conference was 
the most politically motivated and it may be argued that Britain’s stance throughout 
was particularly so.
For the first time Britain had successfully argued for a separate delegation of Anglo- 
Indians, and after a brief postponement due to the fact that ‘some opposition was 
made in certain quarters to the delegates of the Indian government being allowed to 
vote’,"' the conference got under way on May 20, 1885. William Guyer-Hunter 
(Surgeon-General and former commissioner to Egypt in 1883), and Richard Thorne 
Thorne represented Britain, while the government of India was represented by Fayrer 
and Timothy Richard Lewis, who had been a student of Pettenkofer and was ‘special 
scientific assistant to the Indian government’."'* As Harrison pointed out, ‘Lewis and 
Fayrer were almost certainly chosen because of the congruence of their views with the 
political objectives of the Indian administration,’ however, they were not ‘untypical of 
medical opinion in India’."'
Within the first few days of the conference the medical delegates separated from the 
diplomatic representatives and formed what was known as the Technical Committee. 
This was to ensure the achievement of the conference’s dual objectives: (echnico- 
scientific and dipHnicitico-administrative!^^^ Thorne Thorne wrote to his friend and 
superior, George Buchanan, that this departure was niadc both ‘to prepare all the work 
and then to submit our conclusions to the Conference as a whole (every non-medical 
delegate having the right to attend the meetings of the Technical Committee if he 
chooses)’, and because the elected president of the conference was thought lo be a 
‘garrulous dotard, making a speech every time a delegate spoke and then proceeding 
to act the dictionary by giving lengthy expositions of the several words he had used’.
A ‘conspiracy’ was formed by several of the medical delegates against the elderly 
bore and the Technical Committee emerged."'
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During ihc previous year the German Cholera Commission to India, led by Robert 
Koch, announced the ‘discovery’ of the causative agent of cholera, the comma 
bacillus. However, within reports and discussions surrounding the conference in 
contemporary British medical journals, there is little or no reference to scientific 
discussion concerning the bacteriological aetiology of cholera. Such discussion had 
from the beginning been subverted at the conference and in the proeeedings of the 
Technical Committee by the British and Anglo-Indian delegates. Fayrer, particularly, 
threatened to withdraw previous votes he had made if, when Koch began discussing 
the incubation period of cholera with regard to the bacillus, ‘questions of the aetiology 
of cholera and the theory of incubation were admitted to the discussion’."** Indeed, as 
the Medical Times and Gazette reported on June 20, 1885,
the resolute determination of the British and Indian delegates, announced 
boldly from the first, to adhere to the question in its practical bearings, and 
abstain from all discussion on points opening up theoretical differences of 
opinion, was productive of good in many ways. It led to the avoidance of 
squabbling; it saved valuable time; it enabled the results of long practical 
experience to be put on record, and committed the Conference to no rash or ill 
considered action based upon doubtful theoretical opinions which may not 
stand, the test o f time.
Britain, as noted above, confined their aetiological discussion to that which relied 
upon more ’practical experience': clinical, epidemiological experience and statistical 
documentation. Cholera was not contagious, they argued, nor was it related in any 
way to shipping. Rather than directly addressing Koch's bacteriological findings, (he 
British and Anglo-Indian medical delegates challenged members of (he congress to 
provide examples of British ships which had brought the disease directly from India 
to Europe or indeed any occasion where cholera had been introduced from Britain lo 
Europe via shipping. They demanded epidemiological evidence in support of notions 
of contagion which threatened to implicate Britain in the spread of cholera.
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Dr Brouardel and Prout, representing France, insist, as many other members of 
the Congress do, that cholera always originates in India and that it is conveyed 
thence by means of ships to Europe, although no reply was given by any 
member of the Congress to Professor Lewis’s inquiry whether any delegate 
knew of a single instance of cholera having been imported into Europe by an 
English ship; the non-contagionists, among whom were the English 
representatives, Professor Lewis and Sir William Guyer Hunter, affirm, if I am 
not mistaken, that cholera is capable of originating de novo in any locality 
where suitable conditions for its generation coexist, and that it is not brought 
from India to Europe, but that its foci of independent origin are probably as 
numerous in Europe and America as are the places in which it appears.'"
No retort was forthcoming. Meanwhile the British delegates cited against the 
transmissibility of cholera via maritime trade links, what they believed to be the 
consummate example of Australia - ‘...although cholera always prevailed in India, a 
country with which Australia was in constant communication,... the disease had never 
been conveyed to Australia’."
At the same time that Koch’s theory of cholera aetiology was so adamantly rejected as 
an appropriate topic for discussion, many references were made by the British and 
Anglo-Indian delegates to Pettenkofean theories of cholera. They referred, for 
instance, lo its ‘taking root |in| the soil’. "  As one contemporary commentator asked,
how can any rational action for the attainment of these objects issue from a 
Conference of such heterogeneous and chaotic elements as those which 
constituted the International Sanitary Conference Rome in June, 1885? For 
example, one member of the Conference, representing Germany (Dr. Koch), 
affirms that a single comma-bacillus, gaining access to the alimentary canal of 
a man, is sufficient to kill him; another member, representing England, affirms 
that inasmuch as various microscopic organisms arc found in cholera dejecta, 
the selection of the comma-shaped bacilli as the nioierie.s niorhi of cholera
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appears to be entirely arbitrary, and that comma-shaped bacilli are ordinarily 
present in the mouths of healthy persons."
The British and Anglo-Indian delegates, however, made it clear that they were not 
interested in talking about the findings of the German Cholera Commission, evading 
all ‘scientific’ discussion beyond how ‘English sanitary science’ afforded protection 
against the importation and spread of disease. What concerned them most was how 
adamantly the rest of the represented countries adhered to the doctrine of quarantine, 
particularly in relation to the Suez Canal.
It was nonsensical, Britain and India argued, to impose quarantines in the Suez Canal, 
or elsewhere on the route from India, and instead they argued that what was required 
were sanitary improvements similar to those which had been introduced in the United 
Kingdom. Yet, a central allegation of the majority of states represented at the 
conference was that cholera had been introduced from India to Europe via the Middle 
East and North Africa and into the Mediterranean via sea links through the Red Sea 
and Suez Canal. Quarantine, they argued, was the only way to prevent this spread.
This was the first time that the issue of quarantine in the Canal had been raised at a 
conference. Suiprisingly, the opening of the Canal had not been mentioned at the 
1874 conference in Vienna. The conference was convened five years after the Canal 
had opened in 1869. yet the epidemiological significance of this considerably faster 
route between India and Europe was not discussed, even though the conference had 
again focused on India as the origin of cholera. The absence of the Canal in 
discussions at the Vienna conference is curious; its constant role in the discussion at 
Rome, explosive. Considering the importance of the Canal in British, French and 
German imperial politics in the years leading up to 1885," it is not surprising that 
issues relating to it were hotly debated.
A primary concern at the 1885 conference was that four-fifths of the vessels which 
traversed the Canal each year were British. A large proportion of these sailed from 
Indian ports, principally Bombay, in which cholera was endemic. Yet, unless the 
disease became epidemic in Indian ports, ships sailing from them were issLied with
Gli. ipniaii,  C h o l c n i  Cu ra b l e ,  p. 85.
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clean Bills of Health. The conference recommended that all ships from Indian ports 
should be subject to sanitary control at Suez and it was proposed that an ‘independent’ 
medical officer, appointed by an international commission, would inspect all vessels 
intending to traverse the Canal. If a vessel was found to be ‘infected’ or ‘suspected’, 
all passengers and crew would be landed and it would be detained for five days under 
observation. The proposal was carried by a large majority but was vehemently 
opposed by Britain and India. Britain argued that this called into question the 
objectivity and authority of British medical officers -  Thorne Thorne, ‘refused to 
allow that any locally appointed medical officer should supersede a British medical 
officer in deciding whether anyone on board an English ship was suspected of having 
some choleraic affection or not’. "  Furthermore, he argued, any ‘dirty and ill-kept’ 
lazaretto maintained in Egypt was bound to be more hazardous to the spread of 
disease than the free pratique of a well sanitised British vessel."
Any desire to maintain science as a basis of discussion at the conference could not be, 
and was not, sustained while Suez was a focus. Even the Technical Committee, which 
was intended to deliberate on the ‘scientific’ bases of sanitation versus quarantine in 
the Canal and elsewhere, could not extricate itself from the politics of maritime 
quarantine.
Although often using the language of medical or sanitary science, cholera prevention 
became almost a secondary issue to the more immediate political issues surrounding 
the Canal, The simultaneous proceeding of the Suez Canal Commission in Paris was 
of particular importance to the way in which the British and European delegates 
discussed prophylaxis in the Canal. There was, as an article in The 'Times affirmed on 
.lune 2, 1885, a significant connection between this and the extensive and political 
content of, discussions surrounding the Canal in Rome.
It is impossible not to discern a political connexion, more or less direct and 
certainly not without grave significance, between the proposals adopted by the 
Committee of the Sanitary Conference, mainly at the insistence of the French 
delegates, and the provisions of the draft treaty at present under consideration
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of ihc Suez Canal Commission now sitting in Paris. In both cases may be 
traced the working of that unfriendly and unaccommodating spirit towards this 
country which has long pervaded the Egyptian policy of France, and now 
seems to have infected the policy of other European Powers."
France, particularly, was wary of supporting Britain’s interests in the Canal, angered 
by Britain’s unilateral termination of British and French dual control of Egypt, and 
apprehensive of the Canal being reduced to an appendage of the British Empire.'** The 
Paris convention was thus convened with the purpose of reaffirming the international 
character of the Canal and asserting its neutral status with the establishment of an 
international Canal Commission. Britain vehemently opposed this, wanting instead to 
limit the restraints of international control which they anticipated would hinder free 
movement through the Canal. However, Britain was, at the Paris conference as at the 
Sanitary Conference, alone in its plans for the Canal, and a convention, ‘largely 
directed against Britain’, was draw up in early Summer 1885 imposing international 
laws upon passage through the Canal.'" Much of the deliberations of the Paris 
convention were led by the French and the animosity felt between France and Britain 
in Paris was mirrored in the proceedings at Rome, along with the manner in which it 
was reported and received in Britain.
Thorne Thorne, who kept regular correspondence with Buchanan, wrote often about 
die hostility he felt from the French representatives, and the politicised nature of the 
discussions ol' the Technical Committee. He wrote:
It was quite intelligible.. .that Austria, Italy and other countries in close 
proximity to Egyptian ports should, under the apprehension of cholera and in 
view of the exaggerated opinions held by their population on the subject, be 
desirous of the enforcement in Egypt of extreme measures or precaution for 
the relief and .security of their outposts. But 1 did not understand how it should 
happen that the French Representatives should be the prime movers in 
advocating a system of observance and quarantine which if rigidly carried out
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would probably have the elTect of driving British commerce with the East to 
take the route round the Cape of Good Hope to the detriment of the Suez 
Canal in which France had such an interest/"
In medical journal and newspaper reports written at the time of the Rome conference 
it was generally implied that the motivation of the other representative countries, 
particularly France, in proposing quarantine in the Canal, was to ‘fetter., in some 
degree our great Indian commerce’. '^ It was also reported that other European powers 
believed that Britain’s objection to quarantine in the Suez Canal was motivated purely 
by commercial concerns.
English readers have been dismayed during the week to find all the nations 
conspiring against English commerce, and proposing restrictions on the 
passage of ships through the Suez Canal, which might very easily be made to 
tell only on those flying the English flag. It is sad, of course, to see scientific 
men making their views square with political exigencies...**^ Medical Times 
and Gazette
Dr Thorne Thorne, after alluding to the general idea prevailing abroad, that 
Great Britain had given up the quarantine system simply from the selfish 
motive that her enormous commerce was loo much hampered by it, pointed 
out that, since the date of the Vienna Conference, England alone had spent 
twenty-se\en millions of pounds on the improvement of local sanitation...*** 
British Medical Journal
In resisting the proposals of the Conference ... we are not withstanding the 
dictates of science or the teaching of experience in the selfish interests of our 
own trade. We are often accused of doing this, but we may safely disregard the 
malicious and ignorant accusation, in view of the fact that our maritime 
commerce is  the widest in the world, and that cholera has never of late y ea rs
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reached our own shores nor been imported into Europe in an English ship." 
The Times
This was not merely the result of British neurosis, France and Germany, particularly, 
were convinced of the British commercial motivations behind the objections to 
quarantine, as this translated extract from Marseille Medical demonstrates.
The English, who are protected by their climate from the influence of cholera 
-  the English aristocracy of which forms a class apart, and which knows well 
that by means of hygiene and comfort (when they are to be had) it is possible 
to ensure safety from cholera, ... would consent without compunction [a«/î.v 
douleur] that the whole universe should enjoy the benefits of endemic cholera, 
provided that every obstacle to the transport of their products be removed.
This though, raised to the height of an economic system, induced them to 
licence the Sanitary Council of Alexandria in 1883, and induced them to 
declare that the cholera in Egypt during that year, which destroyed not less 
than 50,000 victims, was a local epidemic of no importance.
It is the same thought which has induced them to promote the spread and 
adoption of the belief that cholera has now disappeared from Calcutta,
Madras, Pondichery, Bombay, &c., in short, from all the great ports the 
exports from which concern their industry, and which, from the beginning of 
last year, has made them carry on in Europe a campaign against quarantine.
Is it not demonstrated that, according to the English, cholera ceases to exist 
from the moment that the aristocracy and the great manufacturers do not die of 
h ."
It appears, therefore, that many of the debates and resolutions of the Rome conference 
were more related to political demands and reactions concerning relations between 
Britain, Europe and the Canal, than they were with the pursuit of internationally 
agreed methods of cholera prevention. Regardless of whether the central focus was 
concerned with political control of the thoroughfare, as at Paris, or, as at Rome, the 
epidemiological and medical effects of this speedier route between Europe and the 
East, the issues and responses were the same. Britain argued for the maintenance of
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free movement either through limiting international control or through preserving the 
free pratique of British ships sailing from all ports; while France, for example and for 
a variety of reasons, wished to see these restrictions imposed on Canal traffic.
Commercial pressures on Britain to ensure the limitation of costly delays in the Canal 
were immense. While both the Rome and Paris conferences were taking place ‘the 
principal Eastern steamship lines’ held a meeting in London.
In consequence of the serious loss and inconvenience which have been 
occasioned to shipowners by the vexatious quarantine restrictions imposed at 
the Suez Canal, representatives of the principal Eastern steamship lines met in 
London on Wednesday to concert measures for the protection of their 
interests, and it was resolved by them to amend their bills of lading in order 
that on the imposition of quarantine steamers homeward bound from an 
infected port should be at liberty to proceed by way of the Cape, and so avoid 
delay at Suez. It is found by experience that in the case of large vessels of 
modern construction the loss of time by the Cape is almost compensated for 
by the saving of the canal dues, and that a few days’ detention at Suez would 
remove all advantages now existing in favour of that route.
A telegram from Port Said yesterday states that it is believed that Canal will be 
blocked for 12 days."
While interest in the Rome conference and discussions surrounding its possible 
implications were the topic of a numerous shipping company meetings and journal 
and newspaper articles and editorials, there was no mention of the highly contentious 
proceedings of the International Sanitary Conference at Rome in the Port of London 
Sanitary Committee papers or minutes in the years 1884-5. Nor did the committee 
discuss Koch’s work. That Koch’s ‘discovery’ of the cholera bacillus is not 
mentioned, is perhaps not so surprising. If the British and Anglo-Indian medical 
delegates at the conference refused to speak of it even in Koch’s presence and with 
other European and American delegates eager to discuss its implications, it is not so 
difficult to understand why the domestic sanitary authorities in Britain did not fee! it 
necessary to introduce into their business. However, that an international conference.
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singularly concerned with cholera prophylaxis al major ports and having particular 
relevance to the arrival of infected ships from Britain’s colonies, was not mentioned 
in the papers of Britain’s principal -  and central -  Port Sanitary Committee, is quite 
surprising. Since the Committee were in regular correspondence with Richard Thorne 
Thorne, it might be expected that some news of Rome would be found in the papers; 
but, no special correspondence regarding the conference was received by the Port 
Sanitary Committee from him, or anyone else - although Thorne Thorne had written 
to Buchanan throughout his time in Rome^^.
Some of the proposals made by the British and Anglo-Indian delegates at the 
conference had direct and important ramifications for British ports. It was, for 
example, proposed that rather than imposing quarantine on British ships as they 
traversed the Suez Canal, these vessels could sail through without having contact with 
the shore; that they ‘should always be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal as 
through an arm of the sea’.^  ^ If the ships sailed directly to Britain from India without 
docking, quarantine, they argued, would not be necessary.
We maintained that no British vessel passing from India to England had ever 
yet conveyed cholera to Europe, and hence that we could not, merely because 
other countries did not wish vessels from the East to enter their ports without 
first undergoing a period of detention, admit the right of anyone to say that 
British vessels coming to our ports and touching nowhere else should be 
otherwise than unhindered in their course.
However, this would in effect have meant that ships from ‘infected ports’ - as cholera 
was endemic in ports such as Bombay and Calcutta -  would arrive in London having 
had no quarantine or even disinfection since it had embarked. While the incubation 
period was believed to have been less than the time taken for the Journey from India, 
the Jury was still out. Even so, this issue -  the arrival of vessels direct from India - 
was similarly absent from Committee discussions; as were discussions about the 
incubation period of cholera. The possibility that the conference could have resulted
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in an inlcrnalional convcnlion requiring minimum and maximum periods of 
quarantine al all ports into which ‘infected’ or ‘suspected’ ships sailed, had direct 
relevance for the workings of the Sanitary Committee, yet remained unmentioned; as 
did the possibility that vessels might begin to arrive from India which, having had no 
land contact, sailed directly from an ‘infected’ port.
Even though Britain did not experience a cholera epidemic between 1872 and 1892, 
cholera featured as an important issue at British ports in the mid-1880s. The 
committee papers and minutes of the Port Sanitary Committee clearly demonstrate an 
anxiety about the presence of cholera in Italy, Spain and France, and the almost 
certain ‘recrudescence of cholera on the Continent’ anticipated in the 
Spring/Summer of 1885. As well as anxieties about cholera being imported from the 
Continent, and about ensuring that the sanitary authorities were fully prepared for its 
arrival, the arrival of a number of ships from India, during 1884 and 1885, which had 
had cases of cholera on board during the voyage, were also cause for concern. Yet, it 
was because the Committee and Medical Officers knew that vessels which arrived 
from India had invariably undergone quarantine and disinfection before sailing into 
the Port of London, that they were not anxious at their imminent arrival.
On the 29'*^  May, owing to an intimation from the Customs, I visited the 
S.S.Nivia from Calcutta, one of the crew on board having died from cholera 
during the voyage -  The death occurred on April, the corpse was at once 
buried at sea and (he bedding, clothing and everything used by the deceased 
during his illness destroyed -  on arriving at Ceylon the passengers were 
landed and the ship was thoroughly fumigated and disinfected -  Again on 
reaching Port Said the passengers were pul on shore, the ship was placed in 
Quarantine for seven days, fumigated and disinfected twiee over -  There was 
no other case of infectious disease on board during the voyage -  Under these 
circumstances no further sanitary action was deemed necessary -  the vessel 
was released and saved her tide up the River.'^'
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Another ship, The Queen o f Scots, arrived into Gravesend from Calcutta in September 
1885 with the clothes of a man who had died of cholera on board. As the disease had 
been present in the ‘homeward’ passage, it was deemed infectious and ‘ought 
therefore to have been detained at Gravesend’, but, as the disease -  or the clothes -  
had not been reported, the master of the vessel was fined £20 and the Committee set 
about establishing measures whieh would ensure such an occurrence was not 
repeated.
Thus, the absence of any discussion about proposals put to the 1885 conference 
regarding the passage of vessels direct from India to Britain is peculiar. The Port of 
London Sanitary Authority only appeared to be at ease with the S.S.Nivia after it was 
made clear that she had already undergone extensive disinfection and a period of 
quarantine on the homeward journey, and The Queen o f Scots caused such a stir 
because it had not. This indicates that part of the ease with which Medical Officers 
dealt with these cases, was due to their knowledge that, in most cases, by the time a 
vessel reached Britain she would already have undergone one, if not several, periods 
of isolation and disinfection. The absence in the Port Sanitary Committee papers and 
minutes of any reference to the conference or the British proposal to have vessels sail 
directly from India without docking suggests either that they were unaware of the 
deliberations of the conference, despite considerable press coverage, or that the day- 
to-day running of the ports demanded all of their attention. Perhaps one may also 
speculate that the Port authorities did not anticipate any resolution being passed which 
would be ratified by the British government. Before it began the conference was well 
known to be slacked in favour of quarantine and against British interests, and it was 
well known that Britain would not endorse any international agreement calling for 
minimum periods of medical detention. In terms of how things operated at domestic 
ports, the likelihood of change was minimal. As it was, the conference again resulted 
in no ratified agreement and quarantine continued to operate on a nation to nation 
basis.
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Koch’s Comma Bacillus and the Problem with Bacteriology
Britain’s reluctance to enter into any discussion regarding a specific infective agent 
for cholera at the 1885 conference followed the pattern of previous conferences. 
Britain consistently stood apart from other European states in its total allegiance to the 
non-contagious nature of cholera and other imported diseases. It also reflected the 
general way in which Koch’s ‘discovery’ was received in Britain. Although, as 
already indicated, British physicians did not entirely reject the notion of a contagious 
agent in the transmission of infectious disease, environmental factors, as suggest by 
Pettenkofer who was still in the late 1880s regarded to be ‘the greatest living authority 
on the aetiology of cholera’ always played a more prominent role in British 
aetiologicai theory. Koch’s theory proposed, on the other hand, that the comma 
bacillus was the singular cause of cholera and that environment played no ‘miasmatic’ 
role in the spread of the disease.
Koch’s vibrio cholerae was ‘discovered’ while ‘Germany’s leading bacteriologist’^^  
was working for the German Cholera Commission in Calcutta in 1884. '^  ^ Despite the 
acclaim Koch received in Berlin after it was announced that he had discovered the 
cause of the disease, his assertion that the comma bacillus was the source of cholera 
hinged on precarious evidence. Since the 1870s a sequence of rules dictating the 
necessary criteria for determining whether a particular micro-organism was the cause 
of a disease had been clearly laid out by Koch’s teacher, Heine, and refined by Koch 
himself.
They dictated that the agent or micro-organism had to be isolated from a 
diseased subject. It then had to be used experimentally to induce the same 
disease in an animal. Next, the micro-organism had to be isolated from the 
diseased animal. The experiment had to be repeatable. The micro-organism 
had to be present in all diseased subjects.
K l e i n ,  l i . .  The Hm h'ria in Asiniic Cho lcnr  ( L o n d o n :  M a c m i l l n i i  a n d  C ' o . .  I S S U ) ,  p .  \  i n :  a l s o  K l e i n  
a n d  C n b h e s ,  An ln<jtiir\ into the Etioio^y o f  Asiatic Ciiolcm,  ( L o n d o n :  I H K S ) .  p. I .
"  L \ a n s .  Death in fhnnhttfy,  i b i d .  p .  2 6 . S .
' S e e .  O p a w a .  ' t b i e a s \  B e d l e l l o w s ' ;  W i l l i a m  C o l e m a n ,  ‘ K o c h ’ s  C o m m a  B a c i l l u s :  T h e  h i r s t  Y e a r ' .  
iU t l le i tn  o j  th e  H i \ t ( ' i  \ o j  X -ied ic ine .  6 1 .  ( I V K 7 ) .  3 1 5 - 3 4 2 ;  L v a n s .  D e a th  in l l a n i h n n y  p  2 6 5  7  I . 
l o a n s ,  D ci i th  in I h n n h n r y .  p .  2 6 5 .
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The main weakness in Koch’s argument was that although the bacillus found in the 
intestines of cholera victims was isolated and a pure culture produced, Koch was 
unable to reproduce the disease in animals. Although he successfully demonstrated 
the existence of the bacillus and its association with cholera, he did not fulfilled the 
criteria required to prove that it was the cause of the disease; it could quite as 
reasonably have been a consequence of it.^  ^ It was this shortcoming which was at the 
heart of much of the scientific opposition in Britain to Koch’s findings. While, as one 
of Britain’s leading bacteriologists, Edward Klein, noted ‘with few exceptions most 
Continental pathologists consider the eomma-bacilli of Koch as being the cause of 
cholera’, most British physicians and scientists working on the disease ‘differ from 
the proposition that Koch’s comma-bacilli have been satisfactorily proved to be the 
cause of cholera’, and that the ‘prevailing opinion [was] that the comma-bacilli of 
Koch [were only] an important diagnostic guide’.
British physicians argued that epidemiological and clinical experience demonstrated 
the close association between environment and disease and that the methods of 
prophylaxis developed and employed according to these theories were successful in 
preventing the spread of disease. Sir William Gull, physician extraordinary to the 
Queen, observed that, ‘we may in fact be able to defend ourselves against the invasion 
of cholera before science has discovered the essential cause of the disease. This 
happened very largely in the case of ague, where, by drainage and other matters, the 
occurrence of miasmata has been prevented’. T h e  scientific value and validity of 
Koch’s ‘discovery’ was examined during the sitting of a committee which was called 
by the India Office to discuss the report ‘An Inquiry into the Etiology of Asiatic 
Cholera’ by English bacteriologists, Klein and Gibbes. The Committee’s conclusions 
were published in a report called, unambiguously, The Official Refutation of Dr. 
Robert Koch’s Theory of Cholera and Commas,’ in which Koch’s ‘discovery’ was 
rejected on several grounds. These included; firstly, that the bacillus could not be u.scd 
to reproduee cholera in lower animals; secondly, that comma shaped bacillus were
l-tarrison. Fuhlic Health in British India, p. 112.
Klein, The Bacteria in Asiat ic Cholera,  p. vii-vlii.
■jLoccctling.s ol'a committee which a.s.scmbled al the India OlTicc ... lor the piitpo.sc ol considering ,i 
Report entitled 'An Incjuiry into the Etiology o f  Asiatic Cholera', in Klein and (l ihbes. A n  Incjiiiry.  p.
95
said 10 be ordinarily present in the alimentary tract during health; and, because water 
tanks which had been contaminated with the faeces of cholera victims, and contained 
the comma bacillus, had failed to produce cholera in the villagers who consumed the 
w a te r . 'H o w ev e r ,  this final objeetion required clarification, as Buchanan wrote in a 
supplementary report to the Annual Report of the Local Government Board, 1886,
I should wish to give a caution against a presumption which appears to have 
gained ground among Koch’s opponents, that their [the Committee’s] 
objection to his inferences respecting the relation of cholera to comma-bacilli 
present in tank-water, justifies any defection from the doctrine formulated by 
Snow in 1849, and now based on abundant experience, that cholera .. .may be 
produced by means of water polluted with cholera evacuations.'®'
‘Scientific’ -  bacteriological - classification and aetiology of cholera was resisted 
because of its apparent shortcomings, but also because of the strong allegiance to non- 
contagionism and clinical practice in Britain. Furthermore, a bacterial cause of 
cholera had important implications for the policy and practice of public health and 
port prophylaxis. Essentially, and on the face of it, it appeared to undermine the whole 
non-contagionist theoretical background of the sanitary system, and as such was 
considered, potentially, to be a ‘dangerous’ idea.
The doctrine of contagion.. .is still maintained by many influential authorities 
on the Continent and here; the former loudly insisting on quarantine and 
charging us with conniving at the introduction of cholera to Europe, rather 
than interfere with our own mercantile interests... That a bacillus in 
association with cholera has been detected there need be no question... but 
that the cause of cholera has been discovered any more than it was before,.. 1 
believe to be a dangerous and unverifiable statement, inasmuch as it will tend 
to emphasise the views of contagion and the importance of quarantine already 
so much insisted upon.'®“
" ‘The OtTicial Refutation of  Dr. Robert Koch’s Theory ol C’holera aiul C’oninias', (J n ( i r ic r lv  J o i n n , i l  
o f  M i c r o s c o p i c a l  S c i e n c e ,  26 (1886),  303-16; sec also, Ogawa, ‘Uneasy BcdfelKnss' .
‘The Official Refutation', p. 316.
Buchanan, E i f t e e in h  A n n u a l  R e p o r t  o f  th e  iX lH ,  IH S5-0 ,  p. wi.
‘Proc. Madras .San C'oinin',. no. 42 1884, quoted in. Harrison. Ri i hl i c  H e a l t h  in B r i t i sh  In d i a .
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The highly politicised reaction to the bacterial cause of infectious disease was not 
only expressed in response to Koch’s comma-bacillus. This is demonstrated in a letter 
written by the physiologist, William Carpenter ( 1813 -1885) to Sir Benjamin Ward 
Richardson (1828-1896)'®'^, in reaction to a letter published in the Daily News by John 
Tyndall (1820-1893). Tyndall was a physicist and polemicist who rejected the theory 
of spontaneous generation and was the first person to link the ‘cholera-fungus, ideas 
on contagia and Lister’s septic germs’.'®"' His public addresses and publications were 
widely rejected by the medical profession. The letter, dated August 27, 1883, archived 
at the Royal College of Physicians, London, illustrates the strong reaction with which 
the bacteriological construction of infectious disease was met.
Have you seen Tyndall’s absurd letter in the Daily Newsl He out-buds Budd, 
maintaining that cholera and typhoid can only be propagated by the 
introduction of their germs into the alimentary canal; so that if a man’s water 
supply be pure and he does not take in the intestinal dejecta of a cholera or 
typhoid patient with his food or drink, he may live close to an open sewer, or 
over a choked-up cess-pool, or have his house filled with sewer gases, without 
any danger of taking these diseases! He says 1 belong to an ‘antiquated 
school’, because I do not agree with him. His authority with the public is such 
that I consider it necessary to show that this is a matter on which he is not to 
be trusted. '
It was the theoretical implications of a specific causative agent in diseases such as 
cholera and typhoid, rather than any identified microbe, which was considered highly 
problematic. Whether before or after the culpable microbe had been identified, the 
theoretical basis of bacteriology was associated with 'old-school' conlagionism, 
which allowed for the transmission of disease irrespective of environment. 'Old- 
schooT contagionism, as has been shown, had direct implications for Britain's 
maritime trade, and thus the development of bacteriology was, among those involved
' ' R i e l u u v K d i i  i n  J c s l ' i  I l ' ic h  i n  th e  Concise Dicfionory of Scieniifii' Hioyropln . I New 5 u i  k  t  l i . t i  l c \
. S c i i l i n e r ' s  . S o n s .  1 9 8 1  i a s .  ' . . . a n  e m i n e n t  p h y s i c i a n  a n d  a c l i e e  r e f o r m e r  i n  t e m p e r a n c e ,  p i i h l i e  h \  e i e n e .  
a n d  s a n i t a t i o n ' .
' " W o r t i o \ s .  S i n e o i l i n y  C r r i i i s .  ; i .  I 25 &  p .  279 .
' ' '! . e i l e r  f r o m  W i l l i a m  B e n j a m i n  C a r p e n t e r  I I 8  I .V 1 8 8 5  i t o  S i r  B e n | a m i n  W a r d  R i e l i a r d s n i i  \ t  ■( i 
1 8 8  V .  R i i \ . i l  C ' o l l e e e  o l  R h \  s i e i a n s .  L o n d o n ,  ( o r i g i n a l  e m p h a s i s i
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with port prophylaxis, considered a Theory’ which could, potentially, cause much 
harm. Whether Koch’s ‘discovery’ was considered legitimate or not -  with regard to 
the validity of Koch's scientific procedure - was less important than the acceptance of 
the theoretical basis of the comma bacillus. The acceptance of contagionism, ‘proven’ 
or ‘unproven’, meant the acceptance of the principles of quarantine. This was clearly 
demonstrated in the reaction of the British and Anglo-Indian delegates at the Rome. It 
was also evident within the vast number of British publications, of greater and lesser 
medical content, which emerged in the years after 1884.
Further to these publications, the scribbled notes of a meeting held at the Royal 
College of Physicians in May 1889, illustrates with particular clarity British hostility 
to Koch’s comma bacillus in the years following the ‘discovery’. The Colonial Office, 
with an attached dispatch from the Governor of Barbados, had approached the Royal 
College with an inquiry as to the appropriate ‘periods of detention for purposes of 
Quarantine in Yellow Fever, Cholera and Small-pox’. The assembled Committee of 
four, including Fayrer, delivered its conclusions in a one-page report, including the 
following, most unsurprising, recommendations.
That the incubation period of Yellow Fever and Cholera is uncertain, and the 
Committee is of opinion that it is unwise to impose Quarantine restrictions in 
the case of these diseases.
The Committee is further strongly opposed to such restrictions generally, 
which it considers harmful and vexatious.'®'’
Most illuminating are the barely legible short-hand minutes, scratched onto the back 
of a Royal College circular letter. They reveal the strong aversion to a bacterial cause 
of cholera developed among many high level physicians in Britain in the years 
immediately following the ‘discovery’ of the comma bacillus. As might be expected 
from a committee attended by Fayrer, quarantine was harshly opposed. Indeed the 
minutes begin with Fayrer calling for a ‘general protest against Quarantine’. The 
committee discussed how it would be, ‘absurd to Quar|antine| a ship wh| ich| comes 
f|romI an infected place and one wh|ich| has chol|era| on board*, and that. ' all
' R r p n i  I n i  t h e  ( J i k i i n m i i i c  C ' n i i i i n i n e c . R i i y a l  C'dllcyii  o l  P in  s ic ians .  1 .o ikU u i .  | .''2 1 8 /2 1
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precautions except sanitary ones and medical inspection arc useless, these precautions 
should be such as are adopted in this country & not suffering the laws of Quarantine’. 
Again, these comments do not particularly surprise. Yet, the few comments relating to 
the incubation period and cause of cholera and yellow fever are what particularly 
stand out in the notes. According to these eminent fellows of the Royal College, The 
incLib[ation] period of Yell[ow] fev[er] & chol[era] is undefined / uncertain & the 
cause’. Considering that the meeting took place in 1889, five years after the 
‘discovery’ of the cholera bacillus, and the subsequent acceptance of the theory on the 
Continent, the statement was particularly pointed. Rather, all the members of the 
committee rejected bacterial contagion and concurred that the diseases were ‘affected 
by climate -  just as is affected in sewerage’. Fayrer concluded:
Sir J. Fayrer.
They wanted to do away with Quar[antine] in Roman conference -  Thorne & I 
& Hunter opposed it -  & to good effect.
Others wanted to return to t h e  System. Whole of Europe deranged by
fear of bacillus -  Koch did all that.'®^
After the moderate headway made by Britain in reducing European reliance on 
quarantine during the 1874 conference, the announcement of a specific contagious 
agent in 1884 appeared to have had a regressive effect. It was much more difficult for 
Britain to argue, in an international forum, that the maintenance of a sanitary urban 
environment could provide sufficient protection from epidemic cholera after a germ 
had been identified which could, theoretically, produce the disease regardless of local 
conditions. Non-acceptance of Koch’s bacillus was directly related to the implications 
it had for quarantine. Britain could ill-afford to concede that an infective agent could 
be imported and take hold in a port regardless of the sanitary environment which had 
been created there. It had grave implications for imperial trade and, as such, for 
Britain’s domination of the Suez Canal. By denoting the contagious nature of cholera, 
it medically justified the requirement of quarantine stations at either end of the Cana! 
and at ports throughout the Mediterranean. Furthermore, as the 1866 conference had
N i n e s  I ' or  I h c  Q u a r a n t i n e  C ' o t n i n i t t e e ,  M a y  1 8 8 9 ' ,  R o y a l  C o l l e y e  o l  P h y s i c i a n s ,  I . o n c l o i i ,  | 2 2 4 8 / 3 | ,  
f o r  s i m i l a r  r e s p o n s e  s e e .  F a y r e r .  ' 1  h e  O r i g i n .  F t a t i i l s  a n d  D i l ' f u s i o n  o l ' C h o l e r a ,  a n d  W h a i  M a y  h e  B o n e  
l o  P r e \ e n l  o r  A r r e s t  i t s  P r o g r e s s ,  a n d  M i t i g a t e  i t s  R a v a g e s ' .  ( 1 8 8 6 ) .  A d d r e s s e s  / i i id  P a p e r s .  IH6H- /<S'.S'<S', 
p  9 ) 2 ,  R . A . M C '  C o l l e c t i o n  { W e l l c o m e  I n s t i t u t e  L i b r a r y ) ;  a n d  F a y r e r .  i ' l ie  N a i t u i d  H i s a i r v  a n d  
I .p id e n i i t i l a y s  n j  ( i i a . \  ra .  p .  3 2 .
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highlighted, accepting cholera as a contagious disease was lo accept that cholera was 
imported to Europe from its origin in India. By a process of simple logic, this 
implicated Britain and British ships in Europe’s numerous encounters with cholera 
since 1830.
Maintaining that cholera was non-contagious suited Britain’s commercial and 
political interests but was also well supported by numerous epidemiological 
investigations into the disease carried out in both Britain and I n d ia .E x p e r ie n c e  had 
demonstrated overwhelmingly, after the 1866 epidemic, that the British system of 
public health sufficed in precluding any great extension of the disease from individual 
cases which arrived into British ports, while the unsanitary ports and lazarettos of the 
subcontinent, Lavant and Mediterranean were culpable, rather than any infective 
agent, for their numerous and devastating epidemics of cholera. Non-contagionism 
was thus not merely maintained because it supported the commercial requirements of 
free trade and movement, but also because it was supported by half a century of 
epidemiological investigations, clinical research and experience.
However, regardless of Britain’s strong political and medical objections to quarantine, 
the majority of the rest of Europe, to varying degrees throughout the second half of 
the nineteenth century, supported the need for quarantine in cases of cholera, plague 
and yellow fever. Britain’s position was well known, and, as indicted, her 
commercial motives were particularly commented upon by the principal European 
naval and imperial powers. As no ratified agreement was made at any of the 
conferences until the 1890s, Britain was thus free to perform any means of 
prophylaxis within her own ports. However, it would have been unwise for the United 
Kingdom to have removed, earlier than the mid 1890s, quarantine from the statute 
books. Regardless of problems that were caused in having the dual authority of 
quarantine and the Port Sanitary Authority, Britain could not, while Europe adhered to 
various contagionist theories of infectious disease, and demanded quarantine, be seen
For further reading on these investigations see: Felling, C h o le r a ,  F e v e r  a n d  E n g l i s h  M e d i c i n e .  
Christopher Hamlin, ‘Politics and germ theories in Victorian Britain; the Metropolitan Water 
Commissions of  I 867-9 and I 892 -3’, MacI.>eod (ed) C o v e r n i n e m  a n d  Experl i .se .  pp. 1 I 0 - 1 27; I lainliii. 
,\  S r i e n r e  o f  i m p u r i t y .  Anne Hardy, ‘On the Cusp: Epidemiology and Bacteriology al the Local 
CiON'crnment Board, 1890-1905,  M e d i c a l  H i s to r y .  ( 1998), 42, pp. 328- 346; C hapman, C h o l e r a  
C n ra h lc ' .  A..I.Wall, A.v/at/c C h o l e r a :  I ts  H is to r y .  P a th o l o g y ,  a n d  M o d e r n  I ' r e a tm e n t .  (London:
II.K.Lewis, 1893); Fhorne Thorne, O n  th e  P ro p ,re ss  o f  P r e v e n t i v e  M e d i c i n e .  Klein and (i ihhes.
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lo have abandoned quarantine entirely. While it was not necessarily practised to any 
great degree in British ports, the fact that quarantine remained, if in appearance only, 
as a principle of British law, allowed British vessels and vessels travelling from 
British ports, to participate fully and effectively in international trade. A port, such as 
London, if it did not quarantine ships that were found to carry, or have carried, a case 
of cholera, would according to most European states, have been regarded as an 
‘infected’ or ‘suspected’ port. The quarantine which would have been imposed on 
British ships in other European and European-run ports, if Britain did not legally 
maintain quarantine, would have been both constant and severe. While it might have 
been acknowledged that in practice Britain protected her ports almost entirely with 
sanitary measures, officially quarantine remained as a legal obligation and was still 
required of ships infected with ‘exotic’ disease which arrived into British ports.
It is here then that the consequence of foreign pressures on British domestic policy is 
witnessed, and the significance of the ports as the meeting place of foreign and 
domestic policy is clearly illustrated. Britain, in the manner of how she managed 
prophylaxis in domestic ports could not overlook foreign opinion or demand. The fact 
that the 1825 Quarantine Act remained law, despite the apparent success of the Port 
Sanitary Authorities since 1872 and the obvious difficulties which lay in dual 
authority, was largely to do with the weight of international demand, clearly 
demonstrated at the International Sanitary Conferences. The exigency of 
accommodating, within British domestic policy, the overwhelming desire of European 
powers to quarantine, was essential if Britain, despite its naval and imperial 
supremacy at the end of the nineteenth century, was to participate more or less 
unhindered in international trade. Thus, paradoxically, in order for Britain to maintain 
freedom of movement of British ships and trade around the world, she had to 
maintain, domestically, the one system which embodied exactly the opposite of this.
I : i i a l t i y \  o j  ( ' l i o l e r a :  I s a a c s ,  ‘ 1 5 . D .  C ’ l i n i i i n g h a m ’ ; l - - d y v c i \  N a l i i r a l  / l i s l o r s  a n d  E j u d c n u o l o y s  o j  
(  iiolt'ixi.
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TABLE ni:
Representative States at the International Sanitary Conferences 1851-1907
First Conference -  Paris, 23 July 1851- 19 January 1852
Austria, the Two Sicilies, Spain, the Papal States, France, Great Britain, Greece,
Portugal, Russia, Sardini, Tuscany and Turkey
Second Conference - Paris, 9 April 1859 - 30 Ausust 1859
Austria, France, Great Britain, Greece, the Papal States, Portugal, Russia, Sardinia, 
Spain, Tuscany, and Turkey. Representatives of the Ionian Islands were sent as 
observers.
Third Conference -  Constantinople, 13 February 1866 -  26 September 1866 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain, the Papal States, Great Britain, Greece, 
Italy, Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Norway (then 
political unified) and Turkey. The USA was invited but did not attend. Egypt, the 
under Turkish Sovereignty, observed.
Fourth Conference -  Vienna, 1 July 1874 -  1 Ausust 1874
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Serbia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey. The USA was invited but did not attend.
Fifth Conference -  Washington, 5 January 1881 -  1 march 1881 
Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Denmark, France, Germany, great Britain, Hawaii, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Liberia,
Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Turkey, USA, 
and Venezuela. Canada, and Cuba with Porto Rico sent medical delegates only.
Sixth Conference -  Rome, 20 May 1885 -  13 June 1885 
Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Peru, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey, USA, Uruguay. Egypt is given as attending although did not send a delegate.
Seventh Conference -  Venice, 5-31 January 1892
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Turkey (including Egypt). 
Representatives of the Quarantine Board at Alexandria were also sent.
Eiahth Conference -  Dre.sden, 11 March 1893 -  15 April 1893 
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Spain, Serbia, 
Sweden and Norway. Switzerland, and Turkey.
Ninth Conference -  Paris, 7 February 1894 -  J April 1894
Austria-Hungary,  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Germany, Great Bi itain, Gieece ,  Italy. 
Netherlands,  Persia. Portugal,  Russia,  Spain, Serbia, Tuikey  and the I ISA.
See. ( iooilinan. Iin< '-'uiiioiuil Health Orpauisatioas:  and. tlnu'aixl .limes. 'The Seieiiiihe 
haekenmnit'
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Tenth Conference -  Venice, 16 February 1897 -  19 March JH97 
Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Portugal, Roumania, Russia, Spain, Serbia, 
Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. Bulgaria and Egypt were also present 
although not ‘officially’ independent.
Eleventh Conference -  Paris. 10 October 1903 -  3 December 1903 
Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, 
Roumania, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the 
USA.
L ’Office International d ’Hvsiene publique -  ‘The Paris O ffice’ -  1907 
Establishment of first permanent, worldwide body dealing with international health -  
primarily quarantine.
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CHAPTER THREE: 1892
Cholera Moves W est Along the Migration Route
Despite the strong opposition to quarantine which had developed in Britain from as 
far back as the 1820s and certainly from the 1850s, the final decade of the nineteenth 
century witnessed, only a few years before the repeal of the 1825 Act, a short period 
in which shipping companies and medical and sanitary officers rallied to demand that 
ships from certain Continental ports ‘be quarantined’.* Port Medical Officers of 
Health sought to detain vessels for up to seven days and demanded various powers 
previously maintained exclusively by the quarantine service. At the same time, the 
problems encountered in the maintenance of dual authority at the ports appeared to be 
worsening. The renewal of power to detain vessels was not, however, sought by the 
Customs service, but rather, was at the request of the Port Sanitary Authorities. The 
panic which led to this curious insistence on a renewal of strict quarantine procedures 
was the result of the cholera epidemic seen rapidly approaching Britain from the east 
in the summer of 1892.
T he W estern European  and North Am erican cholera epidem ic o f  1892 had, according 
to contem porary  observers,  two origins from whence it began its march westward." 
The first was in the outskirts o f  Paris, where the disease was identified in late M arch. 
It was believed to have been a recrudescence o f former cholera epidem ics in the area, 
which then extended dow n the Seine valley to the Le Havre by .luly 5®' and 
northwards into B elgium  by July 20'*’.^  The second origin was in Asiatic Russia 
‘which ... received its infection as the result o f  an exceptional epidem ic o f  cholera in 
British India during 1891 ; this being followed in the early months o f 1892 by a 
recrudescence along the Indo-Afghan frontier’."* From Asiatic Russia the first case 
reported in European Russia  was said to have occurred in Astrakhan on June 24'*\
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reaching St Petersburg on August and Moscow on August 5‘‘\  It was in Poland 
before the end of the second week of August and at Hamburg, one of the busiest ports 
in the world, by August 16‘*\ Within the month it had reached the United Kingdom, 
followed a couple of weeks later, in September, by its arrival in the United States.
What made this epidemic particularly frightening to contemporaries was the manner 
by which it spread across the Continent. Previous epidemics, such as the last major 
epidemic to attack Britain nearly thirty years earlier in 1866, primarily arrived with 
trade from Egypt and the Mediterranean. The speed with which the 1892 epidemic 
travelled across Europe was quickly associated with the westward migration of tens of 
thousands of East European Jews fleeing persecution in Russia and the Pale of 
Settlement. The disease was not arriving on board trading vessels, among crew and 
their small numbers of passengers, but in the massively overcrowded steerage holds 
of steamships. Although the epidemic of 1866 had arrived in Britain on trading 
vessels from Egypt and the Mediterranean, the source of the disease remained 
sufficiently far removed; this time, in 1892, those people who were seen to be 
responsible for importing the disease were congregating in ports on the western edge 
of Europe; some, having made the crossing to Britain remained and settled within the 
country. The disease was on the doorstep. The transportation of thousands of migrants 
from Russia, west through Europe and ultimately, for most migrants, to the United 
States, was big business, quickly and on the whole efficiently operated. It was the 
numbers and speed with which the migrations appeared to move across Europe as 
well as the accompanying prejudices associated with the cultural, religious and 
physical difference of the migrants, which was particularly frightening to 
contemporary observers of the 1892 epidemic.
The migration principally began in 1881 when the assassination of Tsar Alexander II 
ignited a wave of anti-Semitic retaliatory pogroms against Jews across Russia and the 
Pale."’ One of the Tsar’s assassins had been a Jewess - reason enough to provoke
' I'horne Thorne, Annual Report  LGB JH92-3, p. xvii.
Other immigrant groups settled in Britain at this time. Irish immigration, although not near to the 
scale of  the 1840s and 1850s, was still ongoing.  German clerical workers constituted a large proportion 
ol immigrant numbers up until the late 1880s. Italians also immigrated, and I.ithuamans were a 
proportionately significant immigrant group into Scotland, These immigrant groups, and others, 
continued to enter Britain from the early 1880s but, by the 1890s were mostly eclipsed by the number 
of  East European .lew ish immigrants. Other European migrants often shared with the .lewish migraiiis 
the sieerage accommodation of  the migrant steamships.
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violence where prejudice already existed. Unrecorded numbers were killed, thousands 
injured, and Jewish property suffered hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of 
damage. Following the violence, only months after the widespread devastation of the 
pogroms, the new Tsar introduced legislation which severely restricted the liberty of 
Jews. The so-called Temporary Laws (although they remained in place for over thirty 
years) forbade Jews to live outside designated towns within the Pale, to purchase 
property, to access secondary or higher education, or to vote. The Jewish community 
was forced to submit a far greater proportion of its population to extended military 
service, during which only the lowest ranks of the army were available and promotion 
or advancement was impossible.® These conditions and numerous other anti-Semitic 
laws and pogroms continued over the following decades and encouraged many who 
were subsequently constrained or persecuted to seek refuge in the reputedly more 
liberal west. Some settled in Western Europe and Great Britain, although most -  
almost half a million by 1892^ -  migrated to the United States. Those en route to 
America, when travelling through Europe and Britain, were termed ‘transmigrants’.
Although East European migration continued on a large scale through the 1880s till 
around 1914, 1892 and 1893 were particularly busy years. The social, political and 
religious persecution suffered by Russian Jews since the beginning of the 1880s was 
compounded from 1891-2 by severe famine and by a new, and especially rampant, 
epidemic of cholera which in the Summer of 1892 claimed an estimated 300,000 lives 
in Russia and affected a total of 620,000 people.* Limited access for Jews to medical 
.services in Russia and the potency of peasant superstitions about the illness and the 
medical profession® meant that public health efforts were generally ineffectual and the 
disease spread with frightening rapidity.*® Thus, the number of people fleeing Russia 
increased significantly, as riots and panic escalated. Emigrants headed West both to
Hi) l ines ,  J o h n  B u l l ' s  I s l a n d ,  p. 2 0 - 3  I .
'' Leonard Shapiro, 'The Russian Background of  the Anglo-American .lewish Immigration', in C’olin 
Holmes (ed). M i g r a t i o n  in E u r o p e a n  H i s t o r y ,  vol. I, (Cheltenham: LIgar Reference C'oileciion. | 006i  
Markel, Q u a r a n t i n e ! ,  p. 141.
'' ibid., p. 86.
' ibid.: C'onlemporary sources in Britain also perceived 'peasant superslitioii.s' as a lacior which 
contributed to the rapid spread o f  cholera in 1892. 'Some extraordinary examples of the savage 
ignorance of the Russian peasants are given ... showing the ferocity with which the doctors were 
attacked owing to the conviction of the peasants that the doctors were poisoning the [xitients. and lliai 
the peasants were buried a l i ve . . . ’ B M J ,  Sept. K), 1892, p. 606.
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seule in the more liberal regimes of Western nations and to escape the ‘degrading 
violence’ * ' of one of the most dreaded diseases of the nineteenth century.
However, despite the migrants’ attempts to flee infection, cholera moved west with 
them, following the routes they travelled en route to America. The principal routes 
were west from Russia and the Pale, through Germany to Dutch, Belgian or German 
ports, or from Baltic ports, particularly Libau. As the Chief Medical Officer for the 
Port of London, William Collingridge, wrote in August 1892,
the present epidemic of cholera on the Continent is remarkable for the terrible 
rapidity with which it has travelled... By the Jewish emigrants it was carried 
to Hamburg where for some time its existence was denied. From Hamburg it 
gradually infected Altona, Antwerp, Harve [sic], Paris, Amsterdam,
Rotterdam, Roven, Bremen, at the present moment every port from St 
Petersburg to the Seine must be considered as dangerous*^
The busiest migrant -  and trade - port in Europe was Hamburg and it was there that 
cholera had its most devastating effect in Western Europe. The first case occurred in a 
sewerage worker on August 14’® who died the following day. Each successive day 
saw the disease extend to more and more people. Two more cases were reported on 
the 16’®, four on the 17’®, twelve on the 18’® and thirty-one by the 19’®.'  ^ From one of 
the cases on August 17‘® a sample was taken for bacteriological testing. However, the 
tests did not produce a pure culture of comma bacillus until the 22”®. The Imperial 
Government in Berlin was informed on August 23'® and by August 26'® the number ol' 
newly reported cases occurring in the city that day had reached one thousand.’® Yet, 
officials did not announce to the world that Hamburg was an infected port until 
August 26'®, 1892. Anxious to rid the busy port of the rapidly increasing and 
expensive number of migrants accumulating in the city, the President of the Hamburg 
Medical Board, Senator Gerhard Hachmann, and his colleagues withheld the 
information and allowed the departure of a number of infected ships bound for 
America.'® Once domestic and foreign quarantines were impo.sed on the city, the
" 1 6 ans. Death in Hanihnry.  p. 2.30.
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emigrants stranded in Hamburg would become the financial burden of the Hamburg 
Senate. In all, three overcrowded Hamburg-America Line ships departed Hamburg for 
direct passage to New York with clean Bills of Health between August 17'® and 25’®. 
The Port of New York was the second largest port in the world. The first ship to arrive 
carrying the cholera bacillus was the SS Moravia. Hachmann had assured the 
American Vice-Consul in Hamburg that no cholera was present in the city and the 
steamship departed on August 17’® with a clean Bill of Health.
Although the Imperial Government did not officially announce the presence of 
cholera until August 26’®, the British Consulate in Hamburg telegraphed London on 
August 25’® that the disease had arrived in the port. By then cholera had already 
crossed the North Sea. The first case of cholera to reach Britain appeared in 
Grangemouth on the East Coast of Scotland on August 19’®. On August 25‘® a vessel 
carrying Russian Jewish transmigrants from Hamburg arrived in Leith. They boarded 
a train to Glasgow, where they were to pick up the boat to America, and it was there 
that two of the passengers began to display some of the symptoms of cholera. ‘The 
patients, when received into Belvidere,'® had the cold extremities, the livid fingers 
and toes, the stricken expression, the sighing hollow voice, and the profound 
prostration so characteristic of true cholera’.'^ In London a vessel carrying three fatal 
cases of cholera, all Russian Jewish emigrants en route to America from Hamburg, 
arrived on August 25'®, having sailed from Hamburg after it was known that cholera 
was present in the city but before it was officially announced. In Liverpool, on August 
29'®, three cases of cholera were identified among a group of immigrants who had 
arrived by train from Hull.
T he em igrants  referred to in my telegram were removed from the em igrants  
house in accordance with our instructions, as soon as suspicious sym ptom s 
were manifested, to the city hospital. Park Hill, on Saturday and Sunday last. 
The subsequent progress o f  the cases leaves no doubt that they arc cholera, but 
they arc progressing  favourably. The closest supervision is maintained over 
the emigrant house in question as well as over the other emigrant houses and 
no sickness or ailment of any kind has been d isco v ered . .. '''
Ik'lvidci c. iipoiicci 111 I 8 7 0 .  was Cila.syow’s c c n d  al municipal lc\ cr ( in f 'c c u o u s  iliscasc] linspiial 
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Britain had been making preparations for the imminent arrival of cholera well before 
the disease arrived in Hamburg or appeared in British ports. As Richard Thorne 
Thorne wrote in the Annual Report o f the Local Government Board, 1892, the spread 
of the disease into Western Europe was, from the beginning of the Summer, expected 
to accompany Eastern European migrants.
And, when the disease was evidently about to invade those provinces of 
Russia which are within the Pale of Settlement for the Jews, and from which 
emigration of Russian Jews across Germany and thence to this country was at 
the time in rapid and continual progress, it became necessary at once to warn 
the authorities of those English Ports at which these immigrants and trans­
migrants were landing.*®
Compared with the devastation which the 1892 epidemic caused throughout Europe, 
America, the Middle East, and parts of Northern Africa, British precautions proved 
comparably effective. St Petersburg and Hamburg, for example, suffered thousands of 
deaths in late August and early September 1892, while the British Medical Journal 
was able to report confidently that only twenty-four cases of undoubted cholera were 
reported in England and Wales in the same period."’* Nevertheless, Britain remained 
poised, defences in place, alert to the possible danger. Particularly because the 
epidemic was following the main migration route from East to West, concern about 
prevention focused on the potential risk associated with the tens of thousands of 
Eastern European emigrants making their journeys during the summer of that year.
From the first appearance o f  the cloud not bigger than a m an ’s hand in the 
East, the m arch  o f  the disease was carefully watched from W hitehall,  and as 
soon as it w as seen to be approaching the provinces in Russia within the pale 
o f  settlement from which the emigration of Jews is constantly taking place into 
and across this country, inspectors were sent by the Local G overnm ent Board 
to all the ports on the east coast to warn the local authorities o f the probable 
advent o f cholera, and to urge them to com plete their sanitary defences in time 
to repel the threatened invasion ... The danger was in the piesent instance
I I t o m c  V h o Y u c ,  A n n u a l  K c p o r l  L G H  /<S’9 2 - . f  p .  x x i i i .
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greatly aggravated by the character of the people eonveying the infection ... 
There is reason to believe that the enemy has been successfully repulsed for 
the time, but it is important to realise that the danger is not yet over."'
Cholera was considered in the West to be essentially a ‘foreign disease’^^  and in 1892
East European emigrants ‘the chief source of danger’.23
Paul Weindling has disputed the claim that Jews were responsible for the spread of 
cholera from Eastern to Western Europe and North America. He claims that ‘given 
that transmigrants did not ‘cause’ cholera in other port cities, notably Bremen, to 
accept that Russian Jews had to be the primary cause and carriers of cholera would be 
to swallow the anti-Semitic prejudices of the time’.^ ® He argues that the assumption 
made by scholars such as Richard Evans that cholera was brought to Hamburg and 
subsequently west by Ostjuden, was more a case of ‘conjecture rather than 
epidemiologically proven’. D e s p i t e  widespread belief among the authorities in 
Hamburg that the transmigrants were in fact responsible for the outbreak of the 
epidemic, Weindling insists that ‘such prejudices did not infect expert opinion’,^ ® - le. 
Koch’s. Rather, Koch’s expertise allowed him to see beyond any anti-Semitism 
present in Hamburg during the epidemic and recognise that cholera had spread 
because of the failure of the Hamburg authorities to disinfect the waste water from the 
migrants’ lodgings at the port.^^
Whether or not the failure to maintain sanitary conditions al the ports was the actual 
reason why cholera was transmitted so extensively throughout the city, however, is 
irrelevant. Overwhelmingly, contemporaries in both Europe (including Britain) and 
America blamed Jewish migrants for the disease, and much of the fear which existed 
in relation to the 1892 epidemic was a direct reflection of this. Retrospectively, 
Weindling may be perfectly correct in stating that epidemiologically East European
B M J .  Sept. 10, 1892. p. 604.  
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Jews were not entirely culpable for the spread of the disease. However, Weindling 
develops this analysis purely from the retrospective gaze. Its value lies in clarifying 
the anti-Semitic nature of much of the response in Hamburg and other infected ports 
to the transmigrants as disease carriers.
Russian Jews were scapegoated for the failure of the Hamburg authorities to 
provide filtration. But there is no conclusive proof for the view held at the 
time by anti-Semites that Russian Jews caused the Hamburg cholera 
epidemic.^**
But, as Weindling himself states, ‘the view held at the time’ was that ‘Russian Jews 
caused the Hamburg cholera epidemic’, as well as the New York epidemic and the 
introduction of cholera into the Port of London. What is important in a historical 
study of the 1892 epidemic is not the legitimacy of contemporary fears and 
accusations, nor the distaste they may leave in the mouths of twenty-first century 
observers, but how they affected, in 1892, popular perceptions, the implementation of 
policy and medical practice, and the contemporary texts through which we can 
observe these processes. Indeed, much of the fear and panic of 1892 was due, in part, 
lo the fact that those people identified as carriers of the disease were Eastern 
European Jews. Many of them embodied a physical difference and ‘exoticness’ which 
enabled easy association with the notoriously ‘exotic’ disease, and any other fears 
associated with their arrival were easily projected onto their supposed role as cholera 
carriers.
For decades Britain had felt secure with the preventive structures erected at her ports. 
The Port Sanitary Authority, in co-operation with the local Sanitary Authorities, the 
entire infrastructure of sanitation, as well as the Customs service, had full public and 
government support in its ability to provide the necessary precautions against any 
threatened invasion of imported infectious disease.
There has always been, as you are aware, a considerable divergence olA iews 
between the teaehings put forward by the medieal authorities and accepted by 
public opinion in England and in India, and that which has prevailed upon the
ihul
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Coalinenl, us lo Ihc elTicacy o f  quarantine as a safeguard against the contagion 
o f cholera and som e other diseases. The tendency o f English opinion has been 
rather to look to measures o f  sanitary im provem ent as the best prophylactic 
against cholera, and to rely on the application o f  quarantine for that purpose 
only to a very limited degree.^®
However, in the summer of 1892 the almost complacent attitude which had developed 
in Britain toward diseases such as cholera'®’^ was replaced by quite visible anxiety 
among public health officials, as they saw the disease advance into Western Europe. 
The comfortable confidence in the ‘English Preventative System’ which had 
accompanied British delegates to the International Sanitary Conferences and allowed 
for such assured defiance of quarantine, was suddenly forgotten.
It has been assumed by some sanitary authorities that the mere fact of our 
system of ‘medical inspection’ exhibiting certain interstices through which 
cholera might creep was sufficient to warrant them in crying out for a return to 
quarantine restrictions, some wishing that all vessels from infected places 
should be kept in detention two days, others three and four days, and others 
five days. As to this demand, we would ...point out that the English system 
never laid claim to any infallible pretensions to keep cholera altogether out of 
the country.®'
Her M ajes ty 's  G overnm ent can scarcely refuse to recognise its obligations in a 
case like this, and the protection o f the nation from the iim asion of a 
Continental ep idem ic, w hich  has proved so terrible a scourge, is surely no less 
a matter o f  Imperial policy than the invasion o f our shores by a foreign navy.
It is a m atter on which the country  must make its voice heard with no 
Linecrtain sound, so that there can be no cxcu.se for official vacillation.
But what caused this change  o f  heart, and waning o f  confidence ? Despite what 
W eindling argues, it had much to do with the fact that the perceived source o f  the
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disease was the often bedraggled, ‘exotic’ looking Bast European Jews, arriving in 
their thousands at ports across Western Europe. Although the contagiousness of 
cholera that this implied had crept back into British ideas about the aetiology of the 
disease in 1892, the idea that the migrants could bring with them disease was easily 
accommodated into existing medical theories, which still resisted Koch’s bacillus. As 
an article in The Lancet explained, the migrants did not import the disease through 
any process of contagion, as was articulated in contagionist models of cholera 
aetiology, but were seen within the Pettenkofean model of disease, in that they 
brought with them the ‘locality’ within which disease could generate.
A number of immigrants arriving from an infected district -  possibly dirty as 
regards their persons, and still more so as regards their clothes -  may be 
provisionally regarded as so many minute migratory fragments of the locality 
whence they came.®®
Although somewhat extreme, this example demonstrates the significant place 
Pettenkofean theories still occupied in British cholera aetiology. These theories were 
gradated between the extreme localism of the above, and the notion that ‘if it be true 
that the disease is caused by a living organism, whatever it may be, it is certain that 
the organism goes out in the bowel discharges of the patient’.®® Both ways, ‘it [was] 
not cholera so much that [had] to be feared, it [was] rather the filth which may serve 
as a breeding-ground for imported infections'.''^ Invariably, migrants and 
transmigrants were described and prefaced with the word 'filthy'. During 1892 the 
association of the word ‘filth’ with regard to cholera was often closely associated with 
steerage class migrants -  'the very class that might be picked out as most likely to 
spread the disease'.®®
What thus needed to be targeted in devising prophylactic strategies at the ports in 
1892 was this ‘tilth' and these ‘migrating localities' of di.sease -  the East European 
immigrants and transmigrants. This may appear, as Weindling argues, to he 
'swallowing the anti-Semitic prejudices of the time', but in order to understand the
" l .a iun.  Sept. 9 1892. p. 592.
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particular and additional preventive measures put in place during 1892, and the 
subsequent effects the epidem ic had on British port health, it is necessary  to 
acknow ledge  the strength  o f  these contem porary  fears.
The primary precaution put in place to avoid the importation of cholera in 1892, was, 
in fact directed particularly towards the migrants. The General Cholera Order, issued 
by the Local Government Board on September 6‘® 1892, extended the powers of the 
previous Cholera Order of August 28’® 1890. Under the 1890 Order the Customs 
Boarding Officer had determined cases of cholera and then reported these to the Port 
Sanitary Authority. With the apparently increased danger from the 1892 epidemic, the 
Local Government Board altered this Order to ensure that, in London at least, a 
Medical Officer of the Port Sanitary Authority would visit every ship which arrived 
into the port, accompanying the Officers of Customs on the boarding of every vessel. 
An article in the British Medical Journal from August 1893 described the new 
procedure.
Since August 18’®, 1892, every vessel entering the Port of London has been 
boarded by a medical officer. One at least of these officers is on duty day and 
night.
T h e  necessity had arisen for the Port M edical Officer o f Health to board a vessel in 
the com pany  of the C ustom s Quarantine Officer.
It ...  becom es absolutely necessary that every vessel should be boarded and 
the passengers suspected o f  the [cholera be medically  inspected |.  This can 
only be carried out by the Authority  having a medical man always on the 
Custom s hulk  ready to go o ff  in the launch w henever a vessel is boarded by 
the Q uarantine  Officer.®**
If the Medical O ff icer  o f  Health boarded a vessel before the Quarantine O fficer had 
arrived to undertake his ow n inspection, he was actually, under the Q uarantine .Act. 
forbidden to leave the ship until granted a formal Quarantine clearance by an officer
HMJ .  .Aug .  5 .  1 8 9 3 .  p .  .342.
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of the Customs service. T h e  17’® Section of the Quarantine Act rendered them liable 
to imprisonment if they left a vessel before it was discharged from quarantine’.®® 
Indeed, as the Act clearly stated, ‘every such pilot or other person so quitting such 
vessel so liable to Quarantine shall for every such offence suffer imprisonment for the 
space of six months, and shall forfeit and pay the sum of three hundred pounds’.®’* 
Every vessel suspected of being infected by cholera thus came initially within the 
governance of the Quarantine Act until formally cleared and passed over to the Port 
Sanitary Authority. By boarding vessels with the Quarantine Officer, clearance could 
be granted on the spot and the Medical Officer could continue with his work without 
restriction.®'
Articles 2 and 3 of the 1892 Cholera Order were most specifically focused on the 
arrival of migrants into London. They ordered the refusal of permission to land to any 
passengers without a correct address in the city or means to support themselves.®^ 
Although Medical Officers of Health previously obtained addresses when they 
attended infected or suspected ships and forwarded the addresses to local sanitary 
authorities, this Order actually prevented the landing of those passengers whose 
address could not be fully verified.
1 am directed by the Local Government Board to state that it appears that large 
numbers of aliens in a filthy and otherwise unwholesome condition are now 
being brought into this country, and that the danger of the introduction of 
cholera is thereby increased. Under these circumstances the board have 
thought it desirable to issue an order altering the Cholera regulations made by 
them on the 28’® Aug. 1890, so as to impose certain restrictions on the landing 
of persons from ships bringing passengers of the class referred to . .. The order 
confers power on the Medical Officer of Health in the case of any ship which 
has on board passengers of the class above mentioned, to certify that in his 
opinion, with a view to checking the introduction or spread of cholera, the
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;iiul Mercantile Ga/.c(te' ol the I?"' Decemtier. 1892. By Order of the Rort olT.ondon Sanitar\' 
Oommitfee. p. 6. CT.RO MISC MSS/337/.3.
'"Oiiarantine Act. 1825 (,6Geo. Ill c.78) XVII.
" Cholera Precautions lor J,S9d. p. 76. ( I .R O  MI.SG M.SS/:07/.3.
1 his applied to all classes ol passengers arriving Iront toreign ports. I low e\ er. the addresses ol I ' 
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persons on board would not be allowed to land until they satisfy him as to 
their names, places of destination and their address at such places/'^
Those immigrants whose addresses could not be verified were ‘returned in the ship',^"^ 
and the masters of vessels landing passengers who had not been discharged by a 
Medical Officer could be fined up to £50. An article titled T h e  Importation of Filthy 
Aliens’ which appeared in the British Medical Journal in the late Summer of 1892 is 
demonstrative enough of this point to relate in full;
On September 11“^  the S.S. Ellida was boarded at Gravesend by the medical 
officer to the Port Sanitary Authority, who found twenty-six passengers from 
Lib au, in Russia, a place infected with cholera, who were in a filthy condition. 
He served the captain with a notice requiring him not to allow any of them to 
leave his ship. Nevertheless, it was discovered the next day that they had all 
been landed, without the addresses of any of them having been sent to Dr. 
Collingridge. The captain was fined £25, and we may express the opinion that 
he got off very lightly for an offence by which he exposed London to the risk 
of cholera, and set at naught regulations framed specially for cases such as his, 
the carrying out of which costs the sanitary authority many thousands a ycar.'^^
Firsil)’, intended addresses were verified against a list of registered lodging houses to 
establish whether the address existed. A ‘careful investigation' had apparently  been 
carried out which  inform ed the Local G overnm ent Board that ‘there is difficulty 
dealing with the .lewish im m igran ts’, and that ‘ about 25 or 30 o f the addresses 
given are un trus tw orthy ’ .*^ ’ Addresses were also checked against a list of lodging 
houses recorded as ‘unsan ita ry ’. T he  rule although primarily concerned with (he 
residences o f ‘Jew ish  im m igran ts’, applied to all steerage-class passengers, fhc  
G erm an Y oung M e n ’s Christian Association complained formally to the Port Sanitary 
C om m ittee  when they discovered they had been placed on the ‘unsanitary lodging 
house ' list.
" C h ol er a  R c t^ u la t io n s .  I.ocal Cjovcriiniciit Boaixi. Whitchali, .Aug. IS92, i’KO . \t l l lU/2 I I 
" ‘Monthly Report ol' the l o^rt Medical Officer o f  H ea l t hO c t . ,  ISV2. C’LRO P S C I \  (Oct. I )i 
IKV21,
" AM/,/. .Sept. 24. IXV2. p. 70X.
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The Medical Man, who has the charge of calling on the steamboats on their 
arrival in London coming from the Continent (Hamburg and Rotterdam) in 
order to make sure if the passengers are in good health and to find out to what 
Hotel or private house they intend to go, has on several occasions (which have 
come to our notice) forbidden that passengers should come to our Hotel at the 
above address [Finsbury Sq., London] saying that the sanitary condition of it 
does not give satisfaetion.'^^
The German YMCA, which had three ‘hotels’ in London, was unaware that their 
property had been placed on the ‘unsanitary’ list. Their complaints were an attempt to 
gain some compensation for the losses incurred and to have the property removed 
from the list. Despite the assistant Medical Officer being quoted as remarking ‘I’m 
afraid. Captain, that Hotel is on my black list’ -  referring to a page in his pocket-book 
-  Collingridge claimed that no instructions regarding the hotel had ever been given to 
the Medical Officers. Instead, he explained ‘all that this implies either is that there is 
some doubt as to the passengers themselves or that there is some difficulty in 
verifying the a d d r e s s A  solicitor representing the German YMCA investigated the 
case and interviewed a number of Masters of vessels and passengers. These 
testimonies provide a valuable insight into how the inspections were carried out.
All the passengers were summoned to the Cabin and 1 was the first who 
arrived, in the Cabin were the Captain, the Doctor, a Policeman, and the ship’s 
Steward. 1 understand English sufficiently to know what is heing said but I do 
not speak it well. The Captain’s name was Broc sen (who acted as interpreter 
between the Dr., who spoke English, and the passengers who spoke German). 
The Captain presented to the Dr. a list of all the passengers with the address of 
their proposed destinations, reading my name with 28 Finsbury Square as my 
proposed address. This address did not appear to be satisfactory to the Dr. but 
the Captain urged very strongly that the address was quite suitable and the Dr. 
asked me thro’ the Captain from whom I got the address and 1 replied, from a 
similar home in Mamburu. The Dr, shruaacd his shoulders and said I can't
■C’o m i i i ; i i n l s  t i l  t h u  (  i c i ' i i u m  Y M C . A .  I . ( i t u i o i r .  I c U c i  i k u c U .  A p i . 2  1.  ! XU  t .  (  ’ I , R {  ) l ’S (  7 k  ( J u n o  
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pass your address, but gave no reason. He said tomorrow another Dr. will 
come and give you a final decision.
This particular witness was eventually granted permission to land,'’" but not all such 
migrants were so fortunate. In October 1892, for instance, four vessels whieh had 
arrived in London carrying European migrants were forced to return to the Continent 
with a number of these unfortunate migrants still aboard.^'
Throughout 1892-3 the British Medical Journal printed extensive articles and reports 
about the progress of the epidemic, on treatment, and increasingly on the constant 
potential of the disease’s importation into Britain via the huge stream of East 
Europeans and other steerage class migrants. Concern was met with occasional 
assurance, as the Medical Officer of Health for the Whitechapel District reported in 
September; ‘although inhabited by many foreigners of the alien class, this district has 
been altogether free from cholera. The doubtful cases which were landed from 
Hamburg, and attended to in the London Hospital, proved to be severe enteritis’. 
However, during the potential crisis of 1892-3, most attention directed toward 
European immigrants was negative and provocative. Greater than with any of the 
previous instances of widespread Asiatic Cholera, the 1892-3 epidemic instigated a 
very focused reaction toward immigrants as, almost exclusively, the cause.
Despite increased activity at the ports by both the Port Sanitary Authorities and 
Customs Service (who monitored the arrival of every ship from the extensive list of 
‘infected’ ports during the epidemic) their authority was limited with regard to their 
ability to detain ‘suspected’ vessels. The only way that they could restrict the 
movement of the perceived risk group was through questioning the legitimacy of thcii 
address.
' ' Lcitci JaiL'J. .\la\ I". IXV.yibicl.
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The ‘S.S. Gemma’
The treatment of the steamship Gemma, which arrived in Gravesend, London, from 
Hamburg on August 25"’ 1892 was in many ways typical of the general process of 
prevention that operated in the Port of London in 1892. Yet it was also, in many ways, 
atypical of the procedure which had been established since 1872. The Gemma had 
sailed from Hamburg around midday on August 24*'’. All the passengers were in good 
health on departure but after coming alongside the light ship Sunk [?] the following 
morning, one of the adult passengers became extremely ill. Within a few hours two 
more passengers, both also third class immigrants, were similarly afflicted. On the 
ship’s arrival at Gravesend, the attending Customs Boarding Officer determined that 
there was illness on board and, being unable to contact the Quarantine Medical 
Officer, which was normal procedure, he contacted the Acting Port Medical Officer of 
Health for Gravesend, Dr Whitcombe. Whitcombe examined the passengers and 
concluded that they were infected with Asiatic cholera. He was shortly joined by Dr 
Collingridge, who had anticipated the arrival of the Gemma as a suspected ship and 
who was able to confirm Whitcombe’s diagnosis. Customs then gave clearance for the 
vessel to be released into the care of the Port Sanitary Authority. The three infected 
immigrants were immediately removed to the Denton Isolation Hospital, a mile east 
of Gravesend, along with all of their bedding and personal effects, which were 
subsequently burned. All three died within the following 24 hours. Collingridge and 
Whitcombe medically examined the remaining crew and passengers, and finding no 
cholera among them, the crew and first and second class passengers, all of whom 
could provide a precise and verifiable address where they were staying in London, 
were permitted to leave. Their luggage remained at the port with the third class 
immigrant passengers who were required to remain on board the Gemma. The report 
concludes:
next morning, Friday August 26"’, no further cholera cases having developed 
on board the Gemma, Dr Collingridge set to work to overhaul the clothing 
affects of the immigrants, organising at the same time a gcnci al wash of their 
bodies and of such articles of clothing as he did not on account of filthiness 
condemn to be burned ... Also Dr Collingridge sought through the skipper of 
the Getnma to obtain from Craven and Co. a spare ship for accommodation of
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the immigrants after their washing and disinfecting was accomplished, and 
until they could supply him with satisfactory statements as to their future 
addresses in London to which all were bound.
Being unable to obtain another vessel on which to detain the remaining passengers, 
‘finally the Port Sanitary Authority determined to have the immigrants disposed in 
tents on a spare couple of acres at the Port Sanitary Hospital site’.'’''
Once the migrants left their accommodation at Denton on August 3L* their progress 
continued to be closely monitored. Despite the six-day detention they had undergone, 
concern was still attached to them as possible carriers of disease. The Secretary to the 
Local Government Board in London received a telegram from the Town Clerk for 
Salford on September L* and despite the precautions which had been put in place in 
London, panic was rising.
This day’s papers state Russian immigrants from steamer Gemma landed at 
Gravesend and have come to Manchester. This no doubt will include Salford. 
We have had no notice what should be done, we hear today several persons 
belonging to Salford are arriving at Grimsby from Hamburg. They should not 
be allowed to come on here.^^
The Local Government Board had not known that some of the Gemma migrants were 
travelling on to Manchester but were informed the next day that indeed three had been 
‘found' in Manchester, but that all ‘are in good health at present moment’. In 
response the Manchester sanitary authorities ‘passed a scries of resolutions by a 
special meeting of our hospital committee’, including the immediate publication ‘of a 
handbill of sanitary precautions against cholera and choleraic diarrhoea, printed in 
Hebrew, together with a translation in English language’.'’"
A number of interesting and illuminating points are observable in the case of the 
Gemma. Firstly, during the 1892 epidemic cholera was deemed to he a quarantincablc
I’RO Mlis5/X97,
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disease, and was thus at this stage not fully incorporated into the authority of the 
sanitary system. The Customs Officer, who, in usual practice was the first boarding 
authority, was required to contact the Quarantine Medical Officer in the first instance. 
This officer being unobtainable his second choice was to contact the Port Medical 
Officer. The Quarantine Medical Officer was responsible for diagnosing, in the first 
instance, a case of cholera on board a vessel. He then gave clearance for the Port 
Sanitary Authority to assume responsibility for the disinfection and subsequent ‘care’ 
of the passengers and crew.
Secondly, although Whitcombe remarked in his report of the incident that ‘the ship 
was placed in quarantine’ the detention and observation period imposed on the 
migrants was not strictly quarantine because they were removed from the vessel they 
arrived on and were accommodated in the grounds of the land-based infectious 
disease hospital. Yet, the detention resembled quarantine more than it did the ‘English 
system’, which professed only to incarcerate those people who displayed symptoms of 
disease; and it is interesting that Whitcombe made this distinction even if only 
through the terminology he chose to employ. Evenso, the period of detention under 
which the Gemma migrants and other such passengers were placed was widely 
supported - despite Britain’s accepted opposition to any form of quarantine. An article 
in the Lancet in October 1892 reported that;
having regard to the extrem ely suspicious circum stances surrounding the 
remainder o f  the passengers, they and the vessel were detained afloat in the 
river, under observation for several days; after which they were tem porarily  
provided for in an encam pm ent by the port authority. This later action went 
beyond the powers actually conferred under the Cholera O rder o f  the Local 
G overnm ent Board  then in existence, but the Judicious action taken in this 
matter under the initiative and personal superintendence o f  Dr Collingridge, 
the Port M edica l Officer, received its justification a few days later when an 
additional o rder was issued to meet the case of such passengers as these -  that 
is to say, o f  persons w hom  it is impossible to keep under observation on 
arrival Irom an infected place or infected vessel, lor the simple reason that
'MlhIicmI Report iroin Hospital. Cîravcscnd'. C'I.IAJ PS('I\  (,hil\ Sept.. 1X92). .Sept. (\  1X92,
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they have no home or destination. Dr Collingridge’s action at the time 
received full public support
This period of observation marked a significant departure from the general opposition 
to detention espoused under the ‘English system’; and it reveals an undercurrent of 
thinking among medical officers such as Collingridge and Whitcombe, which was not 
entirely satisfied with the sanitary system. By insisting on the detention of the Gemma 
migrants at the port, Collingridge displayed a level of distrust in the system, either 
with regard to the methods of diagnosis, or the local sanitary authority, or both. He 
clearly was not willing to release the passengers who had come into contact with the 
three infected immigrants. Collingridge’s actions reflected the anxiety among medical 
officers at the ports about the arrival of infected ships. Despite the ‘official line’ 
which rejected quarantine procedures, this anxiety could not, in the summer of 1892, 
be allayed by the operation of the sanitary surveillance alone and demanded detention. 
In public lectures and publications, both before and after 1892, Collingridge declared 
his opposition to the principles of quarantine and imposed detention. Yet, during that 
summer he wrote to the Port Sanitary Committee on a number of occasions about his 
frustration at being unable to isolate and detain infected vessels. As he wrote at the 
end of August 1892:
although obviously it would have been easier to have detained the vessel with 
the emigrants on board there are many difficulties.
Firstly, if they arc detained for a short time, say two or three days, and no 
further disease appears, it is probable that no further spread is likely to occur, 
all the same there is no certainty until the period of incubation has passed and 
there is at present no definite medical opinion on this point. I have been 
obliged to fix a period as guiding my action and have determined to consider 7 
days as a safe term.''’"
The three passengers on the Gemma who displayed symptoms of the disease were 
rcmo\'cd to the Port Sanitary Atithority infectious disease isolation hospital at Denton.
I low e\ er. the onl\' recourse a\ ailable to C’ollingridge to keep the other immigrants 
detained for further observation was to insist tlait the information they supplied about
I am it.  Oal .  I. 1X92.  p
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their addresses in London was unreliable. Collingridge was unwilling to entrust the 
Gemma migrants to the local authorities, as was the usual procedure, but rather 
insisted that they remain under his supervision at the port. On August 25"’, as the 
vessel arrived into London, Collingridge telegraphed Hugh Owen, Secretary to the 
Local Government Board, informing him of his plans for the Gemma migrants.
G em m a from  H am burg  arrived three cases cholera on board have taken these 
to port hospital will fumigate effects and detain em igrants for observation.""
T he  legitimacy o f  the addresses supplied by the steerage passengers was 
inconsequential s ince the decision to detain them had already been made. 
Surprisingly, Ow en replied with m uch support for the idea.
Board  appreciate  your energetic action. W hen em igrants leave ship most 
important that  they should be  kept together and under observation. C ould  not 
port sanitary authority  utilise som e building or m ake other provision for this, 
m eantim e em igrants  should be detained on ship as long as circum stances 
permit."'
Indeed, as The Times reported, while being careful to nolo that any extension of the 
period of detention for healthy passengers was no! a return to quarantine procedures, 
the circumstances of 1892 appeared to require a prolongation of the present period 
and method of observation.
The Local Government Board have been desirous of meeting to a certain 
extent the numerous representations which they have received in favour of 
strengthening the existing restrictions; and while rejecting altogether the 
notion of reviving the exploded and discredited system of quarantine, they 
may have been willing somewhat to extend the plan, not of detaining healthy 
persons, but of taking measures to keep them under observation, if they arrive 
in suspicious circumstances
Appendiuni Report on Ceuuixi.  CLRO PSCf \  f.luly .Sept.. 1X92), Atip. 1X92. 
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The third point illuminated by the case of the Gemma was that the two Medical 
Officers had determined the presence of Asiatic Cholera without recourse to 
bacteriological testing. This demonstrates that not only was Koch's theory of the 
bacterial cause of cholera not integrated into medical practice relating to the disease in 
Britain at this stage but also that diagnostic testing for the disease in the laboratory 
was still not carried out in Britain as it was in Germany or the United States. Indeed, 
bacteriological testing for cholera at the ports did not appear until late 1894, when 
Klein confirmed the presence of cholera in the post-mortem examination of a sailor 
off the steamship Balmore. The examination showed ‘in microscopic specimen and 
cultivation typical cholera’."^  Even then, bacteriological confirmation only arrived at 
the Local Government Board nine days after the Balmore had sailed into the Port of 
London from St. Petersburg. The six other sailors who displayed symptoms of the 
disease were immediately removed to Denton on arrival into London. Specimens were 
also taken from them, which confirmed cholera, although by the time the results were 
received by Thorne Thorne, four were dead and the remaining two were convalescing.
British medical officers still relied primarily on clinical judgement in determining 
cases of cholera. Diagnosis by observable symptoms was clearly demonstrated in 
notes of the cholera cases which arrived in Glasgow’s Belvidere Infectious Diseases 
Hospital in late August 1892. The Superintendent of the Hospital, Dr. .lames Allan, 
published his case notes in The Lancet, on September 2"".
There are at present two cholera cases in Belvidere. The patients (a man and a 
woman) are Russian (.lew) emigrants, who reached Glasgow by Hamburg and 
Leith. The male patient was admitted to hospital at 1 o'clock on the morning 
of the 27‘" u lt. .. The patient’s appearance was a confirmation of the diagnosis 
(cholera). The pinched face, cold, dark, shrunken hands, which were feebly 
tossed about, and the husky moaning voice conveyed a sulliciently dismal 
impression,""
And finally, the passengers on the Gemma who were in 'quarantined' were only the 
third class immigrants, none of whom, according to the report, could provide
’ I cIcL'i .iiii I r o m  K i m I I  t o  I .(iiL .Auu. X. I X94. l^ RC) MH 19/2X9
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Collingridge with satisfactory information as to their address in London. One might 
argue that this was because the cholera victims had all travelled within the steerage 
accommodation of the Gemma and the other passengers from this part of the ship 
presented more of a risk of infection. However, as has been shown, immigrants were 
perceived to be the primary source of infection during the epidemic, and thus their 
containment was a primary focus of prevention. This  inspection is necessary not only 
for the detection of infected persons but also to prevent the importation of pauper 
aliens with the danger attendant thereon’.""
The Impact of 1892
CHOLERA A POSSIBLE BLESSING IN DISGUISE
Dr Collingridge, of the Port of London, is one of those men who can discern a 
‘silver lining’ to even the dark cloud of epidemic cholera. He is reported in 
one of the London papers to have said, in substance; In fact the cholera is the 
best thing that can happen to us. If we did not get a scare about once in three 
years, our sanitation would soon get neglected. Cholera passed our first great 
Public Health Act. It formed our port sanitary regulations and authority. These 
acts have saved more human lives than ever cholera destroyed since the world 
began. If the cholera experience of the Port of New York in 1892 can do for us 
something intelligent, humane, or even human, in the way of sanitary 
legislation, these squalid immigrants, who have excited so much harsh 
comment, may prove to be angels in disguise to ‘a plenitude of generations yet 
to come’.""
The immediate aftermath of the 1892 cholera epidemic saw the respective roles of the 
Port Sanitary Authorities and Quarantine service thrown into question. The Port 
Sanitary Authority began to insist on the permanent Iransfcrral of many of the powers 
they had been issued with temporarily to deal with the epidemic; while the role of 
quarantine in British ports was again thrown into question. Having experienced no
/.(///(■fV. .Sept, .X, I S92. p. 59.x (tny italics).
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real threat of a large-scale cholera epidemic since the Public Health Act of 1872, the 
Port Sanitary Authority had not had any previous opportunity to prove the 
effectiveness of the system with regard to cholera. As cholera was a primary factor in 
the establishment of the Port Sanitary System and this system had been defended by 
Britain at the International Sanitary Conferences as the only viable alternative to the 
antiquated system of quarantine, the 1892 epidemic was an important demonstration 
of how successful it actually was. Having affirmed the efficacy of sanitary practice 
over quarantine - with cholera in Britain during the epidemic not extending beyond 
the 35 individual cases brought into the ports, as opposed to near 17,000 cases which 
were reported in quarantined Hamburg -  the Port Sanitary Authorities and Local 
Government Board began asserting their control over the ports.
On December 17*" 1892, a conference, titled Cholera Precautions fo r  1893 -  
Conference o f Port M edical Officers, was attended by 122 delegates from 42 Port 
Sanitary Authorities around England and Wales, including Port Medical Officers of 
Health, Medical Officers of Health, Port Sanitary Authority Chairmen, Mayors, 
Inspectors of Nuisances, and Town Clerks. The conference was convened at the 
Mansion House in London, with the purpose of reviewing the manner by which the 
cholera epidemic of that Summer had been managed and how best to prepare the ports 
for the subsequent epidemic anticipated for the following summer. The Lord Mayor 
of London on opening the conference
said he was proud to meet ... gentlemen who had so much in their hands the 
health of the people. In the Port of London they had endeavoured during the 
late scourge to keep clear from contagion, and in that he thought they had 
perfectly succeeded. What they had to do now was prepare for the future. He 
was quite sure that gentlemen coming from other ports were equally energetic, 
and he congratulated them on coming there into Conference in order that they 
might arrange matters among themselves so as to carry on the work in an 
intelligent and uniform manner. He might, perhaps, at the same lime, be 
permitted to say that whilst they should be careful to prevent disease entering 
our ports, they should at the same time remember that it was necessary to 
exercise their powers with gentleness and without severity...'’
P r c c a i t l l o m  l o r  / A V . g  p .  I .  C ' I . R O  M l . S C V M . S S / . h t ? / k
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The subjects which were opened up for discussion were divided into eight categories:
1) medical inspection; 2) quarantine; 3) addresses of destination; 4) disinfection &c.;
5) disposal of infected corpses; 6) disposal of other infected articles not capable of 
disinfection (perishable cargoes &c.); 7) hospitals; and, 8) other difficulties 
experienced or anticipated."'^
It is worth exploring the discussion surrounding the first two subjects in some detail. 
The delegates agreed, firstly, that night inspection was not possible in some ports such 
as Bristol, Swansea, Hull and Plymouth because of particular features of the port, but 
‘in London it must undoubtedly be kept up by night as well as by day’."'" If this meant 
the appointment of further staff during crises such as 1892, then so be it. The 
procedure would be to inspect all trading vessels, and those ‘vessels carrying 
emigrants requiring special inspection, requiring an inspeetion for an hour, or an hour 
and a half’ would always be visited last in order to ‘prevent vexatious delays and 
expensive detention of the [other] vessels at the cost of shipowners’.""
The delegates also agreed that the identification of infected ports was a prerequisite 
for inspection. In order to inspect every vessel that had sailed from an infected port it 
was necessary to know which ports were ‘infected’ and subsequently when they were 
declared free of infection. However, as the Port Medical Officer for Newcastle-upon- 
Tync noted.
The meaning of the word ‘infected’ at present is not defined at all. It stands 
alone and is the only word used in cholera regulations. For the lime being the 
definition of ‘infected’ must rest entirely on the Authorities in each case.
There is not provision for ‘suspected’; therefore, anyone interpreting ‘infected' 
must interpret it to mean either known to he in fee led or suspected of being 
infected."'
Ch ol er a  i h e e a u i u m s  toy  / < W .  ( ’i . R O  MI.SC/M.S.S/XX7/1. 
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Although il appeared necessary lo issue the Port Sanitary Authorities with an official 
list of ‘infected’ ports, the difficulties of providing this in practice were quickly 
realised. Firstly, if information about the presence of disease in a port were to emanate 
from British Consuls (assuming they were informed of the presence of cholera in the 
port), the process would take too long to reach all the Local Authorities for it to be of 
any use. Furthermore, and more importantly, the possible implications any such 
official list would have for trade would be too detrimental. As Collingridge explained 
to the conference,
an official list published by the Local Government Board is theoretical and 
imaginary. It is impossible to carry it out. No government could undertake it, 
and no government would undertake it. At present the whole of the littoral 
from St Petersburg to Lorient is infected with cholera. If any Government 
Department issued a notice that all those ports are infected, where should we 
be with regard to British commerce? Hamburg is officially declared free from 
Cholera, but there are cases of Cholera from Hamburg now. If you are to have 
a list of infected ports -  and such a list is desirable for our own purposes -  it 
must be issued on our own responsibility, because the Government would not, 
and could not, declare Hamburg to be infected at the present moment, 
although everybody knows that it is.""
Thus the delegates agreed that, rather than having to rely upon ‘newspaper reports,'"' 
the Port Sanitary Authority of London would issue its own iinofficial list which would 
be forwarded to the other Authorities. As such there would be a uniform 'private list 
of ‘dangerous' ports -  you may keep out the word “infected"'. ' '
The next item for discussion, and one which demonstrates the particular effect of the 
1892 epidemic on the Port Sanitary Authorities, was concerned with those ships 
arriving from infected ports which had migrant passengers on board. These ships were 
deemed to require special attention and thus, particularly in those ports where the Port 
Medical Officer cuuld not board vessels arriving by night or where several arri\ed in 
the same dav, the conference aereed that authority was needed to detain \ essels for
i lvd.  p.  4 - s ,  
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whatever period was necessary. As the Port Medical OlTiccr for Liverpool, Dr. J. S. 
Taylor, explained,
sometimes one, sometimes two and sometimes three vessels would come up in 
a tide. Unless these vessels were immediately boarded by the Customs 
Officers, who would land the Assistant Medical Officer on them, they would 
pass up the river and enter our docks. You will understand the length of our 
dock frontage is about 6 miles, and that the only boarding station we have in 
Liverpool is at the Dock Entrance, so that during high water the Dock Gates 
are open and a vessel can steam directly into the Docks, and is only boarded 
by the Customs Officer.""
Although vessels could only enter the dock after they were granted a quarantine 
clearance, no other restrictions were placed on them. If the medical officer had a 
number of ships to attend to there was no way he could not deter anyone from 
disembarking until he returned and could record the names and addresses of those on 
board. Particularly in the case of migrant ships this process was deemed to be of the 
utmost importance and was a central focus of the preventive measures put in place 
during 1892. The Medical Officers at the conference argued unanimously that they 
would require more powers if they were to continue to carry out their duties in 
protecting the ports from imported cholera, particularly with regard to cholera on 
migrant ships. The powers they wanted included those which were at that time 
confined lo the Customs Officers acting under the Quarantine Act. This coveted 
authority included the power to detain a vessel until such time as the Port Medical 
Officer of Health had undertaken a thorough inspection. It was agreed that a proposal 
should be put to the Local Government Board to authorise a period of detention of six 
hours, three hours before inspection and three hours afterward, for all vessels sailing 
from an infected port. The ‘Quarantine Certificate’ which permitted clearance to enter 
the dock was argued to be ‘given as a mere matter of form, and was therefore 
useless’."" Rather than being issued by the Customs service it was argued that this 
clearance should be issued by a Medical Officer of Health after he had made his own 
examination. Similarly, it would be put to the Local Government Boartl that full 
authoi ity be granted to both the Port Sanitary Authority and CTistoms Service to
i h u i  p.  t n.
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severely penalise -  up to £200 - anyone who provided false answers during an 
inspection. The Port Sanitary Authority beyond London had no such power, and the 
authority of the Customs Service to do this was at that time being examined by the 
law officers of the Crown."" Significantly, the overwhelming conclusion of the 
conference, with regard to the medical inspection of vessels was, as the Chairman, 
Collingridge, pointed out:
What we are doing here is gradually to remove the present quarantine powers. 
Everything suggested today is in the direction of removing the onus of medical 
inspection from the Customs to the Port Sanitary Authority -  a most desirable 
change."^
However, the Chairman also noted that,
in London it would not have been possible to carry out the Cholera 
Regulations without the co-operation of the Customs. He had, therefore, great 
pleasure in moving: T hat this conference gladly recognises the very valuable 
assistance that Port Medical Officers of Health have received, and are still 
receiving, from H.M’.s Customs and other public bodies having jurisdiction in 
the various ports, and tenders to such Authorities its cordial thanks’."'"
The Port Sanitary Authorities of Scotland did not attend the conference in London. 
While almost identical lo the English and Welsh authorities, the Scottish Port Sanitary 
Authorities had been established under the separate Public Health (Scotland) Acts. No 
similar conference, following the 1892 epidemic, was convened in Scotland. One 
reason for this was because the dual authority of Customs and Port Sanitary Authority 
did not appear, in Glasgow and Greenock at least, to have created the same problems 
as were encountered elsewhere. Of course, the same difficulties arose with regard to 
Jurisdictional boundaries, yet the issues relating to detention and notification were 
more satisfactorily attended to in Scotland, particularly immediately after the 1892 
crisis. An Order in Council of 1893 conferred greater powers on both the Customs
'' i l ' ti i. l .  p .  6 .
■ S e c  c h a p t e r  o n e .
'' ( ' l i d l c n i  P r c c d n t i o n . s  l o r  i b i d .  p ,  X .
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S e r v ic e  and the Port Sanitary  A uth or it ies  o f  S co t lan d  ‘than the co r re sp o n d in g  order o f
sothe Local Govt [sic] Board applicable in England and Wales gives to Officers there’.
The practical effect of this provision is, practically, to put it in the power of 
the Medical Officer of Health at any Scotch port to define, at his pleasure, as 
‘infected’ any foreign port, and then to invoke the aid of this department 
[Customs] for the detention of any vessel coming from a port so defined by 
. him, and merely on that ground.^'
Any vessel, therefore, which arrived in a Scottish port from a port which the Medical 
Officers of Health deemed to be infected with cholera,''" could be detained by Officers 
of the Customs Service until the Medical Officer was informed and brought to the 
ship. Even if the vessel held a Clean Bill of Health, issued at the port of departure, the 
fact that the ship departed from a port which the Scottish Medical Officers deemed 
‘infectious’ was sufficient for Customs to detain it.^"
Although a level of co-operation was reached between the two authorities in Scotland, 
this was not the case in England and Wales, and the London conference of Port 
Medical Officers became the domestic setting for the beginning of cautious 
proceedings aimed at the abolition of quarantine in all British ports. It occurred as a 
direct result of the cholera epidemic as 1892 demonstrated what had already been 
known hut had never been illuminated with such clarity, that having dual authority in 
the ports hindered the efficient working of both authorities. During a crisis as 
potentially large as the 1892 epidemic, the cracks in the system were brought into 
sharp relief. As no threat on the scale of that posed in 1892 had arisen in the previous 
twenty years of the Port Sanitary Authority’s existence, the problems and rivalries 
between the authorities could be accommodated for the appeasement of foreign 
demands (as discussed in the previous chapter). Yet, what was most politically 
fortuitous was that the 1892 epidemic also clearly demonstrated that the quarantine 
employed in other countries to prevent the import of the disease had not proved
t V i  3,  IK9X, S R A  C H 9 0 / I / 8 9  p. 197.  
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successful. Thus, Britain provided the ultimate example of the superiority of the 
‘English system’ over quarantine, just as it had argued at the International Sanitary 
Conferences over the previous four decades.
Before the outbreak of cholera in Western Europe, another International Sanitary 
Conference had been held in Venice in January 1892. The conference again discussed 
cholera, but with particular -  almost exclusive -  reference to the Suez Canal. For the 
first time an agreement was composed which was signed by all the representative 
nations. Although it was somewhat compromising to Britain’s desire for completely 
free pratique in the Canal, it was a welcome concession within the increasingly 
impossible impasse which had developed between British and French interests in the 
Canal. As was noted in The Times, in February 1892,
this is the first international sanitary conference which has adopted definite 
and complete regulations to improve the present state of things and safeguard 
the interests of trade conjointly with those of public health.'^''
In response to the 1892 epidemic another International Conference was convened in 
Dresden in March 1893, and Britain was in a prime position, having been the least 
effected by the epidemic, to persuade the ‘Quarantine States’ to reconsider the 
‘English system’. It meant that as far as Britain was concerned ‘the conditions for the 
summoning of a Sanitary Conference were far more favourable than had been the case 
on former occasions'.*'" Furthermore, the 1892 conference, concerned more with Suez 
and having found an agreeable compromise on prophylaxis in the Canal, had set a 
precedent for consensus which had previously proved unattainable. The final ratified 
convention, resulting from the 1893 conference, saw further minor concessions to 
Britain's formerly uncompromising position, but the British generally regarded it as 
having sufficiently incorporated the ‘English system’ into international prophylaxis. 
Minimum and maximum periods for a ‘quarantine of observation' were applied to 
healthy passengers from infected vessels, but because this ‘observation’ was not 
required to lake place on board the vessel 'it will require no alteration whatever in the
' I ' ch.  1. 1 XV2. [1. .So.
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cholera Regulat ions  under  which our ports arc at present adminis tered’.*'"
Furthermore, only merchandise defined as ‘susceptible’ to ‘contamination by 
choleraic matter’, such as bed linen and clothing, was required to be detained or 
destroyed; and as such ‘the convention offer[ed] advantages as regards the landing of 
merchandise which we trust will tend to free our commerce from some of the 
vexatious restrictions to which it has hitherto been so often subjected’.^ " However, 
despite these favourable outcomes, Britain remained firmly committed to many of the 
same issues which had distinguished her from other nations in previous decades.
One such issue was the application of bacteriological methods for procuring a 
diagnosis in the case of cholera. Eight years had passed since the notorious 1885 
conference at which it was made clear that the British would not entertain the 
practical -  or political -  implications of bacteriology. These methods were becoming 
much more widespread by 1893, but Britain remained resolute. The 1892 epidemic 
had further demonstrated to British physicians that the principles and practice of 
bacteriology could not prevent the import or spread of the disease. In Hamburg, for 
example, where bacteriological testing was employed from almost the first cases, 
more than 8,500 people died of the disease within the first month.*''' In Britain, on the 
other hand, the reliance on clinical diagnosis and on sanitary measures proved more 
successful in effectively preventing the disease. Thorne Thorne, again sent to 
represent British interests at Dresden (but by this time also in his role as Chief 
Medical Officer of the Local Government Board) wrote to the Foreign Office in 
February 1893, to clarify the position which would be adopted by Britain at the 
conference.
The ver if ication by bacteriological  examination and on the spot, of  the precise 
nature of  first ‘cholera ic’ attacks is a requirement which Her M aje s ty ’s 
Government  may hesitate to accept as a definite ‘obl igat ion’. Apart  from 
possible ques t ions  as to its value from a scientific point of  view, the interval of 
time involved in tnaking the necessary investigation is more than likely to 
become associated with a delay in the adoption of the necessary measures  o f
■ R e i i o r i  o i  i l i c  H r i t i s h  D e l e g a t e s  t o  i h e  I n t e r i i a l i o i i a l  . S a n i t a r y  C ' n n l e r e n e e  o l  D r e s i l e n ' .  / ' u c i u v  f ' l i i r d  
. \ i i i n i i i l  H e p o r l  o (  t h e  i X i H .  S i i p p l c i n c n i  C o n k i i n i i i p  l l i c  R c p o r i  o f  t h e  M e d i c i i l  ( R l i c e r .
1 1 A ) [ u l n n :  I I M S O ,  I K 9 4  l, j C .  7 5 3 X | ,  . A p p e i u l i x  A  N o .  2 0 .  p .  45 . 3 .  
i h i i f  [1. 4 5 9 .
1 \ a i l s .  / ) c ( H h  i n  I h n n h u r i t .  p .  2 9 5 .  T a b l e  4 .
i : 3 3
prevention, such as may be of serious import. For the purposes of notification 
and of prevention every case of choleraic diarrhoea should be regarded as one 
of cholera, and be forthwith dealt with as such.*''"
Again, the primary interest represented by the British delegates was the avoidance of 
any delays imposed on maritime trade due to the medical prevention of cholera. Lord 
Rosebery at the Foreign Office addressed a letter to the three British delegates at 
Dresden before the opening of the conferenee reinforcing the position which they 
were to take.
Her M ajesty’s Government would not be likely to assent to any important 
alteration in the practice now in force in the United Kingdom. There would, 
for example, be serious difficulties in the way of introducing a system of 
permits, or verification cards, to be used by passengers; and apart from 
scientific questions, the adoption of any system of bacteriological examination 
must, in the event of administrative action being dependent upon its results, 
create delay.
Her M ajesty’s Government further deprecate any general rules with respect lo 
quarantine or the detention of vessels.'"*^
Following the month of discussions and the eventual approval of the government back 
in Britain, the delegates signed a convention which did in fact allow for the detention 
of some vessels. Ships, having sailed from a cholera infected port but not having on 
board any cases of the disease, ie. ‘suspected’ vessels were to be given free pratique. 
They could, howe\ er, be detained at the discretion of the local authorities, but for no 
longer than a period of five days from the date of sailing. The passengers and crew of 
a vessel which had a case of cholera on board within the previous seven days, ie. an 
‘infected’ vessel could be detained for a period of up to five days alter the date ol 
arrival. It was, however, included within the ratified agreement that ‘no persons 
arriving in Great Britain in cholera-infected vessels, other than those who are actually 
sick on arrival, will be compulsorily detained’."' The detention, lor purposes of
l.oitcr IVoni 'flKinie Thorne to Foreign OITiee. Feb. IX, IX9X. FRO MH19/2XK/MX44/9X,
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medical observation, of any crew and passengers of ‘infected’ vessels was to occur,
‘if possible’, after disembarkation.
It appears that the application of the Convention will, in the more backward 
countries, meet with opposition from populations that have hitherto trusted to 
Quarantine Regulations, in the old sense of the term, to preserve them from 
cholera. In such countries the adoption of the Convention by Her M ajesty’s 
Government would, no doubt, be of value in strengthening the hands of those 
who are in favour of the sanitary system so long followed with success in this 
country, and it would afford to those countries a knowledge of security that 
their trade will, in the United Kingdom, continue to enjoy that freedom from 
useless restrictions which is guaranteed by the Convention.'""
As The Times reported, the Dresden convention had finally achieved the general aims 
that Britain had advocated ‘alone’ since the first conference in 1851, and persuaded 
other European states to substitute ‘the haphazard and arbitrary action of individual 
states and local authorities’ for ‘measures compatible with the necessities of 
international intercourse and commerce’.'""
There was, however, one exception to the free pratique of healthy passengers off non­
in lected vessels -  migrants. Before departing for the conference, Thorne Thorne 
wrote to the President of the Local Government Board saying that, while he and his 
colleagues would object at all levels to quarantines and detentions which would 
disrupt the free movement of maritime traffic, he felt that it might, on the other hand 
‘be undesirable to interpose objection to restriction of some sort being imposed... as 
regards special classes of traffic’. The classification of these ‘special classes of traffic' 
was clarified by the example of ‘restrictions...aimed at preventing the undesirable 
immigration of destitute aliens from cholera stricken districts’.'"" Indeed, the 
conference agreed that local authorities would be granted ‘the power to enact special
Lotler IVoiii T-oieigii Office lo I.ocal Oovcrnnienl Boaitl’ as well as Hoard ol I'rade and .Adiniralis 
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Regulat ions  in the case  o f  vessels which carry emigrants,  which are overcrowded,  or 
are in a bad sanitary con di t ion ’.""
Yet, as the detention of migrant passengers was conducted by the Port Sanitary 
Authority, and required detention of the vessel only until the arrival of the Medical 
Officer of Health, it could not be regarded as an imposition of quarantine. It did not 
come within the administration of the Quarantine Act, nor did it contradict Britain’s 
other tradition of providing asylum. It was merely, as the British Medical Journal 
reported in August 1893, ‘but a first line of defence’ against ‘the importation of 
pauper aliens, who [are] usually of the lowest class, coming from the most unsanitary 
districts’."*’ The detention of steerage class migrants for observation at the ports, rather 
than releasing them into the responsibility of the local sanitary authorities, was, as the 
article continued, necessary for the following reasons:
[they] are exceedingly likely to bring germs of disease, which, on account of 
the short passage, might not develop until they had left the ship, and they 
themselves had been lost sight of, in the poorest and most crowded portions of 
London. Since the present system has been in working order, this dangerous 
class has practically ceased to enter the port.""
The cholera ep idemic  o f  1892 brought to the fore the issue of restricting ent ry to the 
Uni ted Kingdom to those immigrants  whose  standard o f  health was such that it could 
be det rimental  to the publ ic health. An article for the British Medical Journal from 
September  1892 titled, ‘Cholera and Pauper  Aliens: A Point of L aw ’, ext racted from a 
piece written by the London Correspondent  of  the Manchester Guardian, c laimed 
that:
the revolut ionary  dem and  being made  ... to exclude all pauper aliens from 
entry to this country  is not likely to meet  with any active response,  for the 
simple reason,  if no other, than it constitutes an at tempted invasion of  the 
rights of  Parl iament .  ‘The C r o w n ’, says Professor Dicey,  'cannot  except.
''' 'British Delegates te the Dresden Sanitary Coni'erenee tu the Lari ol' Rosebery'. dated .April 1 8. 
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under statule, expel any alien from England, nor can it refuse him asylum here, 
and there is no statute in existence which confers such power ... Although for 
the moment the steps taken by the Local Government Board to prevent the 
landing of ‘filthy and unwholesome’ persons coming from foreign ports may 
pass unchallenged, it is by no means clear that the Board have not exceeded 
their pow ers... The Board now seeks to prevent aliens from landing unless 
they can satisfy the medical officer of health as to their place of destination in 
England, and the intention is that as they have no destination in England, but 
are going across the country to ship for America, they shall not be allowed to 
do so."^
Indeed, as had been stated at the Cholera Prevention conference in late December 
1892, the strict enforcement of the Cholera Regulations was intended to deter the 
arrival of immigrants, where no other authority under the law was able. Although 
none of the constraints on migrants applied at the ports by the Medical Officers of 
Health were as harsh as some of those imposed on the Continent or in the United 
States, they appeared to succeed in deterring migration through Britain (although this 
was more than likely due more to the severe restrictions of these other countries).
C O L L IN G R I D G E :  [The] ar rangement  had had the desired result, and one 
effect had been to check Jewish pauper  im m igra t io n . . . When the form was 
filled up it was  sent to the Sani tary Authori ty o f  the district in which the 
person said he resided,  and that Authori ty was informed that he was detained 
on board the ship pending verification of  the address.  The passengers  were 
kept on board the ship practically as prisoners until an answer received from 
the Sanitary Authori ty by post or by wire.
DR. A R M S T R O N G  (P M O H  Newcastlc-on-Tyne):  That sys tem will soon stop
the immigrat ion of  Jewish paupers.
Indeed in the United States,  these 'a r r ange men ts ’ at British ports establ ished during 
the cholera epidemic of  1892 were claimed to constitute a police ol immigration 
restriction. As the .Win York Medical Jounicii reported in September  1892. the
’ / A / . / .  S o p i ,  17, i s n : ,  p  959
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insislcnce on verifiable addresses of immigrants as they arrived in the port was 
‘virtually a prohibition of immigration, as the question can hardly be answered by the 
average immigrant unless he is very carefully coached’,'™" Indeed, as the example of 
the Gemma demonstrated, whether satisfactory or unsatisfactory, migrants’ addresses 
were inconsequential to the decision made to detain them.
The 1892 epidemic thus not only brought changes -  or at least provided a definite 
impetus to change -  to the operation of port prophylaxis, it also began in Britain a 
new attitude to the restriction of immigration on medical grounds. These restrictions 
sat uncomfortably between a commitment to free pratique, a tradition of asylum and 
the desire to restrict the entry of undesirable and potentially disease-carrying 
migrants. Although Britain remained committed after 1892 to the tenets of free 
movement of trading vessels, unhindered by the costly delays of maritime quarantines 
which had informed her position at each International Sanitary Conference of the 
nineteenth century, the detention of vessels carrying third or steerage class migrants 
was an exception Britain was more than willing to concede.
C h o i e n t  r r c i  ai i l ioin  f or  I S C h  p. 12-1.3. C I .R O  MISCVM.S.S/ 3 37/.V 
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CHAPTER FOUR: External Pressures: The Impact of United States Port Health 
and Immigration Legislation on the Operation of British Ports
As has been shown, migrants were perceived in 1892 to pose a particular risk in the 
spread of cholera. This response developed as cholera was seen rapidly approaching 
Britain from Eastern Europe in the early summer. Temporary modifications were 
made during and after the crisis in preventive measures at the ports which targeted 
this risk group and which prompted moves toward more permanent alterations. Yet, 
just as the ports responded to both internal and external pressures in the 
implementation of policy and practice for quarantine and the ‘English system’, the 
reception of migrants as a health issue at the ports was similarly influenced. Where 
the demands of European imperial powers, such as France and Germany, and the 
‘Quarantine nations’ influenced domestic policy regarding the arrival of an infected 
vessel, the development of immigration and quarantine policies in the United States 
also affected British responses to immigration.
Greater than any other external source, the operation of port prophylaxis and 
immigration restriction (particularly after 1891) in the United States influenced 
Britain’s approach to port health and the ‘alien problem’.’ There were two key 
reasons why this occurred. Firstly, port prophylaxis and immigration restriction were 
closely linked in the United States. Systems of disease prevention were central tools 
in the screening of ‘undesirables’ and were occasionally employed in order to reduce 
drastically the number of migrants attempting to gain entrance to the United States. 
An estimated one million, of the 2.4 million Russian and Polish migrants who settled 
in the United States between 1881 and 1914," transmigrated through and departed for 
the United States from ports in the United Kingdom." However, the stricter
' M..I. Lancia, The Alien Problem and Its Remedy,  (Iw)ncion: P.S. King & Son, 191 I ).
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immigralion laws of the United States -  which could prevent the entry of migrants 
who did not satisfy its medical, financial or moral requirements -  often encouraged 
migrants who fell short of the entry requirements to stay in Britain, either temporarily 
or on a permanent basis. More significantly, in British consciousness, a number of 
migrants who were rejected by United States immigration officials were returned to 
Britain by the shipping companies under whose liability they fell.
Secondly, the United States influenced the way that Britain dealt with the perceived 
health problems posed by immigrants by way of example. As the United States 
received by far the greatest number of migrants, the pressure to create legislation for 
monitoring or restricting their arrival appeared earlier in America than it did in 
Britain. Thus American legislation served as an example in Britain either to be 
emulated or altered, or, as John Garrard has suggested ‘to assume the importance of a 
blue-print for anti-alien agitators in England’ Similarly, where certain diseases, 
namely trachoma, were regarded in America as analogous with steerage class 
migrants and grounds for deportation, Britain began to make the same associations. If 
trachoma were grounds for rejection in an American port, it might become grounds 
for a migrant to remain in Britain. Consequently the otherwise relatively unimportant 
disease became a focus of British Port Medical Officers and those pushing for 
legalised immigration restriction in Britain.
Just as Britain observed with care the progress and consequence of American policy 
and practice, America also closely monitored the conditions of British ports. As 
millions of migrants intending to reside permanently in the United States were 
spending a number of days prior to their Trans-Atlantic voyage in some of Britain’s 
busiest and most overcrowded port cities, the health of these ports and the manner by 
which disease was prevented in them were of great interest to America. Indeed, 
America’s desire to implement its own independent observation of ports from which 
vessels departed for the United States was one of the main reasons why it hosted the 
International Sanitary Conference in 1881.
third of those .lewish migrants who settled in Australia, for example, had spent enough time in ihe 
United Kingdom for them to have learned a small amount of Hnglish by the time they arm ed m 
.Australia.
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Thus, just as it has been important to examine the proceedings of the International 
Sanitary Conferences in order to understand the policies and practice of disease 
prevention in British ports, it will be necessary to conduct a similar examination of 
American management of immigration and health, as it related to the United 
Kingdom.
immigration and M edical Inspection  at United S ta tes  Ports
The first federal legislation regarding immigration in the United States was passed in 
1819. It required masters of all vessels entering American ports to provide Customs 
Officers with a complete list of the number of passengers on board, their names, sex, 
age and occupations.^ Until the 1880s further laws were enacted which did little more 
than redefine and clarify the Act of 1819 - although a number of other laws were 
passed during this period which regulated the conditions on board passenger vessels 
travelling both to and from the United States. An Act of 1855 defined more clearly the 
sanitary conditions on board passenger vessels and was particularly concerned with 
controlling overcrowding in steerage (however this law was never completely 
successful in its execution).
The first federal law in the United States which restricted a specific class of people 
from entry to the country was passed in August 1882. It stated that ‘it shall be 
unlawful for aliens of the following classes to immigrate to the United States, namely, 
persons who are undergoing a sentence for conviction in their own country of 
felonious crimes other than political or growing out of or the result of such political 
offences, or whose sentence has been remitted on condition of their emigration, and 
women imported for the purposes of prostitution’.^ ’ The Act did not limit the 
immigration of these three classes to people of Chinese or Japanese origin only, but 
that these nationalities were the focus of the restrictions was more than apparent. This 
was clearly illustrated ten years later when the Republican President Benjamin 
Harrison endorsed the 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act, which built upon the 1882 Act 
and imposed severe quotas on Asian immigration.^
Roy I.. Claris, Inuni^nitioii Restriction -  A Stncly o f  the Oppositio)t to and the Rcpniaiion of 
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Beyond the J882 Act, there existed no ‘all-inclusive’ federal immigration law for the 
United States, and any further restrictive legislation existed only on a state level. The 
Act which eventually codified the hotchpotch of laws relating to immigration was the 
Immigration Act, 1891 (26 Stat. 1084). The Act was passed during the second session 
of the Congress and was the result of a bill, sponsored by the Joint Committee on 
Immigration and Naturalisation, entitled ‘In amendment of the various acts relative to 
immigration and the importation of aliens under contract or agreement to perform 
labor’.^  Within only a month of being presented to the House of Representatives in 
Bill form, the Act passed by a vote of 125 to 48 and was approved by President 
Harrison within days. It expanded the range of restricted classes of immigrants set out 
in the 1882 Act and included:
idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become public charges, 
persons suffering from a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease, persons 
convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving 
moral turpitude, polygamists, persons whose tickets were paid for with the 
money of another, or who are assisted by others to come, unless it is 
affirmatively and satisfactorily shown that they do not belong to one of the 
excluded classes, or to the contract labor class.^
In order  to extend the ca tegory  ‘likely to become public charges ' ,  it ordered the 
depor ta tion  o f  any immigrant  who became a ‘public c ha rg e ’ within one year o f  
arriving in the Uni ted States.^'’ All immigrants  rejected by United States inspectors,  
inc luding those depor ted  after arrival, were required to be returned to their port  o f  
origin by the s t eamship  company  which carried them to America.
The passing o f  the 1891 Immigrat ion Act,  however,  did not entirely satisfy those who 
campaigned for a t ightening o f  immigrat ion restriction. President Harrison,  in his final 
State o f  the Union address  in D ecem ber  1892 before he was superseded by the 
Democrat  Grover  Cleveland,  still appeared to consider the restrictive measures  put in
'■ h.h. Hutchinson, Lc^tiSlci t ive  History o f  A m e r i c a n  In i in i f t r a i io n  R o / i c v  17dS /V6S, ( I’liihidclphi.i 
Ihuvcrsity of Penns\t\,in ia I^ress, 1981 ) p. lOt).
' i h i c l .  
i l m L  p .  I ( 1 2 .
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place by (he 1891 Act inadequate, particularly in relation to the threat of inlcctious 
disease importation.
We are particularly subject in our great ports to the spread of infectious 
disease by reason of the fact that unrestricted immigration brings to us out of 
European cities, in the overcrowded steerages of great steamships, a large 
number of persons whose surroundings makes them the easy victim of the 
plague. We have, I think, a right and owe a duty to our own people, not only to 
keep out the vicious, the ignorant, the civil disturber, the pauper, and the 
contract laborer, but to check the too great flow of immigration now coming 
by further limitations. ' '
Immigration restriction, with particular reference to possible contagion brought to the 
United States by an undesirable class of migrants, was part of the platforms offered by 
all parties in the 1892 Presidential election campaign. Although arguments about the 
social and economic threats posed by the immigrants were heavily employed in the 
campaign, the health risks associated with immigration had a particularly poignant 
role to play in the orations of that Summer.
The year 1892 began in New York with the arrival in late January of the S.S.Massilia, 
a Russian emigrant ship infected with typhus. By the beginning of April 200 cases of 
typhus had been identified: 138 among Massilia passengers, as well as 49 New York 
residents, 11 nurses/helpers, and 2 policemen.’" The disease was confined to the 
Lower East Side and although there were only 24 deaths, more than 2,600 people 
residing in the area and from incoming steamships were quarantined. They were 
almost exclusively Russian Jewish immigrants. One ship, for example, the Nevada, 
which had departed from the typhus free port of Liverpool, was declared by the 
Health Officer of the Port of New York, Dr William Jenkins, to have not the 'slightest 
suspicion’ of typhus on board. Yet, the 30 Russian migrants on board were placed in 
quarantine, while Scandinavian passengers of the same class and all other passengers 
and crew were free to land without delay.’^
" [ten jainin Harrison, l 'oui th Annual Address to the C'oivaress. Hcccinhei U. I 892', in Market. 
(J i id rc i i i i i iw ! . p. 14s.
' iliid. p fdi,
’ ' i h u l  p  7  1
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Quarantine was enforced under the Quarantine Act of 1878 (20 Stat., 37) until the 
passing of the National Quarantine Act in early 1893, The 1878 Act was the first 
attempt at applying a national approach to quarantine and had been established in 
response to an epidemic of yellow f e v e r .A n y  immigrant or vessel infeeted with a 
contagious disease, or proceeding from an infected port, was under the Act prevented 
from entering any United States port without first undergoing a medical inspection 
and a period of quarantine where required. Although it was a federal act it could not 
under ordinary circumstances supersede or interfere with sanitary procedures or 
quarantine systems already in operation in any given state or municipal authority. 
Thus, the implementation of any quarantine measures ultimately remained under the 
regulation of state or municipal authorities.*^ Nevertheless, the 1878 Act permitted the 
federal government to enforce additional quarantine regulations at any specific port in 
the event of an emergency. These powers were further enforced by the passing of the 
National Board of Health Act, 1879, which, although providing little other real 
authority to the Board of Health, permitted this federal agency to take over the 
quarantine responsibilities of any state if their own laws proved ineffectual.*^
The National Board of Health Act was primarily concerned with preventing ‘the 
introduction of infectious and contagious diseases’, with specific reference to the 
‘extensive prevalence of yellow fever in certain parts of this country during the past 
two years, and the almost continual existence of the danger of the introduction of such 
contagious or infectious diseases as yellow fever and cholera by vessels coming to 
thi.s country from infected ports abroad’.'^ The provisions of the Act were such that 
all ships departing from a foreign port bound for America were required to be in 
possession of a Bill of Health and ‘sanitary history’ endorsed by a United States 
Consular Official or Medical Officer working in the foreign country. The Act stated 
that, ‘it shall be the duty of the National Board of Health to obtain information of the 
sanitary condition of foreign ports and places from which contagious or infectious 
diseases are or may be imported into the United States, and to this end the Consular 
O fficers.. .shall make weekly reports of the sanitary condition of the ports and places 
at which they are respectively stationed’.'** This required the Consular Official to 
inspect the ship and port of departure, as well as any Bill of Health or inspection
' ' i t i i i l .  p .  9 . S ,  
i h i i l .  [1.  9 6 .
KraLi l .  Si l ent  Trav i 'h  ; s, p .  5 I
I I n w a n i  . l o n a s ,  ' I ' l t a  S c i c t i l i l ' i c  l i a c k p r o u n d ,  . 3 ' .  p .  3 7 0 .
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which had been made by a port officiai belonging lo the country of departure. It was 
believed that this would render Bills of Health more reliable as the authorities of the 
country of departure might possibly conceal epidemic infections in order to protect
their own commercial interests.'^
As discussed in Chapter Two, in order to implement this essential feature of the 
National Board of Health Act, the United States required international sanction -  to 
which end the 1881 Washington International Sanitary Conference was called. The 
focus of the conference was to reach an agreement which would ensure a level of 
cleanliness and sanitation on board vessels before they departed from a port. The 
United States delegates framed their argument in terms of preventing obstructions to 
commerce through the time-consuming and costly enforcement of quarantine in 
America which would necessarily be applied to ships whose health status was 
questionable due to unsanitary conditions on board. The success of their argument 
was, however, limited. Britain was one of the chief opponents to the American 
proposal, labelling it impracticable. Again, as at the 1866 and 1874 conferences, the 
British argued that the suggestion of an ‘independent’ medical inspection of vessels 
greatly undermined and questioned the authority of British Medical Officers, and they 
would thus not support the proposal. In the end no effective resolutions or 
international agreements were reached, except that United States consuls were 
permitted to endorse Bills of Health prepared by health officials of the country of 
departure. Although this had not been the ideal outcome of the conference from the 
American point of view, it did allow the United States to oversee foreign departures 
and maintain most of the clauses under the National Board of Health Act and the 1878 
Quarantine Act.
United States Immigration and Infectious Disease Laws and the United Kingdom
These American laws (both federal and state), which operated against the import of 
infectious disease and restricted immigration, had a significant effect on British 
attitudes to immigration and health at British ports. One of the most notable 
ramifications of American law for Britain was the authority both state and federal 
laws had for returning migrants deemed ‘undesirable' to their last port of departure.
Wiiioiuil Hoard of IHadlh HnlU'lin, vol. [. no. 1, June 28, 1879. |). 2. 
(iiHuliiian, Inteniaiunicd !lealth Organisations,  p. 61.
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Undesirability was measured both by economic and medical factors although neither 
was grounds for rejection under British law. When immigrants were rejected, either 
on arrival in the United States or for offences committed within a year of arrival, the 
steamship company which brought them to America was responsible for returning 
them to their port or frontier of origin. Frequently, in order to avoid the full cost of the 
passage back to Eastern and Central Europe, companies economised by returning the 
migrants to their last port of departure at less distant British ports. This point was 
noted some years later in the evidence of a Medical Officer and Ophthalmic surgeon 
to the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration in 1903.
.. .cases had been referred to me which had been returned from America, 
aliens who had gone to America, and had been examined by the immigration 
officers at certain ports in America, and sent back, not to Poland, but to 
London. So that there is a possibility of them accumulating in this country, on 
account of the fact that the shipping companies find it cheaper to send them 
back to London than to Poland.^^
The passage back to the United Kingdom was not only cheaper but also, as an 
investigation undertaken by the Poor Jews Temporary Shelter in London discovered, 
better for business.
If they went back to their own countries rejected by the United States it would 
considerably affect [the shipping agent’s] business in those countries; and as a 
result they come to England and learning from the agents here that they can 
get to America through Canada they either take this course oi’ remain in 
London."'
Aware of the frequent expensive liability they incurred, shipping company owners 
undertook to enforce medical inspections of their own before departure and refused to 
carry migrants who would not, on arrival in the United States, pass the increasingly 
rigorous requirements of entry.
" lA idcncc (it Dr. 1*.A.C.Tyrrell. Medical OITicer to the London .School Board, and Suryical Of'licer to 
the Royal l.ondon Ophthalmic Hospital: M i n u t e s  of IiviJeiu'e I'aken liejore the fS n a l ( 'oniiniwioji on 
.Mien !inniii;r(ilion. / VC/o'. vol. II, (lamdon: HMSO, 190.3). jC'd. 17421. 3670.
' I . M . A .  B o a r d  o t  D e p u t i e s  o l ' B r i t i s h  . l e w s ,  A C X V 3  I 2  I / B 0 2 / 0 1 / 0 0 3 .
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While at the boarding-house lin Liverpool], the immigrant is under constant 
medical surveillance; for the shipping companies employ a medical man 
(some companies employing a special ‘shore doctor’ others sending the 
surgeon of the ship in which the immigrants are to sail), whose duty it is to 
pay a daily visit to the boarding-houses and to inquire into the health of their 
inmates. One principal object of this medical inspection is to avoid all risk of 
shipping persons whose state of health might cause danger or inconvenience to 
their fellow passengers. But the inspection serves at the same time to enable 
the discovery of persons who are likely to be treated as ineligible by the 
American immigration authorities by reason of their state of health^^
The return to British ports of migrants who had been deemed not fit to settle in the 
United States was perceived in Britain not only as a financial burden, but also as a 
threat to the public health. Yet, despite the great concern raised by this issue, the 
actual impact of return migrants, in terms of numbers, was minimal. In an 1893 Board 
of Trade report on alien immigration into the United S ta te s ,D a v id  Schloss included 
in the eoncluding chapter of his report on the efficacy of American immigration 
policy and practice a subsection titled, Ejf'ect o f United States Laws Upon Ratepayers 
in United. Kingdom.^"^ The inquiry examined to what extent persons debarred or 
expelled from the United States within a year of settlement and returned to the United 
Kingdom, subsequently sought the assistance of public relief. Schloss presented
■" 'Report by Mr Schloss: - American Legislation and Practice’, Reports to the Board o f  Trade on Alien 
Iinmii>rati()n, 1893, (London: HMSO, 1893), p. 10,
In 1893 the Board o t  Trade appointed two men, John Burnett and David Schloss, to compile a report 
on,
the laws relating to the immigration of foreigners into the United States, the practical methods 
of enforcing those laws, the state o f opinion in the United States with reference to restrictions 
on immigration, the proposals on the subject before Congress, and the nature and economic  
effect o f the immigration o f  destitute foreigners from the eastern parts of Europe, (p. hi)
The report was commissioned both on the impetus of parliamentary discussion on the issue of alien 
immigration into the United Kingdom, and because the duty bestowed on the Board of Trade to 
compile statistics relating to immigration had, during the course o f  numerous inquiries, left the Board 
o f  Trade with ‘a great deal’ o f information regarding immigration to the United Slates. The fact that so 
much information on American immigration had been unintentionally collected in the process of  
compiling UK statistics, demonstrates further that any investigation into immigration into Britain must 
he accomplished with reference to the United States.
The report gives a detailed account of the 'sifting process' of immigrants both at the ports ot departuie 
and at the major immigration ports in the United States, particularly New York. Although the ma|oi it\ 
of the report concerns itself with the internal workings of American immigration policy, there are 
sex'cral interesting references made to the relationship between these [lolicies and their reference to and 
implications lor the United Kingdom.
■' ibid. .  p. 87 89.
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Board o f  Trade s la l i s l ic s  Cor im m ig ra n ls  returned lo  the U nited  K in g d o m  during
892. 25
According to the report, a total of 118 immigrants from New York, Boston and 
Philadelphia, both rejected on arrival and returned during the year 1892, were 
conveyed to ports in the United Kingdom at the expense of the steamship 
c o m p a n ie s .O f  the 85 returned from New York, 65 had migrated from Russia or 
Poland, 12 from Germany, 6 from Sweden and the rest from other Northern European 
countries such as Finland. As TABLE III clearly illustrates both the actual number 
returned to British ports and the percentage this represented of the total arrivals into 
the three American ports, was very low.
TABLE IV 27
1892 New York Boston Philadelphia Total: NY, 
Bost.
Philadelphia
Total No. of 
Alien Steerage 
Arrivals
374,741 29,709 29,292 433,742
No. Returned 
to UK Ports 
from US
85 27 6 118
Percentage of 
Total Arrivals 
Returned to 
UK Ports
0.02 0.09 0.02 0.03
The 85 immigrants  re turned to Britain from New York during 1892 were only 3 % o f  
the 2574 who were debarred or returned within a year o f  arriving in New York."** The 
2489 who were not returned to Britain were taken back to European departure  ports. 
A similar  proport ion was returned to the Cont inent  from Boston and Philadelphia.  
Fur thermore ,  as Schloss  noted, ‘a very considerable propor tion'  of  the migrants  who 
were returned to Bri tish ports was subsequent ly returned to their respective
Although Schloss's tigure.s arc of particular interest, they must be placed within the context o f 1X92 
conditions. It must be remembered that these figures might be wholly unrepresentatix e o f other non­
epidemic -  years. The regulations put in place in 1892 in response to the cholera epidemic drasiicalK 
reduced the number of immigrants crossing the Atlantic, 'fhe over all figures for the number o f  
steerage class immigrants arriving into the Port o f New York during the 1892 calendar year were down 
\ y / (  on the previous \ ear. and during the last quarter of 1892 figures were down between SS ,uid 87 A 
o n  I 89  I figures.
" . S ch l os s ,  On Alien h ’:iniv.naion. 1893. p. 87.  
ibid p. 87' . I ' A H I P .  11 ( N e w  York); T A B I . P :  III. ( N e w  Y o r k u  and l A B I  P. W i l l  (Al l  P o r t s i  
ibid I . A P I .F  II 1 N e w  Yo r k  )
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continental ports of'origin."'^ According to Board of Trade reports for England (not 
including London) only three returned immigrants, all in Liverpool, became reliant on 
public relief in institutions maintained by the local rates. In Scotland, although total 
numbers are not given, four returned immigrants sought public assistance in 1892, all 
within the Parish of Govan Combination.^**
Application for poor relief by returned migrants was infrequent, and once a claim was 
made the expense was often reimbursed by either the shipping company or, in the 
case of Jewish migrants, by local Jewish charitable organisations. Yet, regardless of 
their infrequency, as described by Schloss and demonstrated through an examination 
of poor relief applications in Glasgow,*^* the belief that migrants, who were unwanted 
by America, were publicly supported in Great Britain was a powerful one. Two 
examples will suffice demonstrate the type of relief afforded to this conspicuous few.
Goldie Friedman, a 27 years old Russian Jewish woman was brought before the 
Glasgow Parish of Govan Combination with an application for poor relief by State 
Line Company Officials on the 23'^ of February 1886;
this woman was an emigrant on her way to America and turned insane on 
board the vessel. She was three weeks confined in an asylum at Staten Island, 
America, and was handed back to the State Line Company, who now applies 
for her rcmo\'al to asylum. She having arrived at Mavis Bank Quay on board 
the S.S. Stale o f Georgia. Her husband is in Baltimore. Sent to Merry flats 
[asylum] and removed on 12th March by order of the board. '"
She remained in the asylum for nearly three weeks, the cost of which was claimed 
from the State Line C om pany .S im ila rly  the Allan Line Company met the cost ot 
five days spent in the Poorhouse by Abraham Wahl hand 1er in October 1891. He had 
been in America for four months but had been ‘Returned by authorities Irom New 
York'. His only ailment appears to have been a sprained ankle, yet he was ‘refused at
ih id .  p. 88,
ih id .  p. 88.
"  K r i s t a  M a g i c  a .  I n v c ^ : ! v . a i i n p ,  t h e  l i n t t i i i > r ( i f i t  E . \ p c r i c t u v :  H o o t  R c t i c I  A p p l i c a t i o n s .  (  o n i p u t c r  
A n a l y s i s  a n d  E n r o p c i i n  h n m i p r a n t s  i n  ( l l a s n ^ o w ,  !  8 H  !  - 1 H 9 ( ) .  ( M P h i l  D i s s e r t a t i o n ,  ( i l a s g o w  t l n i \ c r s i i \  
1 9 9 7- 8 )
' ,SR. \  l ) - l l l - ; W I 7 / 2 9  j SI  277,
' 11er s i i l isc i i i ien l laie \\ as not recorded.
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Royal Infirmary not requiring surgical treatment’ and thus applied for |outdoor 
medical] poor relief.
So, although American policy to return to shipping companies any immigrant 
expelled on grounds of health or likely to become a public charge attracted both 
popular and some official concern in Britain, the quantitative evidence is unable to 
account for the strength of the reaction. Part of the reaction was due to Britain having 
to accept (there being no reeourse to refuse an immigrant entry) people who had been 
rejected by the United States for failing to satisfy its requirements for permanent 
settlement - being physically, morally or economically undesirable. These 
undesirables were without difficulty allowed not only to enter the United Kingdom, 
but to settle, work and claim relief. An article in the British Medical Journal in 1896 
complained that ‘hundreds of thousands of wretched paupers... are crowded together 
in the cities of the Pale until life becomes intolerable. Then they escape in hordes in 
the hope of reaching the free West. The stronger and more able-bodied manage to 
reach America, but the less fit stay behind in England’.
This notion that Britain received those immigrants who United States immigration 
officials rejected came to the fore in the British medical press in 1892 and remained 
contentious over the following decade. Part of the concern, despite the preventive 
system established at British ports, was that no medical inspection was undertaken on 
vessels departing American ports for Britain and Europe, While inspections -  
established under the National Board of Health Act -  were carried out on all vessels 
bound for the United States before embarkation, none were on those returning. As a 
Medical Inspector working with the United States Consul in Britain wrote to the 
Board of Trade in 1896:
passengers leaving the other side are not required to undergo an examination 
at all, as the object of the American Government is simply to prevent disease 
being imported into their own country, and they apparently do not care what 
disease may break out in the ship or may be imported into this country,''’
" SKA l)-Ht-;W 17/358 - 1073.
H.M.I. ,Sop(, 12. 1896, p. 700.
'■ I L'tlcr (lalcd Auu. 4. 1896, PRO M l 9/559/1 3 197.
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In the United States the new Immigration Act of 1891, combined with state quarantine 
laws, was put into practice with the arrival of cholera from Europe. It had particular 
consequences for Great Britain. While Britain anticipated the arrival of cholera, 
watching its progression across Europe ‘from W hitehall’ with limited alarm and 
urging local authorities ‘to complete their sanitary defences in time to repel the 
threatened invasion’,A m e r ic a  responded with considerably less optimism. As in 
Britain the source o f the disease was seen to be East European migrants, and America 
responded with great vigour by initially focusing prevention almost exclusively on 
this group.
With the danger of cholera in question, it is plain to see that the United States 
would be better off if ignorant Russian Jews and Hungarians were denied 
refuge here .. .These people are offensive enough at best; under the present 
circumstances, they are a positive menace to the health of the country. Even 
should they pass the Quarantine officials, their mode of life, when they settle 
down makes them always a source of danger. Cholera, it must be remembered, 
originates in the homes of this human riff-raff.
The first cases of cholera arrived in New York on August 30*'’ aboard the steamship 
Moravia sailing from Hamburg. The vessel was at once placed in quarantine with all 
passengers, regardless of health, detained upon it. With the arrival of more infected 
vessels immanent. President Harrison summoned a meeting with the Attorney 
General, Secretary of the Treasury and Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine 
Health Service. They agreed to impose from September P* an extended period of 
quarantine -  twenty days -  on all vessels from an infected port which carried ‘Russian 
Hebrew’ immigrants. The period of quarantine applied only to immigrant steerage 
passengers; other passengers of cabin class would be released. The 1878 Quarantine 
Act permitted the federal government to impose periods of quarantines on vessels 
arriving in American ports during emergencies. Using this authority Harrison issued a 
circular which placed all responsibility for the importation of cholera on steerage class 
immigrants and the vessels which carried them. The circular referred specifically to 
the ‘prevalence’ of cholera in ‘Russia, Germany and France, and at certain ports in
BMJ. Sept. 10, 1892, p. 604.
New York Times, Aug. 29, 1892, p. 1 a.
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Great Britain’ and that ‘ immigrants in large numbers are coming into the United 
States from the infected districts aforesaid’. It ordered,
that no vessel from any foreign port carrying emigrants shall be permitted to 
enter any port of the United States until the said vessel has undergone 
quarantine detention for a period of twenty days."***
As Markel points out, this quarantine and the circular which enforced it ‘had nothing 
to do with bacteriological concepts of cholera culture diagnosis or incubation periods. 
It was explicitly conceived as a financial brake to halt steerage immigration’."*' With 
developments in bacteriological understanding of cholera in the United States, the 
estimated time deemed appropriate for the isolation of people who had been in contact 
with the disease was five to eight days."*  ^Indeed, at the beginning of September 1892 
the Advisory Medical Council of the Chamber of Commerce in New York^^ 
recommended that ‘the period of quarantine detention of healthy persons ... should be 
five days in case no cholera occurs among them ’."*"* However, President Harrison 
made it clear in his final two addresses to Congress that he strongly supported 
restrictions on the immigration of Russian Jews. The twenty day quarantine period on 
all steerage passengers and the vessels they arrived in was imposed, as Markel 
explains, not simply to provide New York with the greatest level of protection against 
cholera, but to drastically limit the number of immigrants who arrived. By enforcing 
such extended delays it would not be economically viable for steamship companies to 
continue to run the Trans-Atlantic migrant routes. The scheme worked. Steamship 
companies which had first and second class bookings began to refuse to take on board 
steerage class immigrants and were subsequently spared the imposition and expense
[Circular. 1892. Department No. 150] Quarantine restrictions upon immigration to a id  the 
prevention o f  the introduction o f  cholera into the United States, (Treasury Department, Office o f  the 
Supervising Surgeon-General, U.S. Marine Hospital Service, Sept. 1, 1892), N ARA S. exdoc. 52 (52- 
2) Congressional Series Set, vol. 3056., also see, BMJ, Sept. 10, 1892, p. 606.  
ibid.
Markel, Quarantine!, p. 98.
ibid. p. 104. The Medical Officer o f  the Port o f  New York, Jenkins, wrote in his 1892 Annual Report 
that the known incubation period o f  cholera was two to five days.
”  Members o f  the Council included T.M. Prudden and Hermann Biggs, who had both studied in 
Germany under Koch and who both ‘played major roles in the introduction o f  bacteriological research 
to the United States’, Elizabeth Fee and Evelynn Hammonds, ‘Science, Politics, and the Art ol 
Persuasion: Promoting the N ew  Scientific Medicine in New York City’, Rosner, Hives o f  Sickness, 
1 5 5 -1 9 6 ,p. 157-164.
''■* Journal o f  the American Medical Association, Oct. 22, 1892, p. 505.
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of quarantine."*'"* In an attempt to re-establish steerage passage the steamship 
companies proposed to the United States Consul in Liverpool an expansion of the 
steam disinfection facilities for cleansing steerage-class clothing and baggage in order 
to eliminate cholera. But this
experiment proved that to continue the steaming properly would necessitate 
great enlargement of the plant at considerable expense, and as it was believed 
that even with this precaution the twenty days’ quarantine at United States 
ports would still be required, the steamship companies concluded to abandon
After the failure of this proposal all steerage passengers already booked aboard 
vessels sailing from Liverpool to America were removed from ships carrying first and 
second class passengers and, ‘the emigrants thus shut out with others whom the 
companies had already contracted to carry are being sent over in special ships with no 
other passengers’."*^ The Consul at Liverpool then issued orders to all steamship 
companies operating out of the port not to book steerage emigrants until further 
notification and to ‘avoid taking first and second class passengers from infected 
ports’.
If the cessation of European immigration was Harrison’s intention in imposing such a 
severe and focused quarantine policy, his scheme proved successful. Russian Jewish 
immigrants arriving in New York averaged approximately 3,800 per month during the 
early months of 1892, but between October and December, after the application of 
immigrant quarantine, this average fell to around 270 a month."*** The policy was not 
entirely successful in preventing the spread of the disease into the city of New York 
but unlike previous epidemics, such as the epidemic of 1849 which killed 5017 New
Letter from T, Sherman (Consul, Liverpool) to W. Wharton (Assistant Secretary o f  State, 
Washington) No, 180, Sept, 15, 1892, N AR A  Consular Correspondence, Dispatches From C o n su ls -  
Liverpool, Jan 1, 1891 -  Dec 1, 1896 (States Department Central Files, Record Group 59, National 
Archives Microfilm Publication M I41, roll T-52) Archives II. 
ibid. 
ibid.
Markel, Quarantine!, p. 140.
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Yorkers within three months, there were only nine deaths from Asiatic cholera 
reported in the City of New York during September 1892."***
The decline in the number of migrant passengers arriving in New York in September 
1892 corresponded with and contributed to a decline in the number of migrants who 
arrived in Britain. Medical officers working at British ports and for the Local 
Government Board -  Thorne Thorne and Collingridge for example -  saw the decline 
in numbers arriving into British ports in 1892 as a reflection of the Local Government 
Board’s Cholera Orders of that Summer.^' However, the rigid restrictions placed on 
migrant passage in United States and at European ports together with border 
controls^^ were probably more responsible for the decline. As the British Medical 
Journal remarked,
if evidence were needed of the effect produced by the drastic measures of 
quarantine adopted by America during the prevailing cholera epidemic upon 
the flow of Russo-Jewish transmigrants from Hamburg across Great Britain on 
their way to the West, it may be found in the return of the Board of Trade as to 
the number o f aliens arriving at ports in the United Kingdom during the past 
month. In place of the 5,615 aliens who landed on our shores from Hamburg 
en route for America in September of 1891, there was not one such entry in 
the same month of the present year. It is thus seen how effectually America 
has done for England that which she herself did not see her way completely to 
accomplish, and certainly not in the manner in which America has deemed 
necessary to her safety.'"*^
Watching closely the progress of cholera vessels in New York Harbour, British 
responses were favourable, for reasons shown above, yet were critical of the extreme 
restrictions of the twenty-day quarantine.
Rosenberg, The Cholera Years, p. 114.
This reduction may also be accounted for in improved sanitary conditions in New York. See Charles 
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The United States have made vast progress in public health, some of their 
advisers are men of the highest eminence, and it may be that some system of 
quarantine is that which will best meet the possible importation and diffusion 
of cholera in the case of their country. But, however this may be, its 
educational effect is of the worst."*"*
For many, the twenty-day quarantine period clearly demonstrated the ‘evils’ long 
associated with quarantine: its essential ineffectiveness and its ability to incite panic. 
The New York epidemic did not extend much beyond the end of September, but 
during those 30 or so days seven ships heavily infected with cholera arrived in New 
York Harbour. 120 people died on board the seven vessels and thousands more on 
other vessels were quarantined. By September 5'*’, with the threat of cholera growing 
ever greater, the Health Officer of the Port of New York, Dr Jenkins, extended the 
scope of quarantine to passengers of all classes. Two days earlier, two ships from 
Hamburg, the Rugia and the Normannia, arrived in the harbour with cholera on board. 
On the same day, more passengers aboard the Moravia succumbed to the disease. 
Jenkins, his small staff and resources desperately over-stretched, decided to place the 
entire population of the Normannia, 1355 people, under quarantine, despite a number 
of eminent individuals on board, including a U.S. Senator and the British music hall 
star, Lottie Collins, about to begin her debut American tour.'"*** The cabin class 
passengers were detained for 11 days, while the steerage class immigrants were 
interned for 16 days. During this time all 1355 people were moved to what was 
considered more appropriate quarantine accommodation on Fire Island, thirty miles 
east of New York City and away from the overcrowded quarantine facilities in New 
York Harbour. However, on arrival at Fire Island the passengers of the Normannia 
were forced to remain on the pleasure boat which had ferried them from New York. 
For three days a combination of bad weather and irate local residents on Long Island 
prohibited their landing at the temporary quarantine barracks, and they had to remain 
on board without even the most basic amenities.
Between the peril of the voyage, the fear of a mob of armed and frenzied men, 
and the misery of being confined all night in a small steamer without provision
L aitcd ,  Scpl. 17, 1892, p. 672. 
Markel, Quarantine.' p. 101.
155
or opportunities for eating or sleeping, the passengers had a pitiable 
experience, and their hardships reached a climax.
The incident caused national and international outrage and the world’s press seized 
upon the affair. It was extensively covered in The Times although criticism seldom 
went beyond the following:
Loud complaints are being made by cabin passengers at their unreasonable 
detention at the New York quarantine station. A relaxation is demanded of the 
strictness of quarantine provided that the passengers can provide where they 
were living for ten days before embarking.'"**^
Medical journals such as The Lancet were more straightforward in their condemnation 
of the New York quarantine and the consequent fiasco at Fire Island.
If healthy people are, in the eyes of the [United States] Government, such a 
danger to a community because they come from an infected port, or because 
cholera has occurred on board the ships in which they travel, that they must be 
kept away for ten or twenty days, although this may involve the greatest 
cruelties, indecencies and danger of death, then why complain of the action of 
people such as those who, in the Fire Island case, armed with clubs, pistols, 
boat-hooks and rifles, and were deaf to the entreaties, tears and pleadings of 
helpless women and children, who, though healthy, had been labelled by the 
quarantine system as dangerous?'"***
The incident provided the ultimate, dramatic evidence against quarantine. It had all 
the necessary ingredients to demonstrate the claims Britain had been making 
throughout the century against the system. Once British faith in the sanitary system 
was restored after the brief brush with temptation to revert to quarantine in response 
to the immanent arrival of cholera in early 1892, British attacks on quarantine 
resumed with full force. By mid-September 1892 the Lancet g'dve those in Britain 
who still advocated the detention of vessels arriving from cholera infected ports and 
carrying ‘diseased’ immigrants the example of the Normannia to heed.
Times, Sept. 13, 1892. p, 3a. 
Times, Sept. I, 1892, p. 3c.
156
We would urge people who are thus pressing the [British] Government [to 
‘authorise a reversion to the ancient, useless, and cruel system known as 
‘quarantine” ] to read again the intelligence from Fire Island, and also note 
that the practical outcome of the New York quarantine system is an 
announcement on authority of the Board of Health that five cases of genuine 
Asiatic Cholera have already occurred in New York.**^
The Normannia incident came to be used in Britain as a graphic example of the ‘evils’ 
of quarantine. For example, at a meeting of the Ship M asters’ Society in London in 
1894 after a lecture by Collingridge on the ‘Hygiene of Ships and Quarantine’, one 
ship captain offered the Normannia incident as evidence that ‘quarantine, as carried 
out in many places is a cruel, cowardly and sometimes barbarous imposition’.
Before me are the Quarantine Regulations current in most ports in the 
colonies, also French, Turkish &c. &c. [sic]. These regulations are reasonable 
enough generally speaking, but the trouble comes when carrying them out. We 
all remember the Normannia’s case, in which, at Fire Island, 400 people, 
young and old, of both sexes, were kept huddled together on board a small 
vessel without proper food, bedding, or other necessities of life for a number 
of days because ‘a mob of armed and frenzied men’ refused to let them land.^**
The cholera epidemic of 1892 in the United States, as in Britain, was a catalyst to 
further debates and developments in immigration restriction and quarantine laws. Yet, 
rather than discouraging the use of quarantine as it had in Britain, the epidemic 
instigated a debate in the United States which led to the passing of the 1893 
Quarantine Act, which extended the use of quarantine under federal, rather than state, 
law.
In general, British and American positions regarding the effectiveness and desirability 
of quarantine were at odds with each other. In Britain the application of quarantine 
was thought to be to be archaic and ineffectual, while in the United Stales it was 
believed to be the safest and most assured means of preventing the importation of
Lcuicc't, Sept. 17, 1892, p. 672. 
ibid.
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infectious disease. Current medical opinion in either country cannot always account 
for this difference. As Markel points out with regard to the approach taken toward 
cholera in New York, ‘it was not Jenkins’ (or any other health official’s) scientific 
understanding of cholera that would primarily guide the management of the epidemic. 
Bacteriological knowledge had far less to do with the proceedings of the 1892 
epidemics than politics and nativistic sentiments’.**’ In the simplest of terms, the issue 
of quarantine in the United States became an important part of the immigration 
debate. Any discussion about quarantine in the 1890s was not only a discussion about 
how to prevent the importation of disease, but also about how to prevent the 
importation of a certain class of immigrant. As Markel argues, quarantine and the 
restriction of immigration were closely linked.
Vibrant and colorful in its expression, but often blurred at the edges, the 
medical profession’s debate [about quarantine] had less to do with the victory 
of germ theory and the institution of the laboratory in public health than with 
the bitter fight over U.S. immigration policy.^^
So closely did the issues of quarantine and immigration restriction become bound 
together that the 1893 Quarantine Act was largely perceived, then and now, as both an 
attempt to prevent disease and an attempt to place a ban on undesirable immigrants 
under the more palatable guise of public health.**  ^The final report of the National 
Board of Trade’s Quarantine Committee in January 1893 stressed that the two issues 
needed to be kept separate.
The general question of immigration, and whether it has the same value for 
our country as in past decades, is foreign to the subject, and care should be 
taken under the pretense and cover of quarantine laws that the opponents to 
immigration, as such, be not permitted to effect their purpose contrary to the 
will of the majority of the people of several states. That classes of immigrants 
shall be admitted to this country is one question; what system of quarantine 
and sanitary inspection of vessels, cargoes and passengers shall be adopted is
"" Collingndge, 'Practical Points in the Hygiene of Ships’, p. 27. 
Markel. Quarantine!. p. 104. 
ibid. p. 153. 
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another question, and it is the opinion of this Committee that the best results 
will be attained by separating the two subjects in legislation.**"*
The Act which was eventually passed brought the implementation and administration 
of quarantine under central, federal control. Ironically, given the policy during the 
1892 epidemic, it was based less on a policy of total isolation and non-intercourse 
than existed under the previous system of separate state regulations. Instead, the Act 
transformed United States quarantine into a system that appeared to mirror more 
closely the British system of ‘medical inspection, rigid sanitary regulations, and the 
isolation of those found to be ill with a contagious disease based on bacteriological 
concepts of disease incubation and transmission’.^  ^ As a concession to the 
immigration restrictionists the Act also included a clause which allowed the President 
to put a stop to all immigration if the threat of imported contagion appeared imminent. 
This clause was never employed.
Those individuals in the United States who were in favour of sanitary control, rather 
than quarantine as the best means to preventing the importation and spread of 
infectious disease drew from the British both their model and illustrative examples. 
Not only was the arrangement in Britain to be emulated but also India was used as an 
example of how British administration could implement simple sanitary precautions 
which drastically reduced the risk of infectious disease spreading in notoriously filthy 
cities. Night-soil collection was one such sanitary precaution which could prevent 
disease. According to a contributor to the North American Review, this was the type 
of reform which was required in cities such as New York if sanitary prevention was to 
be relied upon. ‘Now, in civilized cities, whether in India or England, it is the rule to 
remove all filth during the hours of night, and before sunrise, and if the Health 
Department of this city of New York do not see the necessity of such an arrangement 
they have certainly not learned the initial principles of sanitation’.***’
In the United States British dedication to free trade was seen to be of prime 
importance in any discussion of medical inspection and disease prevention at British 
ports. The driving force perceived to be behind British policy was to find the least
’ ibid. pp. 171-2, from ‘Report o f  the Special Committee of the New York Board of Trade and 
transportation on Quarantine, Adopted January 6, 1893, with the Correspondence’, 
ibid. p. 180.
'''' Thomas P. Hughes, 'Sanitation Versus Quarantine’, North American Review. 1892, vol. 155, p. 638.
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expensive and most efficient method of intercepting infection in accordance with the 
‘worship of the Mammon of pounds, shillings and pence’. M o s t  discussion in 
America reflected European opinion that the British approach to protecting its ports 
from cholera stemmed from its trade interests. In an article entitled ‘The Ability of the 
State to Prevent an Epidemic of Cholera’ which appeared in the Philadelphia journal, 
Medical News in September 1892, Benjamin Lee, the Secretary to the State Board of 
Health of Pennsylvania, offered a blunt reading of British motives in responding to 
the threat of cholera.
The system of seacoast quarantine in Great Britain, as has long been known to 
American sanitarians, is defective in the extreme. Recent disclosures have 
developed the fact that there is really no power in the Government to enforce 
quarantine. The great British doctrine of free trade seems to have been pushed 
to its utmost limit to include disease as well as other commodities.*^^
Lee went on to admit that throughout the previous weeks while the United States had 
struggled to keep down the number of cholera cases breaking through the barriers of 
quarantine, the British system had proved more successful in preventing the spread of 
the disease. However, such a system, where ‘everything [was] in such an admirable 
condition of cleanliness and [had] such strict enforcement of local precautions that the 
germs will quickly d ie’, required ‘a complete and thorough sanitary organisation of 
the country so that no foot of ground escapes frequent sanitary inspection and no 
accumulation of filth is allowed to remain on its surface or beneath the surface for an 
hour’. Within two paragraphs of having admonished Britain’s ulterior motives for 
rejecting quarantine as an effective preventative system, Lee shifted his position to 
one of admiration as he lamented the deficiencies of the American system. ‘Such, 
unfortunately, is not the sanitary organisation of the States of this Union
More forceful and less relenting in his disapproval of the English system was S.T. 
Armstrong, a visiting physician to the Harlem Hospital who wrote an article for the 
New York Medical Journal in September 1892, entitled ‘Quarantine and the Present
N.Y. Med. J n i .  1892. vol.56, p. 355.
Mediccd News, (Philadelphia) 1892, vol.61, p. 322, 
ibid.
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Status of Quarantine Laws’/** Armstrong asserted that, in contrast to Britain ‘the 
welfare of the many must be given precedence over the inconvenience of the few’/ '  
He argued that the system which operated in the United Kingdom was in no way 
superior to the system of quarantine in place in the United States.
They profess to base their indifference to a quarantine in general to the 
improved sanitary conditions of their cities, towns and villages. And yet it is 
difficult to understand a sentiment that professes to ignore a maritime 
quarantine, and yet provides a maritime inspection service, with crude 
appliances for caring for the sick who are detained from an infected vessel.
Arguing that the British sanitary system of disease prevention was little more than a 
second-rate alternative to quarantine, Armstrong’s key point was that quarantine was 
still used and indeed favoured as a preventative measure in Britain where there were 
no consequences for trade. He cited the example of the quarantine of school children 
who had been exposed to infectious disease and asked how the British could support 
this when they frowned upon maritime quarantine.
The code of rules of the English Medical Officers of Schools Association 
provides that a quarantine of from twelve to twenty-one days, according to the 
disease, with thorough disinfection on the pupil’s return to school, be required 
of all pupils exposed to an infectious disease. If such methods are deemed 
desirable to prevent an epidemic in a school, in consequence of one or more of 
the pupils having been exposed to an infectious or contagious disease, why is 
not the principle just as applicable to the prevention of an epidemic in a city, 
in consequence of one or more of the passengers on a vessel arriving at that 
place having been exposed to one of what may be considered the epidemic 
diseases? To ask this question seems to me to answer it affirmatively.^’*
These responses to Britain’s apparent preference to commerce over public health were 
similar to those expressed by the French and German delegates to the International 
Sanitary Conferences and in the French medical press during the 1880s and 1890s.
The paper was read before the Seetion in Public Health o f  the New York Academy of Medicine, 
September 19, 1892.
-  N.Y. 
ibid.
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The United States was determined to continue its own medical inspections - overseen 
by consular officials - in British ports. While some Americans believed British 
methods to be successful, despite the assumed motivations, the Americans did not 
have the systems in place to rely entirely on her own or British sanitary means. 
Consequently, the Americans subjected vessels which arrived in the United States 
from British ports to as rigorous a medical inspection as vessels which departed 
directly from Hamburg, for example. Quarantine and the strict exclusion of those who 
displayed symptoms of infectious disease became the preferred method of the United 
States.
Just as the sanitary system supported the British ‘worship of the Mammon of pounds, 
shillings and pence’, the quarantine system supported American nativism and the 
increasingly rigorous requirements for en try .C o n c ilia tio n  to commercial interest 
appeared in America to account for Britain’s rejection of quarantine during the 
cholera epidemic and British willingness to release potentially infected immigrants 
into the community. In the United States the situation was reversed. Economic 
concerns were sacrificed to the creation of barriers to the entry of ‘infected’ 
immigrants. The twenty-day quarantine detention period was particularly harmful to 
trade coming into New York and to the business of many American steamship 
companies, but it was successful in reducing the average number of migrants who 
arrived into New York each month by up to 93%.^*
In the more palatable language of public health Americans argued that strict 
quarantine, although detrimental to the economic interests of maritime trade, was no 
more damaging to commerce than the label of ‘infected port’ which would be applied 
should a contagion be imported.
It will be admitted by all that the sanitary interests of the United States call for 
the exclusion, by proper restrictive measures, of all exotic, pestilential 
diseases; and it can be shown that even from an economic point ot view, a
ibid.
See Markel, Quarantine!-, Kraut, Silent Travelers-, and High am, Strangers in the Land. 
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single wide-spread epidemic of yellow fever or cholera costs more than our 
commerce with permanently infected ports is worth/*’
Whether or not economic concerns or immigration restriction was prioritised when 
dealing with imported infection, scientific medicine, bacteriology and new diagnostic 
techniques, were only employed at the ports when they could reinforce or justify these 
priorities. During the 1892 epidemic, bacteriological testing was only employed in the 
United States to prove that Asiatic cholera had entered the country and thus justify the 
use of extreme quarantine measures. Thereafter only a small number of bacilli 
cultures from the ports were cultivated, and the knowledge derived from bacteriology 
that the incubation period for cholera was only five to eight days was ig n o re d .A s  
Charles Wilson of the New York Board of Health wrote, ‘all that science can do, has 
been done in the way of preparation should the pest come; all that science can suggest 
to lessen the evil effects of the pest, should it break out, is either finished or now in 
the course of c o m p le t i o n I n  American, as in British, ports there was a 
subordination of laboratory medicine to political agendas. In the United States the 
primary political agenda which selectively employed and ignored the bacterial 
aetiology of cholera was the nativistic resistance to the immigration of poor East 
European Jews.
With the passing of any immediate threat from cholera after 1892-3, other diseases 
began to replace cholera in perceptions of immigrant contagion. The narratives which 
redefined certain diseases as ‘immigrant diseases’ or ‘contagions’ generally emanated 
from the United States and were quickly adopted for the same purpose in the United 
Kingdom. By the turn of the century Ellis Island^'* and other facilities for the reception 
of immigrants in America had implemented systems of inspection which could 
process up to 5000 people each day at Ellis Island alone. Easily visible and 
identifiable diseases associated with poverty and overcrowding such trachoma, the 
contagious eye disease, and favus which affected the scalp were incorporated into
George Sternberg (Major and Surgeon, U.S. Army), ‘The Reconciliation of'our Commercial and 
Sanitary Interests', Reports on the Sanitation o f  Ships and Quarantine  -  Prepared by the Supervising 
Surgeon-General. U.S. Marine Hospital Service, f o r  the Use o f  the International Anieri('an Conference  
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), p. 19, NARA S.exdoc, 58 (51-1 ). Congressional 
Serial Set vol. 2685.
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‘Safe-Guards Again 
Opened in late 1892.
163
st the Cholera’, North American Review, 1892, vol. 155, p. 491.
immigration law and popular perceptions of the contagious ‘nature’ of immigrants/** 
Trachoma was especially associated with immigrants from 1897 when the 
Supervising Surgeon General of the U.S. Marine Hospital Service declared it to be a 
‘dangerous, contagious disease... seldom seen except among recent immigrants from 
the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Polish and Russian Jew s’.*" The identifieation 
of trachoma became the most common reason for immigrants to be debarred on 
medical grounds, constituting an estimated 80% of cases rejected under the 
classification of ‘dangerous and loathsome contagious disease’ between 1897 and 
1902.^^ Nine out of every ten migrants who were diagnosed with trachoma on arrival 
were refused e n t r y .T h e  American Public Health Association reported at its Annual 
Meeting in 1903 that
the ordinary quarantinable diseases were eliminated by efficient quarantine 
methods, but certain communicable maladies, classed as loathsome or 
dangerous contagious diseases, existed among immigrants, and constant 
vigilance and considerable skill were necessary on the part of medical 
inspectors of immigrants to detect these cases and separate them from the 
healthy immigrants. The most important of these diseases, because of its 
frequency, was trachoma. Of the total number of cases of loathsome or 
dangerous diseases found in immigrants, 87% were due to trachoma and 10% 
to favus.
Although trachoma was a highly infectious disease which if untreated could result in 
blindness, it was no more prevalent among immigrants than other infections and much 
less widespread than tuberculosis, for example. Trachoma was a disease which was 
easily transmitted in the overcrowded conditions of steerage accommodation and as 
the development of symptoms occurred around five to twelve days after infection - 
not much less than the time needed to eross the Atlantic -  evidence of the disease was 
often manifest on arrival. The disease inflamed and reddened the eyes making them 
weep and form pustules; it was unavoidably visible. It could be quickly diagnosed 
among the hundreds of immigrants who lined up for inspection after the arrival of a 
vessel and thus became branded as the most notorious disease of immigration. While
See Birn, ‘Six Seconds Per Eyelid’; and Markel, 'The Eyes Have It’. 
Markel, ‘The Eyes Have It’, p. 533. 
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tuberculosis presented a significantly larger problem in terms of numbers, the 
visibility of trachoma’s unsightly symptoms meant that immigrants wore their 
‘undesirability’ on their face. For these reasons trachoma was, what Markel has 
called, a ‘central character’ on the ‘stage of infectious diseases and immigration’.***
Since 1892 particularly American port health controls were perceived in Britain to 
contribute to the risk of disease in British migrant port towns. This idea gathered 
speed in the early years of the new century. Yet, before 1897 there was no specific 
connection made in Britain between immigration, issues of port health, and trachoma. 
Indeed, it was not until the issue of immigration restriction began to be seriously 
considered by the British government in the first years of the twentieth century that 
trachoma began to emerge in port papers and related medical articles. In the 1889 
Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration^** evidence regarding the health of 
migrants referred only to their sanitary condition on arrival into British ports and their 
general propensity to contagious disease. The annual reports of the Port Medical 
Officers of Health during the nineteenth century referred to the number of cases of the 
‘exotic’ disease cholera^^ and ‘indigenous’ diseases, such as scarlet fever and measles 
which arrived on incoming vessels; they did not specifically identify cases of 
trachoma until the turn of the century. The inclusion of trachoma in British port 
medical reports coincided with the move toward the legal restriction of immigration.
It was a disease which was adopted by immigration restrictionists for the same reason 
as it was adopted in the United States: it was easily visible. Markel points out that ‘the 
stigma of trachoma became an essential consideration in the East European Jewish 
immigrant’s calculus of migration’ as it ‘permeated the experience at almost every 
point along the journey’.^ ** In British ports, United States consular or shipping 
company officials checked for trachoma among hundreds of migrants who lined up 
for the notorious eye examination before embarking for America. It was a primary 
reason why a proportion of migrants were debarred from entering the United States 
and were returned to the United Kingdom or remained in Britain for some time before 
attempting to enter America. By the turn of the century, the American stigmatisation
American Medicine. (Philadelphia), 1903, vol. 6, p. 771.  
ibid. p. 528.
Report from the Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (Foreigners) -  Together with 
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Only the case oi'yellow lever on the Neva  in Southampton, 1889, was reported and plague appeared 
in the reports from 1899.
Markel, ‘I ’he Byes Have It’, pp. 528 & 560.
165
of immigrants as a particular source of trachoma had also become an integral part of 
British perceptions of the immigrant as disease carrier. The Royal Commission on 
Alien Immigration^^ in 1902-3 took evidence from ophthalmic physicians about the 
disease. Anti-immigration provocateurs began to target the disease in their literature 
and newspapers. The Daily Mirror, for instance, ran an article on the ‘Alien Scourge 
-  Disease Stricken Immigrants’ which highlighted Britain’s role as ‘dumping ground’ 
for those migrants who had trachoma and were thus medically unfit to enter the 
United States.
Recent investigations have shown enormous prevalence of the highly 
contagious eye disease known as trachoma among recent immigrants. 
Trachoma subjects are rigidly barred from entering the United States, where it 
is admitted that many of the Russian Jews, now transmigrant in London, are 
bound. At the Royal Ophthalmic Hospital in City Road it was stated that 
during the last week or so the Russian Jews suffering from incipient or 
developed trachoma have been flocking for advice and treatment.
On one day, out of 160 new patients, 102 were aliens, mostly with eye 
disease... M ost of them follow the same formula: ‘Can I go to America?’
They do not want the treatment so much as expert advice on the possibility of 
passing the medical examination at the ports of arrival.
Once told that the disease would cause them to be sent back they disappear. 
They know their forward voyage is impossible, and seem to take no interest in 
curing the disease.
Thus they remain in metropolis to become a source of infection for others.^"
Britain followed America’s lead in identifying trachoma as a disease of East European 
Jewish immigrants. Just as cholera had represented the contagious nature of 
immigrants in the early 1890s, by the turn of the century trachoma, and to a lesser 
extent favus, came to represent all that was pernicious in the arrival of migrants in 
both Britain and America. The trachoma-stricken immigrant not only threatened to 
spread the contagious microbe which caused the disease, but also embodied the 
contagion which threatened the well-being of the body politic.
See Chapter Five.
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Throughout the nineteenth century Britain developed a system of protection at the 
ports which had full public and government support. Vessels and people from around 
the world arrived daily, causing no more difficulty than the odd altercation resulting 
from the dual authority of the Port Sanitary Authority and Customs Service at the 
ports. At the International Sanitary Conferences Britain displayed complete 
confidence in the safety of the systems which had been established to prevent the 
importation of infectious diseases into the ports. Yet, two factors in the early 1890s 
led to marked changes in the operation of the port health system over the next dozen 
years. The first, as we have seen, was the cholera epidemic of 1892 and the idea that 
its source was a particular class of migrant from Eastern and Central Europe. The 
second was the solution the United States adopted to the shared idea that immigrants 
were the carriers of disease. Britain was certainly effected by the 1891 Immigration 
Act and the extreme measures implemented in America in response to the 1892 
epidemic. As Schloss showed, these did not have a numerically significant effect on 
the number of migrants returned from America to Britain. The impact was important 
in the ways it altered British ideas about immigration restriction. America and Britain 
were linked through the western migration of East European Jewish refugees, as well 
as the eastern movement of those migrants who were expelled from America under 
ever tightening definitions of ‘desirability’. The fact that relatively few migrants were 
expelled and returned to Britain from the United States does not diminish the great 
concern felt in Britain and its political impact. The identification of trachoma as an 
immigrant disease in America filtered into British perceptions of East European 
migrants and subsequently to the notice and into the reports of the Port Medical 
Officers. Eye examinations prior to departure for America took place at British ports 
and failure to pass the United States’ examinations meant that those who displayed 
symptoms of the disease were liable to return or remain in the United Kingdom.
The experience of the 1892 cholera epidemic and subsequent American policies 
heightened awareness in Britain of both the presence of transmigrants and the lack of 
powers to refuse entry to anyone who arrived with a ‘dangerous and loathsome 
contagious disease’. Britain had assured the world throughout the second half of the 
nineteenth century that the arrival of contagious disease did not pose a risk to the 
public health if sanitary measures and controls were meticulously administered. Yet 
the fear in Britain that it was becoming the home of ‘diseased’ migrants not ‘good
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enough’ for the United States led Britain to reassess, from the mid-1890s, the 
procedures surrounding the entry of certain groups of migrants and transmigrants and 
their implications for public health at the ports. Thus, the policies of a foreign country 
indirectly exerted pressure to change procedures at British domestic ports. Should 
changes be made to the port health system regarding these migrants? How would 
existing structures be operated under any such alteration of the prized port sanitary 
system?
Just as in America, port health in Britain was beginning to be related more to 
immigration but imperial trade still remained at the forefront of the concerns of 
British port management. However, placing this growing concern and desire for 
immigration restriction within the structures developed over the nineteenth century 
was becoming increasingly necessary in Britain.
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Aliens Act and the Port Sanitary Authority: Bringing 
Immigration within the Sanitary System
In 1896 the Quarantine Act of 1825 was repealed. The barrier was removed to the 
Local Government Board and Port Sanitary Authority’s complete control of port 
health. Britain’s success in averting the spread of cholera in 1892 and its subsequent 
attainment of European acquiescence regarding the superiority of port sanitary 
measures over extended quarantines, hastened the legal removal of quarantine from 
the statute books, for all diseases. Yet the question of health at the ports remained 
open. The increasing belief that migrants -  immigrants and transmigrants -  were a 
source of imported infectious disease in Britain resulted in the introduction of 
legislation specifically restricting the entry of any migrant who arrived displaying the 
symptoms of disease.
The primary focus of the anti-alien debate ' which developed with particular force in 
Britain during the first years of the twentieth century was not, however, the health but 
the economic considerations of this East European immigration.^ Those arguing for 
immigration restriction emphasised the problems of an extended workforce, 
inadequate housing, and the production and introduction into the market of cheap 
goods. Overcrowding in the unsanitary streets of London’s East End or the Liveipool 
dock areas, for example, where the migrants dwelt was described in detail and 
perceived as a direct manifestation of the immigrant ‘problem’. The health problems 
this caused and nurtured in the urban slums of port towns were integral to the 
economic debates of anti-alienism, because they led to migrants becoming a charge 
upon the public funds and a drain on the resources of urban sanitary authorities. 
Diseases brought into the ports with the migrants both put pressure upon the resources 
of the sanitary authorities and posed a threat to the health of the rest of the population.
' ‘A lien’ was the contemporary term used to describe foreigners in or arriving into Britain. In this 
period it referred particularly to Eastern and Central European migrants and migrant Jews. Arnold 
White (1848-1918) - described as ‘Author: Interested in the Question o f  Alien Immigration’ (see also: 
Who Wa.v Who: Vol.II, 1 9 16-1928, p. 1116) -  defined alien immigrant  in his evidence to the RCAI as, ‘ 
a non-naturalised person with a domicile in a foreign country settling in this country’. , RCAI, Mimitcs  
o f  Evidence,  vol. II, 1109.
" For further reading on the economic effect and reaction to immigration sec Feldman. Englishmen and  
Jew.s\ Garrard, The English and Immigration’, Gartner, The Jewish Immigrant in England’, Harris, 
'Anti-Alienism, Health and Social Reform’; Holmes, John Bull's Island’, Anne .1. Kershen (Ed.). 
London: The Promised Land? The Migrant Experience in a Capital City, (Aldershot and Vermont: 
Avebury, 1997); Lucassen (Eds.), Migration, Migration History, History’, and Panayi, Immigration,  
Ethnicity, and Racism in Britain.
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Although the link between immigration and disease was an important part of the anti­
alien debate and found a place within the legislation resulting from it, it did not 
occupy as central a place in British concerns over immigration or excite the same 
fervour or vivid imagery as it did in the United States. Throughout the debate leading 
up to the new immigration legislation, the Aliens Act 1905, the Port Sanitary 
Authority fiercely defended its ability to sufficiently prevent the introduction and 
spread of infectious disease and its complete control over diseased vessels and 
individuals arriving into British ports, so recently acquired from the Customs Service.
This final chapter will examine how those arguing for immigration restriction used the 
issue of disease; how the example of American policy and practice played an 
important role in this part of the debate; and why ultimately infectious disease did not 
occupy a place on the centre stage of anti-alien propaganda as it did in the United 
States. The Port Medical Officers of Health, and those involved with their work were 
among the first to encounter the migrants when they arrived in Britain. The concerns 
they voiced among themselves about the threat of infection accompanying the migrant 
vessels remained evident after 1892 but when giving evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Alien Immigration in 1902-3 and in official testimony relating to 
immigration legislation, these officers assured the relevant authorities that the risk 
was minimal. They displayed their confidence in the Port Sanitary System and in the 
competency of inland sanitary structures and systems. The primary concern of the 
Medical Officers was ensuring that migrants remained within these systems and under 
the observation of the sanitary authorities. Information about the identity and intended 
destinations of migrants which would ensure the success of sanitary surveillance was 
acquired at the ports but was for a variety of reasons unreliable. Between 1892 and 
1905 sanitary surveillance was the primary means of managing immigration, but 
because reliable information was not always easy to obtain its affect was limited.
The Abolition of Quarantine
During the years 1892-95 the Port Sanitary Authorities retained the powers granted 
under the Local Government Board General Cholera Orders during the epidemic. 
These Orders included additions to their powers and an extension to their jurisdiction
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with regard to cases of cholera. The rigorous investigation of passengers’ forward 
addresses (which will be discussed later in this chapter) was continued. However, 
once the threat of cholera had again retreated, the special authority of the General 
Orders was removed and power to deal with cases of cholera, along with yellow fever 
and plague, was once again placed within the jurisdiction of the Customs Service.
From late 1893 the immediate danger from cholera had passed, and serious discussion 
finally began in the Houses of Parliament regarding the abolition of quarantine.
Before legislation could be passed to repeal the 1825 Quarantine Act and the 
associated authority of the Privy Council and Customs Service over port health, it was 
necessary to discuss the implications for trade of removing the legal ‘safety-net’ of 
quarantine. Departments, including the Board of Trade, Local Government Board, 
and Treasury Chambers, exchanged anxious notes to check and double-check that no 
harm could befall British foreign trade if the Quarantine Act was removed. Despite 
Britain’s confidence in the sanitary system after its success in the cholera pandemic of 
1892 and the submission of European states to the British system at the 1893 
International Sanitary Conference, there remained a serious concern that difficulties 
might await British vessels when ‘they go to countries which believe in quarantine’.^  
However, the Board of Trade and Foreign Office gave assurances that no such 
obstacles would hinder the movement of British trading vessels once quarantine had 
been abolished.
My Lords have reason to believe that the Local Government Board attach no 
importance to the maintenance of this Service in the interests of Public Health, 
and it only remains to consider whether its abolition would injuriously affect 
our trade with foreign countries.
Upon this point My Lords are informed by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs that he has no objection to offer to the abolition of Quarantine on the 
ground of Conventions with Foreign Powers, or of hindrance to our Foreign 
Trade.^
' Memorandum from Marine Department o f  the Board o f  Trade, end April. 1894.
PRO MT9/5 12/M786S.
' Letter from Treasury Chambers to Board o f  Trade, April 19. 1894, PRO M4’9/512/H343.S.
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With these assurances the Public Health Act 1896^ quickly passed through both 
Houses of Parliament and ‘the remarkable anomaly of one disease being dealt with by 
one Authority and another by a second Authority at the same time and under the same 
conditions’  ^was brought to an end. The Act came into force on November 7, 1896 
and applied to the whole of the United Kingdom. It altered the role of the Local 
Government Board and Port Sanitary Authority in a number of ways. Primarily, the 
Act transferred all the authority previously in the possession of the Privy Council with 
regard to instances of cholera, yellow fever, and plague over to the Local Government 
Board. As the powers o f the Privy Council only applied to these three diseases, the 
Local Government Board could not extend any of its new authority to other -  
‘indigenous’ - diseases. However, as Collingridge remarked in 1896,
the practical results of these Regulations [was] to make the Port Sanitary 
Authority (subject to the control of the Local Government Board) the actual 
Health Authority of the Port, and [gave] to their Medical Officers 
discretionary power as to the detention of vessels infected, or suspected, of 
either of the three diseases above mentioned.^
The Act ensured that no person was permitted to disembark an ‘infected’ vessel until 
the Port Medical Officer had examined it. The definition of an ‘infected’ vessel was 
extended to apply to cases of ‘exotic’ disease on board, up to and including departure 
from its last port, rather than ‘after it had left’. It also included two new provisions. 
The first recognised the expertise of the ship’s surgeon,
and requires him to give a responsible professional certificate as to whether 
there has been any case on board. The Master’s certificate was, strictly 
speaking, of no value, as he certified to a matter of which he had no expert 
knowledge, whereas a Medical Certificate is of a known and definite worth.^
Public Health Act, 1896 [59& 60 VICT.l, 'An Act to make I'urther Provision with respect to 
Epidemic, Endemic, and Infectious Diseases, and to repeal the Acts relating to Quarantine'.
'Sanitary Report -  Port o f  London Sanitary Committee with the Half-Yearly Report of the Medical 
Officer o f  Health for the Port o f  London, to 3 L“ Dec, 1896,’ Fort o f  London Saidtary Reports,  / 896-  
1901, p. 1 L C L R 0 5 6 5 B .  
ibid. p. 12. 
ibid. p. I 3.
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The second gave power to the Port Medical Officer to require the Master of a vessel 
to bring his ship ‘to’ or to moor or anchor the vessel in a place convenient for 
undertaking a thorough medical inspection. This remedied a weak element in the 
previous law which called on the Master of a vessel to permit [sic] his vessel to be 
boarded and examined.^ Furthermore, ‘as to the necessity for detention, and of the 
length of such detention, the Medical Officer of Health [was] the sole judge’.
Thus, after more than half a century of serious endeavour to do away with the 
burdensome and exorbitant obligations of quarantine, the system was finally removed 
from the statute books and the Local Government Board and its Medical Officers was 
alone responsible for the health of British ports. Within four years the responsibility 
for dealing with the reception of previously quarantineable disease was placed firmly 
within the hands of the Port Sanitary Authorities during the pandemic of plague, 
1899-1900. Plague reached Britain in August 1900, first in Glasgow where its affects 
were worst, ’ ’ and then numerous cities around England and Wales. Customs officers 
still boarded vessels under the Customs Consolidations Act of 1876 which regulated 
the importation of goods. Although they no longer had any jurisdiction over the health 
of ships, during the threatened and actual arrival of plague in 1899-1900 Customs 
officers were instructed to assist the Medical Officers of Health in all matters relating 
to inspection and to ensure that the Port Sanitary Authority was aware at all times of 
the arrival of vessels from infected ports. The Port Sanitary Authority enforced 
isolation of the sick and sanitary surveillance of healthy passengers from infected 
vessels both at and away from the port in much the same way it had during the 1892 
cholera epidemic.
However, prevention of plague in 1900 differed from cholera prevention eight years 
earlier. Unlike 1892, bacteriological testing was used to confirm or deny the existence 
of plague in suspicious cases.
' ibid. 
ibid. p, 14.
" 'Altogether there were recognised 36 cases o f  plague in Glasgow from the beginning o f  August to 
the end o f  September, 1900. Of these 16 proved fatal, a case mortality o f  44.4 percent,' Bruce Low, 
'Summary o f  the Progress and Diffusion o f  Plague in 1900,’ Thirtieth Annual Report o f  the LGB, 1900- 
01 -  Supplement Containing the Report o f  the Medical Officer, Appendix No. IH, (London; HMSG,  
1902), ICd, 7471, p. 276.
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At each port visited by the Medical Inspectors a copy of directions for 
obtaining and sending to the Board material from suspected plague cases for 
bacterioscopic examination was left with the Medical Officer of Health for his 
guidance. The Board made arrangements with Dr. Klein, F.R.S., of St. 
Bartholomew’s Medical School, to examine any such material forwarded, 
along with the necessary particulars, to the Board by any Medical Officer of 
Health V
In England and W ales four cases - two at London, one at Liverpool, and the other at 
‘the Tyne port’ -  were confirmed as plague by bacteriological testing. In Glasgow 36 
cases were confirmed in the laboratory. A second way in which the plague epidemic 
of 1900 differed from the 1892 cholera epidemic (in terms of the administration of 
port health) was that Glasgow was declared to be an infected port under the 
convention drawn up at the International Sanitary Conference in Venice in 1897. This 
meant that although sanitary precautions, rather than quarantine, could be used in 
British ports, foreign ports could impose quarantine on any vessel which had sailed 
from Glasgow. Experts from around the world descended on the city to observe the 
disease and the preventive systems employed there, which prevented the extension of 
the disease beyond the boundaries of Glasgow.’^  The classification of Glasgow as an 
infected port lasted only until October, and the city was congratulated by the Local 
Government Board for its success in controlling the epidemic through the combined 
efforts of the sanitary authorities. Finally, the 1900 plague epidemic differed from the 
cholera epidemic in that, although it focused attention and prevention upon the arrival 
of vessels from infected ports, it did not direct particular attention toward any specific 
group or class of people. The co-operation between port and local sanitary authorities 
which controlled plague in 1900 had been cemented during the 1892 cholera epidemic 
and the methods of observation were the same. People who had departed from plague 
infected ports were put under sanitary surveillance away from the port and infected 
individuals were isolated. However, this prevention was not aimed primarily at 
migrants. The spread of plague was not associated with migrants, nor did it follow
'Memorandum on Precautionary Measures taken in 1899 to Prevent the Importation ol Bubonic 
Plague into England and Wales Twenty-Ninth Annual Report o f  the LGB, 1899-1900 -  Supplement 
Containing the Report o f  the M edical Officer, Appendix No. 15, (London: HMSO. 1901 ), |Cd. 299 ]. p. 
345.
' ’ Sixth Annual Report o f  the Local Government Board fo r  Scotland, 1900, p. xxxvli.
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specifically migration ro u te s .T h e  prevention of cholera, on the other hand, was so 
directly associated with migrants that it not only relied upon the sanitary authorities, 
but was also depended upon the co-operation of migrant aid organisations for control 
of the disease. Control of the 1892 epidemic involved both the control of disease and 
the control of a certain ‘class’ of people.
‘The Duty of Keeping These Aliens Under Supervision.. ,15
It is now necessary to return briefly to 1892 to explain the particular methods and 
problems involved with the sanitary surveillance of migrants. These began in 1892 
and continued until the introduction of the Aliens Act. The Local Government Board 
Cholera General Order of 1892 caused great difficulty for many migrants entering 
Britain during the epidemie.*^ As highlighted in a number of American journals at the 
time the Order was Britain’s only means of refusing immigrants entry. Addresses 
unverified by the local sanitary authorities frequently demanded the detention of 
migrants at the port and occasionally their return to Continental Europe. Many of the 
migrants had booked their passage with agents who organised the various stages of 
the journey from Eastern Europe to the United States. These agencies often had 
offices at the European departure ports of Hamburg, Bremen or Rotterdam, for 
example, as well as in the transmigration towns of Britain, such as London and Hull. 
Yet, not all were scrupulous in the running of their businesses and some exploited the 
naivete and desperation of many of the migrants. Agents in Europe often produced 
tickets only as far as London, where the migrants were instructed to collect the 
onward ticket from their agency office. But, the London addresses provided by 
dishonest agents in Europe were often fictional. As a result the migrants arrived with 
nowhere to stay and no ticket to collect for completing the journey they had paid for 
to America. The temporary residences agents provided were also frequently in the 
most wretchedly overcrowded and unsanitary lodging houses. The Port Medical 
Officers questioned the agency addresses for these reasons and many migrants found
'■* Plague first became cause for concern in Britain when it appeared in .leddah. Port Said, and 
Alexandria in the first half o f  1899. ‘It was not, however, until August that the Board became at all 
disquieted about this disease,’ In August official information 'was received' o f  the presence o f  plague 
in Oporto, Portuagal. Twenty-Nineth Annual Report, 1899-1900, p. xiv.
Theodore Thomson. 'Cholera and Alien Immigrants Arriving in the Port of London’, ( 1905), PRO 
M H 19/237
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themselves unable to land. With no other connections in Britain nor the funds to find 
alternative lodgings the migrants fell into the hands of the agencies and sanitary 
authorities.
In addition to the problems caused by invalid agency addresses, other difficulties 
awaited the émigrés at the landing stations of the major migration ports, particularly 
London. Recognising the vulnerability of the arriving migrants various groups 
gathered at the ‘landing places of the riverside’ anxious to take advantage of the 
bewildered arrivals. In his memoirs Abraham Mundy, who was Secretary of the Poor 
Jews Temporary Shelter between 1897 -  1946, recalled and described the chief 
offenders:
crimps of the worst type were abounding at every landing place, who took 
charge of the emigrants, presumably to eonduct them with their baggage to 
friends or lodgings. They were, however, in many instances taken to 
undesirable lodging houses where they were robbed of all their belongings, 
whilst their young women-folk were decoyed to places of ill repute and 
shame.
The watchful eyes of the missionaries propagating Christianity amongst the 
Jews were mainly focused on these people, who they were anxious to 
ensnare... These ‘soul-snatchers’ were usually lying in wait at the landing 
places of the riverside, and on the disembarkation of each load of immigrants 
from the Continent, they poured upon them and distributed their religious 
tracts and insidious literature amongst them, inviting them at the same time to 
their centres to listen to their religious services and preaching, and offering 
them as a bait assistance in kind.'^
The Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter was established in October 1885 in Leman Street, 
Whitechapel to provide immediate aid to poor immigrants and transmigrants in
See Ciiapter Tliree.
Memoirs o f  Ahrciham MumJy -  Secretary to the J e w s ’ Temporary Shelter, 1897-1946,  \ ol. I. dipt. I. 
p. 1-2 (Jewisti Museum. Finciiley, Memoirs Box I); See also evidence o f  Stephen Moore. Chief 
Inspector of the Thames Police. Minutes o f  Evidence -  Select Committee on Emigration and  
Immigration (Eoreigners), (1889), 1841-1846. 
ibid., dipt. 10, p. I -
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L o n d o n .In  1893 the Shelter signed an agreement with the Port Sanitary Authority 
which offered an alternative to the fictional or notoriously unsanitary lodging houses 
provided by agents, and would protect migrants from the ‘dangers’ awaiting them at 
the landing stations. The Shelter, in accordance with the wishes of the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews, wanted to have a presence at the docks to give advice to the 
arriving migrants and to protect them from the ‘crimps’ and ‘missionaries’ who 
awaited them.
The agreement originated after the 1892 epidemic at the initiation of the Port Sanitary 
Authority. Collingridge contacted the Poor Jew s’ Temporary Shelter in London 
because the notoriously unreliable addresses provided by agents were making the 
work of the Port Medical Officers, and their counterparts in local sanitary districts 
more difficult and time consuming. In 1893 the Shelter and Port Sanitary Authority 
reached an agreement in which the Shelter would ensure the whereabouts of all 
Jewish immigrants in London for seven days after arrival ‘on condition that 
Collingridge undertook to hand over all immigrants to the Shelter and not part only, 
the others especially not to be handed over to missionaries or other irresponsible 
persons’. A f t e r  much negotiation, during which Collingridge conceded only ‘to do 
his best’ '^ with regard to the Shelter’s provisions, they signed the agreement. It stated 
that it was the right of the Port Medical Officer to detain any immigrant arriving into 
the Port of London. Rather than kept at the port until the local Sanitary Authorities 
reviewed their addresses, those migrants detained for questionable addresses were 
handed over to an officer of the Shelter with a ‘nominal roll’ drawn up by the Port 
Medical Officer. The migrants were taken to the Shelter where a further roll was 
taken of their names and their intended addresses which were subsequently examined 
by officers of the Shelter. Once the Shelter verified their addresses, an officer of the 
Shelter personally escorted the migrants to the residence. The roll and details of 
anyone who subsequently left the Shelter to board another vessel within seven days of 
arrival into London was forwarded to the Port Sanitary Office at Greenwich. The Port 
Sanitary Office also agreed to furnish the Shelter with a list of all immigrant vessels
' ' The Shelter was the principal immigrant aid organisation in London, through which, by 1903. 95% 
ol the total number o f  Jewish immigrants arriving into London passed. Similar organisations operated 
in Hawich and Grimsby. See Evidence of Herman Landau, President o f  the P.ITS, in RCA!, Minutes o f  
Evidence, 16273.
General Committee Minutes, PJTS, April 30, 1893.
' ibid.
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due to arrive into the port so that the presence of a Shelter officer could be assured at 
the r iv e rs id e .B y  placing migrants with questionable addresses in the care of the 
Shelter, the Port Sanitary Authority relieved itself and the officers of the local 
Sanitary Authorities from the arduous responsibility of visiting each of address, 
making enquiries and conducting an investigation. They asked, ‘’’were these people 
known there, or were they expected to arrive there” . If they reply “Yes” , they were 
immediately liberated to go to that address’.F u rth e rm o re , the agreement meant that 
should the address not be bona fide, the migrant could remain at the Shelter until the 
seven day period had elapsed without costing either the Sanitary Authorities or the 
shipping companies any more time or money.
The agreement did not always operate smoothly. The Port Sanitary Authority was 
disappointed with the frequent ‘disappearance’ within the seven day period of 
migrants placed within the care of the Shelter; while the Shelter complained that a 
lack of Port Sanitary Authority vigilance was allowing ‘the Missionaries to entice 
away a number of Jewish new arrivals, to unknown addresses, making it difficult for 
the Shelter and the authorities to trace them ’ The Port Sanitary Committee made the 
first official complaint against the Shelter in February 1894 stating that they were ‘not 
satisfied from information which [had] reached them that proper care [was] taken by 
the Committee of the Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter to carry out on their part the 
agreement which was entered into’.^  ^The Port Sanitary Authority worried that 
migrants were disappearing on the way to the Shelter and that the Shelter was not 
properly inspecting and verifying migrant residences, nor personally escorting the 
migrant to the addresses, nor returning to the Port Sanitary Office complete and 
accurate registers of all the migrants handed over to their care."^' As a result, the Local 
Government Board convened a conference at which ‘the Board, the Port of London 
and the Whitechapel Sanitary Authorities (represented by their Medical Officers) and 
the Jewish Board of Guardians by the President and members of the Committee [of 
the Shelter] were present’. U n d e r  some pressure from the Medical Officers, the
”  Memoirs o f  Abraham Mundy,  vol. 1, dipt. 13, p. 1-2; and Jewish Immigrants, Supplement to the 
PMOH Monthly Report, May ! 894, CLRO PSC.P, (March -  May, 1894).
Evidence of Dr Herbert Williams, MOH Port o f  London, RCAI, Minutes of Evidence,  61 89. 
ibid.
Letter from PJTS to the Town Clerk, Guildhall, Feb. 13, 1894, CLRO PSCP, (March -  May, 1894). 
Williams, RCAI, Minutes o f  Evidence,  6189.
"^Jewish Immigrants, Supplement to the PMOH Monthly Report, May 1894, CLRO PSCP, (March - 
Mav, 1894).
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Shelter agreed that they alone had not properly carried out their part of the original 
agreement, while stating that the Port Sanitary Authority had been consistent in 
honouring their side of the agreement. With the Shelter having taken responsibility for 
the problems which occurred, a new agreement was signed which barely differed 
from the original except for the inclusion of a further article requiring that the name of 
the vessel on which migrants arrived be registered on the roll of names and addresses. 
This way it would be easier to trace individuals from the same vessel should it later be 
discovered to be infected.
The agreement terminated in 1895 when the General Order of 1892, which specified 
the medical inspection and registration of all immigrants, was withdrawn because the 
importation of cholera no longer posed a threat. Although not officially continued, 
Collingridge and the Shelter’s Executive Committee agreed to continue the 
arrangements established between their two organisations on an unofficial and less 
stringent b a s is .Y e t ,  with the end of the threat of cholera and the Order removed, the 
Port Sanitary Authority retained no specific authority over the arrival of immigrants 
as distinct from other passenger arrivals.
The General Order focused on the arrival of migrants because they were considered to 
pose a particular threat during the cholera epidemic. As the ‘English system’ was 
based primarily on the principle of observation after disembarkation, the public health 
threat which resulted from the disappearance of passengers from an infected vessel 
was great. If possible sources of infection disappeared from view, it became 
extremely difficult to maintain control over the spread of infection. In specifying 
migrants and migrant vessels the 1892 General Order reflected prejudices against this 
group as a particular class and, to an extent, as Jews. It also reflected a genuine 
concern for public health. Distrustful migrants gave, for a variety of reasons, false 
information to the authorities. The false names, plans and destinations not only, as we 
shall see, drastically distorted immigrant statistics, giving fuel to the anti-alien 
campaign, but also meant that the Sanitary authorities could not monitor the health of 
migrants who travelled from an infected port for the seven day incubation period. Not 
knowing where migrants were in the days after disembarkation from an infected, or 
suspected vessel, meant that an infection could spread before local medical officers
lixecLitivc Coinniittee Minutes, PJTS, .tune 18, 1895,
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could identify and isolate cases where they occurred. The reticence of migrants in 
providing correct information about their intended whereabouts fostered the belief 
among sanitary workers that migrants were not to be trusted and so posed an 
additional threat to the public health. Migrants were thought particularly likely to 
disappear after disembarkation. Within the established sanitary system this 
disappearance was a serious problem which had to be addressed; and although there 
was a strong element of prejudice present in all mandates directed specifically at 
migrants, there was also a strong epidemiological basis to the registration of migrants 
in this way. For these reasons it was essential that the Port Sanitary Authority 
maintained full and accurate information about the identity and whereabouts of 
migrants. It was equally essential to Jewish organisations, such as the Poor Jew s’ 
Temporary Shelter, that Jewish migrants presented, and were perceived to present, no 
risk to the public health. In this matter (as in other issues relating to East European 
immigration and transmigration in Britain) the Jewish organisations wished to prevent 
migrants from providing any ammunition which might potentially excite latent anti- 
Semitism, nor did they wish to see their co-religionists fall into the hands of the 
‘crimps’ and ‘missionaries’ readily awaiting their arrival. Thus the General Order, 
while singling out the migrants, encouraged a system by which representatives of 
Jewish organisations could be present in a semi-official capacity alongside the Port 
Medical Officers at the moment the migrants’ arrived.
As well as protecting newly arrived migrants, the Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter and 
other Jewish organisations in Britain, such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 
were often able to obtain more accurate information from the migrants with regard to 
their intentions. Many of the migrants were frightened of the uniformed Medical 
Officers and other officials they encountered at various stages of their journey. Stories 
and scraps of information filtered through the waves of migrants moving Westward 
about what might happen if one told ‘them’ this or that piece of information; 
experience had shown that it was often more prudent to conceal the truth. Migrants 
frequently lied about the amount of money they possessed, for example, ‘because in 
Russia, if he told an official he had money, the official would have it’."^  However, the 
Jewish organisations posed no such threat and were able to acquire information from 
the migrants. This information was then passed on to the Port Sanitary Authorities and
’ Landau. RCAI. Minutes o f  Evidence, 16283.
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the Board of Trade. Nevertheless, despite the advantages Jewish organisations had 
over the Port Sanitary Authority and Board of Trade for obtaining information, 
migrants continued to ‘disappear’ and migration statistics remained drastically 
distorted.
These statistics had a particular bearing on the development of anti-alien sentiment 
within government circles. Popular discontent about the presence of immigrants in 
towns and cities such as London, Liverpool, Hull and Grimsby, chiefly focused upon 
the perceived economic privations brought about by the extended workforce, 
overcrowding in working class urban neighbourhoods, and the idea that immigrants 
produced goods which undercut the prices of goods produced by native 
manufacturers.^^ Ultimately, however, it was the number of migrants perceived to be 
‘swarming’ into the country which was the impetus to changing the law with regard to 
the regulation of immigration. Attempts were made in 1894, 1896 and 1897 to pass 
legislation against the growing number of immigrants. Yet, Bills drawn up in 1894 
and 1897 went no further than one or two readings, with campaigners such as Lord 
Salisbury unable to gain sufficient support. Britain’s legal and moral tradition which 
ensured liberty of movement and of asylum hindered the support the Bills needed in 
parliament at the early stages of the debate. Legal discussions were frequent and 
difficult, as an article in the Law Quarterly Review titled, ‘Alien Legislation and the 
Prerogative of the Crow n’, demonstrated in 1897:
from a legal and historical point of view the most interesting issue raised is 
whether or not the Crown, acting for the public welfare, possesses an inherent 
right, apart from legislation, to exclude or expel aliens whose presence it 
considers objectionable on public grounds...
There are doubtless groups of persons with strong opinions on moral, 
scientific, and trade questions, who would collectively furnish reasons for the 
exclusion of almost every kind of alien, but in dealing with legislation which 
affects the liberties of foreigners, if we desire to maintain a reputation for
" ILir extended discussion o f  the economic impact o f  immigration in tliis pcrioil and its role in the rise 
of  anti-alien sentiment see texts cited in footnote 2 of this chapter.
181
liberality and common sense, we must act on such grounds as will be generally 
recognised as common sen se /'
By 1898 the desire to place restrictions on the number and type of immigrant allowed 
to enter the United Kingdom was beginning to gain political momentum. A Bill which 
called for the exclusion of anyone deemed to be ‘an idiot, insane, pauper’, likely to 
become a public charge, having symptoms of a loathsome or contagious disease, or ‘a 
danger to good order’ entered parliament and was carried through to the final 
reading of the House of Lords before being discarded. W hat enabled the Bill to get 
further than any previous attempt was the strong arguments made by the Earl of 
Hardwicke and his supporters during the second reading of the Bill in the House of 
Lords. Hardwicke argued that ‘the stream of alien immigration which struck the noble 
marquis [of Salisbury] as so dangerous in 1894 had increased in volume’.
The Board of Trade under the authority of the 1836 Aliens Registration Act,^'^ 
collected official statistics relating to immigration into Britain -  including both 
immigration and transmigration. The Act did not place any restrictions on entry into 
Britain, but rather was concerned solely with registration. It had never been 
vigorously enforced until it was revived in 1890 on the recommendation of the 1889 
House of Commons Select Committee on Immigration and Emigration. The 
Committee was not prepared to recommend restrictive immigration legislation at that 
time but, ‘contemplate[d] the possibility of such legislation becoming necessary in the 
future’, and felt that it would be necessary to ‘ascertain with greater accuracy, and 
more frequently than the decennial census provides, the number of aliens that remain 
in this country’. T h e s e  statistics collected by the Board of Trade were an important 
indication of the number of migrants who arrived in and departed Britain and were 
considered more accurate and up to date than the census. Yet the particular problems 
which were encountered during the collection of these statistics were problems that 
also had a partieular bearing on the sanitary authorities. Where migrants were lost 
statistically, they were also lost to sanitary surveillance.
Tomas Haycraft, ‘Alien Legislation and the Prerogative of the Crown', U iw  Quarterly Review,  vol. 
X in .  (1897), pp. 165-186, p. 165 & 170.
’■ Bill 55, 1898, [61 VtCT.], ‘A Bill to Regulate the Immigration of A liens’.
Times', May 24, 1898, p. 8a.
Aliens Registration Act, 1836, |6. WILL. IVj.
Report from  the Select Committee on Emigration and Immigration (Foreigners),  ( I 889). p. xi.
182
The Master of each vessel which arrived in a British port^^ was required to submit a 
list of all ‘aliens’ on board. According to the statute he was obliged to include 
‘Christian’ name, surname, profession, sex, and native c o u n try .A n  officer of the 
Customs Service who counted the aliens and checked the details recorded by the 
Master verified this information in around one in ten c a s e s .T h e  most important 
information statistically, and the one which caused the greatest discussion, related to 
whether or not the migrants were ‘stated to be en route’. This information formed the 
basis of the Board of Trade statistics, so important in the immigration debate, that 
indicated the number of aliens who remained in Britain and those destined to travel on 
to America or another country, ie. entering Britain on a strictly temporary basis. The 
numbers of migrants ‘en route’ and remaining were determined by the number of 
alien passengers who could on arrival produce ‘through’ tickets to places outside the 
United Kingdom, and those who could not. Those who could were ‘stated to be en 
route’ and those who could not were ‘not stated to be en route’. As the Deputy 
Comptroller-General of the Board of Trade declared in evidence to the Royal 
Commission on Alien Immigration, the production of a through ticket was the sole 
method used to determine these figures because ‘there is no such thing as a statistic of 
intention. There must be some fact to go by’.^  ^Thus only those who could produce a 
through ticket were recorded as being transmigrants while every other migrant 
disembarking in a British port was recorded as an immigrant intent on remaining in 
Britain.
This was the fundamental flaw in the statistics produced by the Board of Trade 
relating to immigrant and transmigrant numbers. Firstly, the statistics did not account 
for those migrants who had arranged with their agents to collect an onward ticket 
from a correspondent in Britain; and secondly, as pointed out by one of the Royal
Ports at which Aliens Lists were collected: Aberdeen, Belfast, Blyth, Bristol, Cardiff, Dover, Dublin. 
Folkestone, Glasgow, Goole, Grangemouth, G ran ton, Greenock, Grimsby, Harwich, Hull, Kirkcaldy, 
Leith, Liverpool, London, Middlesbrough, Newcastle, Newhaven, Newport. North Sheilds, South 
Shields, Southampton, Sunderland, West Hartlepool. RCA!, Appendix to Minute.s o f  Evidence, vol. III. 
|Cd. 1741-1], Appendix IV.
Evidence o f  H.Llewellyn-Smith, Deputy Comptroller-General. Board of Trade, RCAi, Minutes of 
Evidence,  159.
In Llewellyn-Smith’s evidence it was stated that an Officer of the Customs boards every vessel from 
Hamburg, Bremen, Rotterdam, and Libua -  the major Continental migration ports for East Europeans, 
ibid. 146. 
ibid. 155.
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Commission, steamship tickets bore no identification of ownership, therefore they 
could be exchanged and used for the purposes of the Alien list more than once/"
The patterns which emerge from the statistics clearly demonstrate that tickets 
determined figures in the Aliens List. The Northern ports of Hull, Grimsby and Leith 
generally accommodated the ‘package’ passages of steamship companies which 
worked in association with the railways in transporting migrants across Britain to 
West coast ports where vessels were waiting to sail across the Atlantic. Passengers 
who arrived in these Northern ports usually possessed a ticket paid through to the 
United States for which Britain was only part of a larger single journey."^' Such 
transmigration ‘packages’ were rarely available through London, and thus smaller 
numbers arrived in London who could be recorded as ‘stated to be en route’. In 1895, 
for example, the Board of Trade recorded 13,413 aliens who arrived into London as 
‘not stated to be en route’ and only 141 as ‘stated to be en route’. In contrast 2,289 
were ‘not stated to be en route’ in Hull and 23,376 displayed the through tickets 
which classified them as ‘en route’. Similarly in 1902, London recorded 33,046 ‘not 
stated to be en route’ and only 14 ‘en route’, while Hull reported 2,540 and 70,082 
respectively."^^ The Board of Trade were aware, however, that some migrants 
statistieally recorded in London as ‘not stated to be en route’ did actually leave Britain 
shortly after arrival."^^
There was one major cause of a dramatic distortion in the Board of Trade statistics. It 
also had an important impact on the sanitary surveillance of migrants. During the 
second half of the 1890s"^ "^  nine of the major transatlantic shipping companies -  Allan 
Line, Allan State Line, American Line (Liverpool -  Philadelphia), American Line 
(Southampton -  New York), Anchor Line, Beaver Line, Cunard Line, Dominion Line 
and the White Star Line agreed a minimum fare scale for passage to the United 
States from the Continent. The arrangement, called the North Atlantic Conference, 
was intended to stop competitive pricing ‘with a view to raising the fares, which at
itiid. 167-168.
See Evans, European Migration via the United Kingdom.
RCA!, Appendix, T A BLE V.
Ldevveilyn-Smith, Minutes o f  Evidence, RCA!, 122-130.
The precise date on which the arrangement was entered into is unclear.
Letter from PJTS to Board o f  Deputies, Nov. 8, 1898, LMA A CC /3121/302/01 /003 ,
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one time sunk down to about 26s’/"  The £3 profit made from each transatlantic 
steerage ticket from the Continent was thereafter pooled and divided among the 
constituent companies. At the end of 1898 the price of a steerage class journey from 
the Continent to the United States was fixed at £7 .15s for Europeans travelling to the 
United States. However, if the ticket was purchased in London after having taken a 
separate journey from Hamburg to London, for instance, passage to the United States 
only cost £ 5 .16s. This fare was only available to purchase in Britain and was 
restricted to British residents. There was a saving to be made of around £2 by taking 
this latter r o u te .T h e  same was true in 1903 when evidence was taken at the Royal 
Commission on Alien Immigration. By then the price for a voyage from a Continental 
to an American port was £8 .10s., while the price for a ticket from London was only 
£5 .10s., plus the 15s. to 24s. required for the journey from Hamburg or Bremen to 
London."^^ In order to make sure that Continental steerage passengers travelled direct 
from the Continent, thus providing the £3 profit from their tickets to the pool, 
passengers booking with any of the North Atlantic Conference companies were 
unable to purchase a ticket from an English port to America, unless they had been 
resident in Britain for at least five weeks. In terms of the Conference, this period 
officially constituted British residency and thus classified a migrant as an ‘English 
passenger’.
Hardly fool-proof, the system ensured that a great deal of fraud took place to secure 
the cheaper fare. Emigration agents operating in Europe sold migrants tickets to 
London and advised them to declare that Britain was their intended destination. This 
was then entered with their name and nationality in the Board of Trade’s Alien List as 
‘not stated to be en route’. The agent then advised the migrant to temporarily change 
his or her name, declare that he or she had been resident in Britain for any period over 
five weeks and then purchase a ticket from the agent’s correspondent in Britain which 
would take them from London or another British departure port to the United States. 
Thus, the migrant would have been registered on the Aliens List as immigrating into 
Britain. At the same time the migrant gave information to the Port Sanitary Authority 
about his or her intended address in Britain. He or she would then depart, under a
I ..and au, HCAI, Minutes o f  Evidence, (16285).
t.et 1er from the Board o f  Deputies to the Board of Trade, late 1898 (draft letter, undated). 
LMA ACC/3 12 1/B 02/01/00,3.
Landau. RCAI, Minutes o f  Evidence,  (16286).
185
different name, for the United States within hours or days of arriving, stating that he 
or she had been resident in Britain for over five weeks, and indeed often stating 
periods of up to two y e a rsC o n se q u e n tly , as the Board of Deputies and the Poor 
Jews’ Temporary Shelter argued, the figures recorded by the Board of Trade for the 
Aliens List, and used by those wishing to impose restrictions on immigration to 
demonstrate the ‘alarming’ and increasing number of immigrants arriving into Britain 
every year, grossly misrepresented the number of migrants who entered the country 
and stayed.
The Board of Trade attempted to compensate for the discrepancies caused by 
migrants’ attempts to defraud the North Atlantic Conference. They compiled yearly 
statistics relating to the number of migrants whose name was noticed to occur both on 
the Alien list and on lists compiled of departing emigrants.
TABLE V:
YEAR Not Stated To Be En 
Route
Stated to Be En Route Ascertained to be en 
Route in Addition to 
Aliens List
1893 31,056 79,518 420
1894 28,682 35,512, 2,166
1895 30,528 44,637 2,074
1896 35,448 40,036 2,961
1897 38,851 32,221 2,676
1898 40,785 32,177 2,336
1899 50,884 49,947 2,889
1900 62,505 71,682 3,972
1901 55,464 79,140 3,879
1902 66,471 118,478 *7,964
* Provisional figure, subject to slight amendment 
Appendix to Minutes o f Evidence, RCAI, TABLES V & VII 50
ibid. (16284-16288 & 16410-16414); and Letter, late 1898, LMA A CC /312 1/B 02/01/003.
RCAI, Appendix,  TABLE VII titled, ‘Statement o f  the number o f  aliens ascertained to have been en 
route to places out o f  the United Kingdom... in addition to those described in the Aliens List'. I he 
figures represented in both TABLE V & VII represent all migrants to all British ports. In I ABLE V 
these figures are also broken down to represent London, Grimsby, Hull, Tyne Ports, Leith and 
Grangemouth, Newhaven and Dover. Similarly, the different nationalities ol the migrants are broken 
down with regard to the number not s tated to he en route. These arc: Russians and Poles; Norwegians,  
Swedes and Danes; Germans; Dutch; French; Austrians and Hungarians; Italians; Roumanians; Other 
Nationalities.
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However, the number of migrants ‘ascertained to be en route in addition to the Aliens 
List’ only represented those migrants whose name was noticed on departure to 
correspond with one recorded on the arrivals list. These migrants probably departed 
for the United States on one of the few non North Atlantic Conference vessels which 
sold steerage tickets to European migrants from British ports. These migrants had not 
chosen to change their names. Because of the conditions imposed by the Conference 
few who purchased an onward ticket to the United States within five weeks would not 
have changed their names. The figures represented in the table above only represent 
migrants who kept their name and who happened to be recognised by a Customs 
officer on departure. No systematic cross-referencing took place.
We do not attempt to trace the correspondence of names until the officer of 
Customs has stated that he has reason to believe them to be going on. We 
never attempt to compare the alien list as a whole with the passenger outward 
list as a whole. W e should probably find a great many more correspondences 
if we did.^'
In 1902, for example, the 12% initially ‘not stated to be en route’, who were later 
recorded by the Board of Trade to have departed for ‘other countries’, represented 
only a small percentage of those actually departed, as a majority hid their identity in 
order to defraud the North Atlantic Conference.
The Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Poor Jews Temporary Shelter were 
aware of the methods migrants engaged in in order to obtain a less expensive ticket to 
America. Similarly aware of how these methods distorted official statistics relating to 
the number of immigrants who remained in Britain, these organisations wrote to the 
Board of Trade to rectify the inaccuracies. However, their calculations were only 
based on approximations and figures they derived from the Board of Trade. The 
alternative figures provided by these Jewish organisations related specifically to East 
European Jews. Religion was not recorded by the Board of Trade and nationality was 
the only indication of religious affiliation. Russian or Polish ‘Hebrew’ was, however, 
often used. It is thus difficult to determine the accuracy of Jewish organisations’
W w c W y n - S m k h ,  M i n u t e s  o f  E v i d e n c e ,  R C A I ,  1 2 3 .
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figures as nationality^^ was also not always analysed separately in the statistics 
produced by the Board of Trade. Thus the figure of 1,700, estimated to be the number 
of migrants who remained in England [sic] in 1898 in excess of ‘foreigners’ recorded 
to have left, is impossible to verify. The Poor Jews’ Temporary Shelter insisted that 
although this might be an accurate figure for the number of East Europeans recorded 
to have remained, they argued that because an estimated 30,000 migrants departed 
England registered under false names, and as such as ‘English residents’, there was an 
actual deficit of 28,300 migrants for the year 1898, rather than a 1,700 in c re a s e .Y e t 
it was also impossible to know, they argued, of more than one case in ten and the 
numbers represented by the Board of Trade were more misleading than was initially 
apparent.
The result [of the fraud] is most serious and makes the Board of Trade Returns
54of the number of foreigners leaving England absolutely inaccurate.
The distortion of immigrant statistics was the primary and most important 
consequence of the fraud. These statistics were paraded by the anti-alien campaign to 
demonstrate the extent of the ‘influx’ and was a substantial piece of evidence against 
unrestricted immigration. Another consequence of the fraud however, was that the 
sanitary authorities were less able to maintain a surveillance over migrants. When 
migrants presented false names and destinations they undermined the ability of 
sanitary authorities to monitor passengers from infected ports or vessels. However, 
the ‘disappearance’ of the migrants was a response not to the requirements of the 
sanitary system but to the fixed pricing of the North Atlantic Conference on passage 
from the Continent to the United States.
As religion was not recorded at this stage one must assume that migrants from ‘Russian and Poland 
were, on the whole Jewish refugees fleeing from the Pale of Settlement and the restrictive laws relating 
to Jews there.
Letter from the Board o f  Deputies to the Board of Trade, late 1898 (tirai t letter, undated),
LMA A C C /3 121/602/01/003.  
ibid.
See Hawkey, Customs Officer, Minutes o f  Evidence, RCAI, 1422-1554
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The Royal Commission on Alien Immigration
Immigration restriction was an issue which, although crossing party lines, was 
dominated by Conservative politicians. Two main organisations provided the link 
between popular opinion - ‘the public’ - and government; the British Brothers’
League (BBL) and the Londoners’ League (LL). Both were closely linked to the 
Conservative Party through their leadership and initial membership. The LL, 
established in 1901 following a meeting of the East London Conservative 
Association, discussed housing problems associated with the increased immigrant 
population in London’s East End. It was formed to lobby the government for the 
introduction of restrictive immigration legislation^" and, as The Times reported in 
1901,
for the purpose o f collecting information and organising interest and opinion 
upon subjects of importance to South and East London, and it represents... 17 
constituencies, which together contain nearly 150,000 electors and a million 
and a half inhabitants."^
The BBL, formed on February 25, 1901, was ‘founded officially with great publicity 
on 9 May, 1901, at Stepney Meeting House’.M e m b e rsh ip  was drawn from the East 
End and the Conservative Party ‘so that at its inaugural meeting it could claim the 
support of East End Conservative MPs such as Spencer Carrington (Mile End), 
Murray Guthrie (Bow), Thomas Dewar (Tower Hamlets), and Major W illiam Eden 
Evans-Gordon (Stepney)’. The last of whom the Eastern Post and City Chronicle 
claimed had, ‘no small share in the formation of the league’.""
The main objection to immigration among Conservatives was that the immigrants 
damaged the ‘nation’s health and efficiency’. The issue of immigration restriction
Feldman, Englishmen and Jews,  p. 91.
Times, Aug. I, 1901 p. 2f.
Holmes, Anti-Semitism,  (1979) p. 89.
Published, N ov 9, 1901, from ibid.
Evans-Gordon served in the Foreign Department o f  the Government ol'India from 1876-1897. In the 
General election o f  1900 he became a Member o f  Parliament for the Stepney Division of Tower  
Hamlets. ‘With a view to obtaining information at first hand on the subject lo f  immigration] he made 
lour to the Jewries o f  Eastern Europe, visiting St. Petersburg, Dwinsk, Riga, Liban, and W ilna’. He was 
knighted in 1905. ‘Obituary’, Times, Nov. 11, 1913, p. l id .
Feldman, Englishmen an d  Jews,  (1994) p. 287.
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was an issue which could cross party lines and class, as its foundations were rooted in 
ideas of home and country - unified against ‘the other’. However, the non- 
parliamentary individuals within the leadership of the BBL and LL, such as J.L.Silver 
and William Stanley Shaw, objected to the political aim of using the issue of 
immigration to increase Conservative Party membership and support and which 
threatened to push East End politics in a more radical direction. Shaw claimed that the 
‘politicians refused to support me unless I became a tool in their hands’,"' and he 
resigned as President of the BBL.
At its first annual general meeting the BBL claimed to have a membership of 12,000, 
but its support was even greater as a BBL petition in 1902 amassed 45,000 signatures 
in favour of its demands. Two massive public meetings of over 4000 people at the 
Peoples’ Palace, the first in January 1902 under the auspices of the BBL and the 
second in November 1903 under the LL, demonstrated the growing popular support in 
London for the restriction of immigration. Drawing on the increasing pressure of 
popular activity in the East End, Conservatives such as Evans-Gordon and S.F. Ridley 
(Bethnal Green), argued in Parliament for reform. A deputation of the LL met with 
the Home Secretary, the President of the Board of Trade and the President of the 
Local Government Board, impressing on the three gentlemen the ‘urgent need of 
legislation with reference to overcrowding in South and East London and to the 
constantly increasing influx of pauper aliens’."  ^Evans- Gordon was present and 
together with two other Conservative Members of Parliament, Guthrie and Cust, the 
demands of the League were presented. The deputation received a sympathetic 
hearing and was assured that the matter would be supported and presented to both 
Cabinet and at the next Session of Parliament.
In January 1902 the BBL made several requests to Gerald Balfour, President of the 
Board of Trade, to receive a deputation to discuss alien immigration. After several 
letters Balfour replied.
Dear Sirs, - In reply to your letter of yesterday’s date on the subject of alien
immigration, I beg to inform you that 1 have been in communication with
Major Evans-Gordon, from whom you will no doubt hear in due course. It is
ibid, 288.
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proposed to raise the question in an amendment to the Address, and, for the 
present, at all events, I do not think any public purpose would be served by 
receiving the proposed deputation.
Indeed, on the January 1902, The Times reported a speech made to Parliament by 
Evans-Gordon in which he expressed great disappointment that no mention of alien 
immigration had been made in the King’s speech at the opening of Parliament. He 
emphasised that alien immigration had become a prominent and ‘urgent’ issue which 
required ‘legislation to regulate and restrict the immigration of destitute aliens into 
London and other cities in the United Kingdom’. A s  MP for Stepney, he pressed the 
issue of overcrowding and unemployment, but he also stressed that as ‘the American 
law was going to be strengthened ... it was a mathematical certainty ... that the flow 
must go down the channels that were open. There was only one channel really open 
now, and that was the channel which led to these shores’. H e  argued that the desire 
to regulate was based entirely on ‘social and economic grounds’, and that any claims 
that anti-alien movements were motivated by anti-Semitism was unfounded.
1 know it has been said by some people that this is a racial question, and that 
we are trying to stir up anti-Semitic feeling. I will not detain the House going 
into such a question. The reverse is the fact. No one deplores more than I do 
the attitude taken up by some foreign countries towards the Jew s...
It is unfortunate that the racial question should be introduced into the matter, 
but it is difficult for us to enlighten the uneducated classes of this country 
upon the subject. All they know is that they are being turned out of their 
homes and the neighbourhoods in which they are obliged to live, in order to 
carry on their work, and that their places are being taken by Russian and 
Polish Jews, and you cannot persuade them that it is not a racial question.
They naturally take a hatred to the Jewish people. It is for the Government to 
prevent that anti-Semitic feeling which, if something is not done to check the 
influx of aliens into this country, must inevitably result in an outbreak of very 
grave proportions.^’^’
Times, Aug. 1, 1901, p, 2f.
Times, Jan. 23, 1902, p. 71.
Times, Jan. 30, 1902. p. 5e.
ibid.
Han.sard, House o f  Commons Debates, Jan. 29, 1902 1101 j, 1283.
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He argued that the Anglo-Jewish community shared his beliefs and supported his call 
for restriction in attempting to stem the ‘grave risk of an anti-Semitic colour being 
imparted to this controversy’.^  ^ Yet, despite his claims to the contrary, Evans- 
Gordon’s anti-Semitism shone through in his frequent use of anti-Semitic imagery 
when illustrating a point. In explaining to the House of Commons, for example, why 
it was important to introduce national immigration legislation when the problems 
encountered with the immigration of East European Jews were confined to the East 
End of London, and while their numbers were so insignificant in relation to the rest of 
the British population,^® Evans-Gordon chose to employ an analogy with obvious 
overtones: ‘Ten grains of arsenic in 1000 loaves would be unnoticeable and perfectly 
harmless, but the same amount if put into one loaf would kill the whole family that 
partook of it’.^  ^Other examples of this tactic appeared in numerous speeches, and in 
his book, published in 1903, The Alien Immigrant, where he likened the ‘influx’ of 
immigrants to a plague o f locusts.^^ Evans-Gordon was committed to the anti-alien 
cause and the need to introduce immigration legislation, yet the issue could not be one 
of overt anti-Semitism. Although, anti-Semitism was often at the foundation of the 
anti-alien debate, expressions of overt anti-Semitism were not tolerated; indeed, the 
desire to quell an increase in anti-Semitism was an important factor in the decision to 
order a Royal Commission. Feldman argues that the Royal Commission on Alien 
Immigration was appointed in order to stem the growing agitation and anti-Semitism 
of the anti-alien movement roused by the BBL, LL and the popular East End press 
such as the East London O b s e r v e r Evans-Gordon was a central player in both in the 
Conservative Party and the BBL, acting as agitator and as conciliator. ‘It was largely 
due to his efforts that a Royal Commission, of which he was a member was appointed 
to consider the alien question’.
In January 1902, Evans-Gordon concluded an address to Parliament with the request:
ibid.
‘It may be argued that though the foreign population is large and increasing, it still remains small in 
proportion to the total population o f  London and insignificant in proportion to the population o f  the 
United Kingdom’. Hansard, Jan. 29, 1902 [101], 1274.
Hansard, 1274; Parallels may be drawn here with the ‘blood libel’ in which it was accused that the 
blood o f  murdered Christian children was used by Jews in the making oOnatzah  (unleavened bread 
eaten at Passover).
" w i l l ia m  Eden Evans-Gordon, The Alien Immigrant, (London: William Heinemann, 1903) p. 13.
' Eeldman, Englishmen an d  Jews,  p. 288.
“ ’Obituary Sir William Eden Evans-Gordon’, Times, Nov. 3, 1913, p. I Id.
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will they [the House] repeat the promises of legislation so often given, and, 
pending that legislation, will they appoint a Royal Commission to report, as 
early as possible, on what form a restrictive measure should take?^^
The request was seconded and ‘agreed to’.
Only one real objection to legislation was voiced to Parliament in response to Evans- 
Gordon. The President of the Board of Trade, Gerald Balfour, with whom both the 
BBL and the LL frequently communicated, foresaw no need to legislate, but 
welcomed further inquiry. Previous Bills attempted to mirror the American model of 
immigration legislation which restricted entry of individuals likely to become a public 
charge, a lunatic, or suffering from a contagious disease. He noted, however, that 
while these restrictions were strictly enforced in the United States, only one percent of 
those who arrived were refused entry. ‘It stood to reason that the great evils of 
immigration would not be removed in any measure by mere exclusion of persons 
suffering from disease who could not number more than a few hundred in the course 
of a year’.^ "^
It is of course possible (I do not wish to prejudice the inquiry) that the 
conclusion to which any Committee or Commission might arrive would be to 
show that these particular aliens could only be dealt with, not by restrictive 
provisions at the ports of entry, but by increasing the powers of the local 
authorities under the Public Health Acts.^^
Despite Balfour’s reservations. Parliament agreed to an inquiry into the ‘character and 
extent’ of immigration and on March 21, 1902 the Royal Commission was appointed. 
The task of the Royal Commission was to inquire into and report upon:
1) the character and extent of the evils which are attributed to the unrestricted 
immigration of aliens, especially in the metropolis;
Hansard, Jan. 29, 1902 f 1011, 1281. 
Tunes, Jan. 30, 1902, p. 5e.
’ Han.sard, Jan. 29, 1902 1101], 1288,
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2) the measures which have been adopted for the restriction and control of 
alien immigration in foreign countries and British colonies/'’
Lord James of Hereford (1828-1911), who had been Attorney-General 1873-4 and 
1892-5 was the Chairman of the Commission. The other members included; Lord 
Rothschild, banker and philanthropist, regarded as ‘the lay head of the [Anglo-Jewish] 
community’ Alfred Lyttleton, a lawyer and MP; Sir Kenelm Digby, an Under 
Secretary of State to the Home Office; Henry Norman MP; William Vallance, Clerk 
to the Guardians of Whitechapel; and Evans-Gordon.^®
The examination of 175 witnesses^^ began on April 14, 1902. Among the 175 were 
nine Medical Officers of Health, the Chief Sanitary Inspector of Bethnal Green, two 
Vaccination Officers, a Customs Examining Officer, and physicians specialising in 
ophthalmic medicine. All except D r Hope, Medical Officer of Health for Liverpool, 
and James Niven, Medical Officer of Health for Manchester, worked in London. Only 
one Port Medical Officer of Health was called to give evidence - Herbert Williams, of 
the Port of London.®° Investigations into the health threat posed by immigrants were 
undertaken with a particular focus upon the issue of overcrowding. Generally the
Report o f  the R C A f  vol. I, [Cd. 1741] p. v; also see The Times, March 22, 1902, p. 1 If.
‘Rothschild, Sir Nathan Meyer, 1840-1915’, DNB, 7 9 /2 - 7 9 2 / ,  p. 480  
F.E. Eddis was Secretary to the Commission.
Ail witnesses were classified under one o f  the following groups:
1. Census Authorities -  enumerators and the Registrar General, Reginald McLeod
2. Clergy -  including Rev. Stewart Headlam, then Chairman o f  the Evening Continuation Schools  
Committee: London School Board
3. Connected with Education -  including Head Masters and members o f  the School Board
4. Connected with the Jewish Board o f  Guardians and other Charitable Institutions -  including L, 
Cohen, President o f  the Jewish Board o f  Guardians.
5. Magisterial an d  Police -  mostly magistrates o f  police courts and high ranking police officers, one of 
which was from Manchester.
6. Manufacturers  -  representing the manufacturing industries most associated with immigrants, ie. 
shoe, cigarette, and clothes making. Tw o o f  the thirteen in this category were from Glasgow.
7. Cofifiected with the Mining Industry -  all five o f  whom were connected with the Lanarkshire /  West 
o f  Scotland coal mining industry.
8. Officials -  mediczA professionals and local government officials o f  various capacities, eg. Town  
Clerk, inland revenue, etc. Including Sheffield and Liverpool.
9. Workers in Sundry Trades in the East Etid -  tradesmen and small-scale retailers.
79. Representatives o f  Trades Unions -  including trades union representatives from Leeds and 
Sheffield.
77. Tradesmen in the East End -  from undertaker to umbrella-maker.
72. Witness not Specially  Classified -  including, for example: a midwife, the Mayor ot Reading, agents 
o f  shipping companies, publishers, authors, Zionists, architects, local residents, the Ex-Mayor ol 
Reading, an insurance agent, Ex-Deputy Chairman o f  the British Brothers’ League, and a ’Distressed 
English Jew’.
Williams succeeded Collingridge as Medical Officer o f  Health for the Port ol London in 1901, and 
held the post until 1916.
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examination of Medical Officers of Health, Sanitary Officers, and Vaccination 
Officers concerned overcrowding and the laws and bye-laws which legislated for its 
prevention. Questions directed at Medical witnesses initially focused not so much on 
their professional opinions and observations of medical and sanitary issues associated 
with immigrants, but on their opinions and observations of the current Registered 
Tenement Houses By e-Law under the Public Health (London) Act 1891 and the laws 
which enabled sanitary authorities to deal with overcrowding. Via this line of inquiry 
the housing and sanitary conditions of both the newly arrived, ‘green’, and more 
established immigrants were extensively described, and their health and lifestyle 
illuminated in detail.
Although a majority of evidence taken with regard to the health of immigrants was 
concerned with their health and living conditions once they had settled in London’s 
East End as well as Liverpool, Manchester and Glasgow, the Commission also 
gathered evidence regai'ding the condition of immigrants on arrival. This reflected the 
allegations made ‘in respect of these Alien Immigrants’, which focused primarily on 
economic issues but which also claimed
that on arrival they are (a) in an impoverished and destitute condition, (b) 
deficient in cleanliness, and practice insanitary habits, (c) and being subject to 
no medical examination on embarkation or arrival, are liable to introduce 
infectious diseases.®*
Since only one Port Medical Officer of Health was questioned, with limited enquiry 
made of the other medical professionals about health and disease at the ports, the 
issue was not deemed to be as central an issue in British immigration as urban health 
and overcrowding. The evidence presented to the Commission regarding the health of 
immigrants on arrival and the occurrence of infectious disease amongst them revealed 
that although generally unclean, the migrants did not present any great threat of 
infection. What was most evident in the testimony of the medical professionals 
involved with immigrant arrivals was the notion that with greater authority, the Port 
Sanitary Authority, co-operating with the local Sanitary Authorities would be able to 
ensure that immigrants posed no threat at all. All that was required, they argued, was
Report o f  the RCA/, p. 3 itcin 38.
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more complete authority to detain vessels other than those suspected of carrying 
‘exotic’ disease and to enforce a minimum standard of health and cleanliness in 
steerage accommodation.
One of the problems which most concerned the Commission was that if there was ‘no 
suspicion or whisper of any epidemic or disease’,®^ the Port Medical Officer would 
not board a vessel, nor would he inspect any of the passengers or crew. The Medical 
Officer would only board in the case of vessels arriving from ports known to be 
infected with ‘epidemic’ disease, or in cases when there was a positive reply to the 
question, ‘Any sickness?’. As there was a Port Medical Officer on duty 24 hours a 
day in London, on board the Customs launch which met the arrival of all vessels, he 
would be able to immediately attend any case of sickness which was reported.®^ 
However, since the cessation of the General Cholera Order in 1895 there were no 
special powers relating to the inspection or observation of ‘aliens’. Also since the 
abolition of the Quarantine Act, any special powers which the Port Sanitary Officer 
had obtained with regard to the enforced halting and detaining of vessels, applied only 
to cases known or suspected to be cholera, yellow fever or plague. ‘Exotic’ disease 
remained distinctive from ‘indigenous’ infectious disease in the operation of port 
health, and retained with it particular jurisdiction.
7030. (Chairman) You board in order to find whether there are infectious 
diseases on board? -  (Williams) We only board and inspect everyone on board 
when they come from places where there are exotic diseases.
7031. It is the question of exotic diseases and the class of diseases that come 
from specific ports; but is has nothing to do with alien immigrants? -  No, not 
per
It was not the authority to board and examine all immigrants that Williams, as 
representative of the Port Sanitary Authority, suggested to the commission, but rather 
the extension to all serious infectious diseases such as smallpox, .scarlet fever, measles 
and diphtheria, of those powers which related only to ‘exotic’ diseases. He argued that
Es'idence o f  Thomas Hawkey, Examining Officer of Customs, London. Minures o f  Evidence, RCAJ. 
1398. 
iliid. 1387-1403.
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although smallpox, for example, was an ‘indigenous’ disease, the last serious 
epidemic which occurred in England had, without doubt, been imported from Paris 
the previous June or July. ‘That seems to me an example of how a disease existing in 
this country in a slight form might be added to or the effect increased by introduction 
from abroad’.®^
The evidence given to the Royal Commission reveals that the shaip distinction 
between the treatment of ‘indigenous’ and ‘exotic’ infectious disease continued to 
limit the powers of the Port Medical Officers of Health, as it had in the days of 
Quarantine. Although they now had jurisdiction over cholera, yellow fever, and 
plague, the Port Sanitary Authority remained bound to remnants of the old system and 
continued to operate with one set of rules for one disease and one set for another. The 
power to order a vessel to ‘come to ’, and most important to the Port Medical Officer 
of Health, the authority to detain a vessel on his own discretion, only applied to cases 
of ‘exotic’ disease. The powers of the Medical Officer were limited in cases of 
‘indigenous’ disease, in comparison to those he possessed for ‘exotic’ disease. He 
could not detain a vessel on the mere suspicion of smallpox, for example; rather the 
master, a layman, would have to report an illness first -  a case of cold or lumbago 
often indicating the onset of an infection such as smallpox®'’ -  before an inspection 
could take place. The Medical Officer could not detain a vessel in order to inspect the 
passengers when no illness had been reported or the ship had sailed from a port which 
was not infected with an ‘exotic’ disease. The inspection of immigrants, merely 
because they belonged to a certain class, was nowhere accommodated for under the 
law.
Williams made the point that his role was to inspect vessels coming from an infected 
port or where a case of illness had been reported; beyond this he did not have the 
‘power to inspect with regards to individuals’.®^ Thus, unless immigrants arrived on a 
vessel that fit either of the above two categories, the Port Medical Officer of Health 
could and would not examine them. Even if they arrived in a ‘filthy and unwholesome 
condition’ covered with vermin, without illness there would be no inspection. 
Williams explained that vermin were neither particular to migrants -  ‘our soldiers in
ibid. 6241.  
ibid. 6092-3.  
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South Africa’,®® for example, were infested with vermin -  nor were lice an ‘exotic’ 
disease.®^ The responsibility of the Port Sanitary Authority was to prevent the 
importation of infectious diseases, not to ensure the general health and cleanliness of 
persons entering the port. He suggested to the Commission that if it wished to 
improve the health of migrants arriving into the United Kingdom, then the regulations 
relating to sanitation on board British vessels, legislated for under the Merchant 
Shipping Act, 1894, should be extended to foreign vessels arriving in Britain. Since 
the cholera epidemic of 1892 the conditions on German and Dutch vessels had greatly 
improved. However the condition on board vessels from Liban, the main ‘Russian’ 
departure port,^*  ^remained ‘abominable’. In 1902, according to Board of Trade 
statistics 34,918 aliens^* arrived in Britain from ‘Russian ports’, which was generally 
translated as Libau.^^ Not only were the conditions highly unsanitary but, in order to 
maximise profits, migrants were crammed, for the duration of the three to four day 
journey, in the tightly overcrowded lower decks of the vessels.
On the 2L^ May [1902] the SS. Hengest [sic] of Aarhuus, from Libau, arrived 
at Gravesend with 171 Russian immigrants. The vessels left Libau on the 17^ *’ 
May. The immigrants were carried in the main ’tween decks ... an area of 2.3 
square feet only per head being available... The quarters occupied by the 
immigrants were in a filthy condition, the floors being strewn with all kinds of 
refuse, and offensive liquid from the horses carried on the same deck had 
leaked through into these quarters. No attempt had been made at cleansing this 
space since the vessel had left Libau. Two temporary closets were provided, 
and both were used indiscriminately by the sexes. The only ventilation 
provided was by means of the bunker hatchways, and by two 12-inch 
ventilators, one of which was without a cowl, and closed.
Such conditions, he argued, presented the greatest threat to the public health in Britain 
and increased the possibility of imported infectious disease. Williams recommended 
two solutions to the problem. Firstly, that a medical inspection of all persons on board
ibid. 6145. 
ibid. 6165.
Libau was the Lat\'ian port also known as Liepaja.
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ships bound for Britain should be undertaken at the port of departure, similar to 
United States procedure; and secondly, that the sanitary condition on board foreign 
vessels^"* should be brought under the standards of ‘English’ law. In these ways the 
health risk of migrants arriving into British ports could be minimised.
Yet, as both the Chairman and Evans-Gordon pointed out, the conditions on board 
foreign vessels were outside British jurisdiction. ‘Clearly our jurisdiction’, Lord 
Hereford remarked, ‘would come in as not allowing the reception of people, but that 
penalty would fall heavily on the immigrants. They would have to stop on board, or 
go back’.^  ^Evans-Gordon, who had examined the American legislation, believed that 
carrier liability had greatly improved conditions on board vessels bound for the 
United States. He suggested that the ability to refuse entry to Britain ‘would have a 
further effect on the condition of the ship, because they would not bring them ’.^  ^
Williams indeed conceded that by prohibiting the landing of filthy aliens, the 
conditions under which they travelled and therefore their condition on arrival would 
probably be improved. However, he remarked that uncleanliness and vermin could 
easily be remedied by washing and disinfecting their bodies and clothes, and that 
ultimately, in his experience, aliens did not pose any particular or increased threat of 
infection.^®
Generally all the medical witnesses who gave evidence to the Commission, related 
that in their experience immigrants were no more harm to the public health than the 
native population of the same class. Although they lived in overcrowded and 
unsanitary conditions, on board the vessels which they arrived in and in their 
dwellings once they had settled in Britain, immigrants generally displayed better 
results than the native population of the same class in population health indicators 
such as infant mortality, height and weight. What required reform, they repeated one 
after the other, was the authority of the Sanitary Authorities. Increase the power of the 
Medical Officer, they argued, and the perceived health problem presented by 
immigrants would be satisfactorily addressed. This argument did not pertain to the
”  Williams, Minutes o f  Evidence, R C A I , 6176.
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problem of overcrowding that medical officers frequently pointed out, although this 
was a problem that they acknowledged existed even without immigration. With few 
exceptions the evidence the London, Liverpool and Manchester Medical Officers and 
professionals gave stressed that the core concerns of the Commission relating to 
health were not specific to the alien but were ‘really a question of surroundings -  
poverty, and so forth’
The most extreme position on the non-distinction of aliens from the native ‘English’ 
population was adopted by the most senior Medical Officer summoned to the 
Commission, Dr Shirley Murphy (1848-1923), the Medical Officer of Health for the 
Administrative County of London. He had been a member of the Royal Commission 
on Tuberculosis 1901, and was the medical witness most extensively examined by the 
1902-3 Royal Commission. He was thoroughly questioned about overcrowding and 
the sanitary conditions of immigrants in the East End of London as well as in the port. 
The Commission asked him the unusually direct question: did he believe that anyone 
should be refused entry on the grounds of poor health? Murphy rigidly maintained, 
despite a barrage of challenges from Henry Norman, that any person, regardless of 
nationality, should be treated equally. If an alien arrived into the Port of London with 
any infectious disease, he ought to be taken to Denton and treated for the disease in 
the same way as an Englishman would be treated; and once recovered he should be 
free to go, as would the Englishman. He unequivocally opposed the refusal of entry 
upon medical grounds.
5011. (Norman) Do you, as the sanitary authority, see any reason, or not, for 
excluding on arrival a person whose physical condition would be such as to 
render him an undesirable member of the community? -  (Murphy) If he is 
going to be a source of danger to the community, I should put him under 
restrictions on arriving here, that is to say, if the law would apply to similar 
people in this country -  people suffering from the same malady.
5012. (Norman) What sort of disease would you put under these restrictions, 
which is not an exotic disease? -  (Murphy) Smallpox and scarlet fever, tor 
instance; people suffering from these diseases are not allowed to mix with 
other patients.
Evidence nf Edward Hope, Medical Officer o f  Health for Liverpool, Miruties o f  Evidence, RCA!,
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5025. (Norman) You realise that many people coming in in this condition 
would naturally become a public charge? -  (Murphy) If, as the result of 
enquiry, some national danger can be shown by numbers of people coming 
over here, something different from what we already know of these diseases 
now, no doubt the point would have to be considered on its own merits, but I 
am speaking of these things as we see them, and in such a proportion as we 
know them to exist at the present.
The isolation and observation of people with infectious disease, as opposed to 
restrictions which implied a ‘dangerous’ interference ‘ with people’s liberty’,'*^ ' was 
the foundation of the sanitary system -  the ‘English system’. As previously discussed, 
this system had developed over the second half of the nineteenth century in opposition 
to the interference of liberty imposed by quarantine, and M urphy’s testimony 
reflected his belief in this as the essence of the British sanitary system. The basis of 
the ‘Sanitation versus Quarantine’ debate throughout the nineteenth century, at the 
International Sanitary Conferences, and prior to the abolition of quarantine in Britain 
was that,
the Government ... depend for their safety upon the rational system of medical 
inspection at the ports and the first line of defence, and upon the maintenance 
of an increasingly high standard of sanitation throughout the length and 
breadth of the land for the second line of defence in the event of the first line 
being broken through.'**^
Murphy expressed the essential axiom on which the Port Sanitary System was 
developed and which fundamentally differentiated it from quarantine. It held that 
regardless of the disease, or its origin, the same rational system of medical inspection, 
isolation of the infected and unobtrusive observation of the healthy by internal 
sanitary authorities was sufficient to provide a comprehensive barrier to the 
importation and spread of infection. By highlighting this modus operandi Murphy
21466.
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illuminated the inconsistency that medical restriction of immigration at the ports had 
after over thirty years of the ‘English system’. The physical exclusion of aliens in the 
proposed restriction of immigration was a counterpart to the physical exclusion of 
infected vessels enforced by quarantine. This time, however, exclusion was not based 
upon particular ‘exotic’ diseases but had been replaced by a particular ‘exotic’ class 
of people. Just as Sanitarians of the previous century had argued that ‘exotic’ disease 
could be assailed with the same stratagem as ‘indigenous’ disease, M uiphy reasoned 
that the ‘exotic’ immigrant could be treated in the same way as the ‘indigenous’ 
population.
The authority of the Port Sanitary Authority to act upon cases of ‘exotic’ disease did 
not apply to cases of ‘indigenous’ disease, and the Commission argued that 
consequently ‘indigenous’ disease among ‘filthy aliens’ was capable of slipping 
through the first and second lines of defence. In response, Williams and M uiphy 
proposed that the powers granted to them after the abolition of quarantine with respect 
to ‘exotic’ disease, such as the authority to stop a vessel and detain it for medical 
inspection, should be extended to ‘indigenous’ disease. In this way practices similar to 
those conducted during the cholera epidemic could become the general practice. Any 
infection, such as measles, found present among a group of immigrants could be 
isolated. The remaining passengers could be kept under observation at the discretion 
of the Port Sanitary Authority, until they were released to the local Sanitary Authority 
of the district into which they moved.
How would such diseases be classified? At the time of the Commission these 
particular and ‘absolute’ powers only applied to cholera, yellow fever, and plague. 
What ‘indigenous’ diseases would be included if the jurisdiction of the Port Sanitary 
Authority were extended? Williams believed that complete authority to inspect and 
detain, and the other powers particular to ‘exotic’ disease, should be applied to 
possible cases of smallpox, scarlet fever, measles and diphtheria, but not whooping 
cough or vermin, for example. Murphy also included smallpox, scarlet fever and 
syphilis, on the understanding that foreigners should be isolated under the same 
conditions as would a member of the ‘native’ population, but he would exclude from
‘I have atisolute power when there is exotic disease,’ Williams, Minutes o f  Evidence, RCAI, 6082. 
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the list ‘ophthalmia’ (trachoma),'***’ and consumption (tuberculosis),'***’ as members of 
the ‘native’ population suffering from either of these diseases were not legally 
required to be isolated.
Trachoma, following the American example, was given a key role in the 
investigations of the Commission in relation to health. During the examination of a 
number of witnesses the enquiry would return to the question: ‘Should you say that 
the alien population is more subject to [trachoma] than the native?’'**^ Generally the 
reply was negative.
4706. (Vallance) I should like to ask whether in your practice as medical
officer you have found in visiting that children of the alien poor suffer more
from ophthalmic diseases than the children of the native poor? -  (Loane)
Proportionally to the population, I do not think so; that is not my 
108impression.
The issue of trachoma among alien immigrants was so important to the Commission 
that evidence was taken from two ophthalmic experts: William Lang, President of the 
Ophthalmological Society of the United Kingdom, and Francis Tyrrell, Surgical 
Officer to the Royal London Ophthalmic Hospital and Medical Officer to the London 
School Board. Although Tyrrell, following receipt of a letter he sent explaining his 
work to the Commission, was summoned to give evidence, Lang volunteered to speak 
before the Commission in order, specifically, to refute the testimony of Tyrrell.
Tyrrell claimed, when called before the Commission in May 1902, that granular 
ophthalmia -  trachoma - was a disease particularly prevalent in the alien population 
and the restrictive laws focusing upon the disease in America had, along with the 
general uncleanliness of the alien population, exacerbated the problem in London. He 
stated that the Jewish Board of Guardians had sent him aliens suffering from 
trachoma who had been returned from the United States for this reason. The aliens 
had travelled directly from the Continent to America but had been returned to Britain
Murphy, Minutes o f  Evidence, RCAI, 50! 3-5. 
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in order to be treated for the disease before attempting to re-enter the United States.'**** 
He claimed that cases of the disease among the native population had risen since the 
arrival of the aliens and that, ‘the Jewish people are peculiarly prone to trachoma’."** 
Lang, who gave his evidence a year later, in May 1903, informed the Commission 
that contrary to Tyrrell’s view, trachoma was a curable disease and it ‘is not peculiar 
to Jews at all; it is universal all over the world’."  ' It was a disease more dependant on 
conditions than on race and ‘the Jews, if they do bring it over, were not the originators 
of the disease; and they were not spreading it’."*^
The final report of the Commission was submitted on August 10, 1903, and Lang’s 
testimony, supported by the evidence of a majority of medical professionals who were 
examined, was reflected in it.
In consequence of the poor living resulting from poverty there are cases of 
children amongst the immigrants on arrival suffering from a disease called 
‘granular* ophthalmia’. This disease under certain conditions is contagious. It, 
however, appeared that the disease, which is found in the ranks of poor 
children generally, did not exist to an exceptional extent among the alien 
children, and no instance was alleged of the disease being communicated to 
them by others. At the same time the desirability of permitting people 
suffering from this contagious disease into this country has to be 
considered.""^
Thus, it was demonstrated to the Commission that aliens were not the source of 
trachoma among the poor, nor were they more likely to suffer from the disease than 
the native population of a similar class. However, in their final report the 
Commissioners did not object to the designation of trachoma sufferers as undesirable 
for entry into the United Kingdom. This conclusion, despite the evidence received to 
the contrary, together with the singling out of trachoma as the only infectious disease 
specifically commented upon in the report, demonstrated that another agenda was 
served by the disease. Trachoma, with its obvious visibility, had come to symbolise
Tyrrell, Minutes o f  Evidence, RCAI, 3671.I 10 ibid. 3679.
Lung, Minutes o f  Evidence, RCAI, 20590.  
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the ‘undesirable alien’ in the United States and under United States immigration law.
It had also, as a result, come to symbolise, as Tyrrell’s evidence demonstrated, a 
visible display of the fear that Britain was receiving migrants deemed unacceptable 
for entry to America. Although, as Williams had testified, under the present system 
smallpox among migrants was probably a greater public health t h r e a t , t r a c h o m a  had 
been imported from America as the symbolic manifestation of alien infection. It had 
become, as Market remarked with regard to the United States, ‘a powerful symbol of 
the threats of immigrant disease, dependency, and economic ruin against the body 
politic’."^
Although the Commission noted in its report that ‘in relation to health we feel that we 
ought to place reliance upon the testimony of Dr Herbert W illiams’, particularly his 
statement that I cannot say that much infectious disease has come into the country 
among these people’,"^  they recommended
such orders and regulations to include provision from medical examination of 
Alien Immigrants at port of arrival. In cases where an Immigrant is found to 
be suffering from infectious or loathsome disease, or mental incapacity, the 
medical officer to have power to debar such Immigrant from landing, and the 
shipowner to be compelled to re-convey the Immigrant to the port of 
embarkation."^
This, it was claimed, would have the ultimate effect not merely of excluding those 
deemed undesirable on medical grounds but would, in the first instance deter them, as 
in the United States, from attempting to enter and, most importantly, would act as a 
deterrent to shipping companies from carrying unhealthy passengers. It would also 
reduce overcrowding and unsanitary conditions on board passenger vessels. This 
reflected W illiams’ concerns, as did the recommendation ‘that further statutory 
powers should be obtained for regulating the accommodation upon and condition of 
foreign immigrant passenger ships’."® Yet, the recommendation to legislate against 
entry on medical grounds did not coincide at all with the majority of medical
Williams, Minutes o f  Evidence, RCAI, 6239. 
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testimony received by the Commission. Indeed, this did not go unnoticed by two 
members of the Commission, Kenelm Digby and Rothschild, who signed the report 
subject to a memorandum. Digby’s extended memorandum was seconded by 
Rothschild. He objected to ‘some of the recommendations’ of the Commission which 
he believed did not concur with either the evidence presented to the Commission, or 
the conclusions which had been unanimously reached by the Commissioners. Central 
to these objections was the recommendation to restrict entry on health grounds.
It has been proved in evidence as summarised in the Report, that there is very 
little illness amongst these immigrants, and that they are not found to have 
introduced any infectious or contagious disease. There is little or no evidence 
that lunatics come over with them, and the health of the immigrants after 
arrival here as proved by the Vital statistics given in evidence appears to be 
superior to that of the native population. No case therefore seems to have been 
made for any special measures for exclusion at the port of landing on the 
ground of health. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to have more definite and 
systematic inspection by sanitary officers, both of the ships in which the 
immigrants arrive, and of the immigrants themselves."^
Digby, seconded by Rothschild, recommended that
the remedy or mitigation of the evil is to be found in the enforcement of the 
ordinary sanitary law, with certain alterations and additions which experience 
has shown to be required.'^**
Digby and Rothschild argued that the problem of alien Immigration had proved to be 
essentially a local one and did not require solutions on a national level. Rather, it 
ought to be approached via existing public departments, without the need for the 
creation of a separate, national, Immigration Department. A report of the Alien 
Immigration Committee of the Board of Deputies regarding the Commission 
supported the unwillingness expressed by Digby and Rothschild to accept the 
recommendations. In it they lamented that,
il)id. ‘Memorandum', p. 49
206
it w ould.. .be most deplorable if the recommendation, made in the face of the 
mass of evidence to the contrary, serves to give colour to the popular 
impression that the diseased state of the immigrants of the past have 
necessitated the regulations mentioned.'^'
The inclusion of medical restrictions in immigration legislation was the result not of 
the Commission’s findings but of another agenda. This agenda was similar to that 
which allowed the Commission to conclude that trachoma, despite expert evidence to 
the contrary, ought to be considered as a condition disqualifying entry. The 
foundations of the anti-immigration platform, both before and throughout the 
Commission, were based on the leading allegation that immigrants were responsible 
for the housing, employment and poverty problems in London’s East End. Health, 
although not as central to the debate as social and economic factors, played an 
essential role in the debate, as much symbolically as literally. As Markel remarked 
with regard to trachoma in the United States, immigrants not only threatened the 
public health with imported infections, but also the health of the body politic. This 
was a particularly important tool utilised by the BBL and LL in the development of 
popular support for the immigration debate, and one which easily tapped into 
traditional anti-Semitic paradigms; and it was no secret that any legislation resulting 
from the Commission would be directed specifically at East-European Jews. As the 
Royal Commission published in its report, ‘the excess is mainly composed of 
Russians and Poles who belong for the most part to the Jewish faith’. T h e  guiding 
force behind the particular Jewish focus of the Commission’s investigations and 
reports was Evans-Gordon, and it was his particular political agenda which led to the 
inclusion of health restrictions in the recommendations of the Commission.
Shortly after the Comm ission’s findings were published and the first Bill resulting 
from the enquiry was reviewed, the Secretary to the Commission, F.E. Eddis, wrote a 
book regarding ‘all phases of the [alien] question’. He became well versed on this 
issue during the period of the Commission. Before sending the manuscript for
'J"ibid. p. 49.
‘ Report o f  the Alien Immigration Committee o f  the London Committee o f  the Depulie.s o f  the 
British Jews on the Report o f  the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration',
LMA A CC 3121/B02/01/001.
Report o f  the RCAI, p. 40, item 262.
207
publication he forwarded a copy to the Home Office acknowledging his close 
involvement.
Having been the Secretary to the Royal Commission I have doubted whether I 
could claim the independence of one of the general public in the expression of 
views, not only about the recommendations of the Commission but also upon 
the main purpose of the Bill itself.
The reaction from the Home Office was that the book was ‘quite intolerable’ and 
‘objectionable’ and that it could only be supported for publication if approved by 
Rothschild, Evans-Gordon and Lord Hereford; hence it was never published. One 
reason it received such a cold reaction was that it openly criticised the 
recommendations of the report and revealed the biases within it.
The Commission at the outset appointed one of their members to lead the 
attack against unrestricted immigration of foreigners. To Major Evans- 
Gordon, M ember of the Parliamentary division of Stepney, was assigned this 
post of responsibility. All must admit that he brought to bear upon the issue an 
energy, an ability, and a dogged determination to do full justice to his side, 
combined with fairness which called forth the admiration of his opponents, no 
less than his friends.
As Rothschild, who according to Eddis had been appointed to the Royal Commission 
as ‘leader of the defence’, stated to the Deputation from the Jewish Board of Deputies 
to the Home Secretary on the Aliens Act, ‘the General idea of the Commission was to 
recommend that a system somewhat analogous to that in vogue in the United States 
should be introduced into this country’.'^ *’ He also agreed to a point made in a letter 
from Arnold W h i t e d u r i n g  the Commission that, ‘Major Evans-Gordon has been a 
Member of Parliament for a little over a year and although his industry and tact are 
admirable, his interest in the subject are of political origin’. I n  other words, Evans-
Letter to Home Office dated May 2, 1904, PRO HO45/10241/B378 I 1/15.
Proof, Eddis manuscript, PRO HO45/10241/B37811/15B.
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Gordon and the Conservative Party had pledged to legislate on the issue since the 
previous century and the Conservative Prime Minister, A.J.Balfour, was equally 
committed to legislation by 1904-5. The decision to recommend the inclusion of 
medical restrictions in any immigration legislation was the result of the desire to 
replicate American legislation and also to honour the Conservative party pledge to 
legislate, championed primarily by Evans-Gordon.
The Aliens Act and the Port Sanitary Authority
Thus, after one failed Bill,'^® in which a number of clauses were not considered 
f e a s i b l e , a  second Bill was introduced in 1905,'®** and the Aliens Act finally entered 
the statute books on August 11, 1905. In relation to health it stated that an immigrant 
would be considered ‘undesirable’ under the Act, if he [was] a lunatic or an idiot, or 
owing to any disease or infirmity appear[ed] likely to become a charge upon the rates 
or otherwise a detriment to the public’. It only applied to ‘alien steerage passengers’ 
and not to transmigrants in possession of ‘prepaid through tickets’.'®'
From the moment the recommendations of the Royal Commission were published, the 
Port Sanitary Authority began to consider its position within the new system.
Williams wrote in his monthly report to the Port Sanitary Committee in September 
1903 that considering the work undertaken during the operation of the Cholera Order, 
responsibility for medical inspection under the Act should be given to the Port 
Medical Officers of Health.
Your officers have ... had much experience in dealing with such immigrants, 
and the machinery exists and can be put in action immediately if required, and 
I bring this fact before your committee for your consideration, in order that 
should legislation follow on the lines of the recommendation of the
I IS Bill 147, 1904 [4E D W .7 .] .
Such as how was a 'person o f  notoriously bad character’ to be determined and proved; see Holmes.  
John B ull’s Island, p. 72.
Bill 187, 1905 15 EDW.7.].
Aliens Act, 1905 [5 EDW.7].
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Commission, that this authority should carry out the work of medical 
inspection of immigrants coming into the Port of London.'®^
The second Bill did not specify who the medical inspectors employed under the 
proposed Act would be. The Port Sanitary Committee was sent a number of further 
requests in 1905 from Williams and his provincial colleagues to urge the government 
to amend the Bill so that all matters relating to the health of the ports would remain 
within their sole authority. They suggested an amendment to clause 2.(1) of the Bill, 
which proposed that the Secretary of State would appoint men with ‘magisterial, 
business, or administrative experience’ to posts within the new Immigration 
Department. Instead Williams and his colleagues suggested ‘the Medical Inspector 
shall be the Medical Officer of Health of the Port Sanitary Authority or such other 
persons as the Secretary of State shall appoint’.'®® Although this clause was not 
amended in the Act, employment of the established Port Authorities was not 
precluded under it. The Act was passed in August 1905, but was not due to come into 
operation until January 1, 1906. During this period the administrative and 
organisational structure of the Act had to be established, and the Port Sanitary 
Authorities were determined to maintain their dominion in the ports with a secure role 
in the new department.
Opportunely by the end of summer 1905 cholera again threatened to invade Western 
Europe, apparently brought from the East by Russian migrants. By September ‘some 
cases’ had occurred in Hamburg among ‘Jewish emigrants’. The outbreak did not 
appear to be a ‘serious one’ but precautions were nonetheless put in place.'®'* Again 
the Local Government Board issued regulations which permitted special authority, 
such as had been applied from 1892-5, with regard to ‘risk’ vessels.
The Medical Officer ... detains on board at his discretion the passengers from 
‘infected’ ports [ports on the Vistula and Oder, and Hamburg] and all 
immigrants from other ports.'®®
CLRO PSCP, (Sept. -  Dec., 1903).
Letter from the River Tyne Port Sanitary Authority to the Town Clerk, Guildhall. June 21, 1905,
CLRO PSCP, (May -  July, 1905).
CLRO PSCP, (Sept. -  Dec., 1905)
' Sept. 19, 1905, CLRO PSCP  (Sept. -  Dec., 1905).
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The verification of addresses was also re-introduced and the arrangement which had 
been entered into between the Poor Jew s’ Temporary Shelter and the Port of London 
Sanitary Authority was renewed. Throughout the ‘crisis’ period which lasted from 
September to late November (the months between the passage of the Bill and the 
introduction of the Act), Medical Officers were required to employ particular 
vigilance in boarding every vessel which arrived carrying immigrants.
The Aliens Act having been passed, duly comes into force on the January 
1906 and it is probable that with a view to escaping this Act, that the numbers 
of such aliens will be very considerable from now until the end of the year and 
will entail much work on the part of [the Port Sanitary] Officers in supervising 
them.*®®
During these three months the total number of migrants detained on board vessels and 
only allowed to disembark ‘under supervision’ was 6,036. The monthly report for 
October/November stated that the success of the Port Sanitary Authority in 
controlling the disease and the migrants was demonstrated in the fact that ‘only three 
or four were subsequently untraced’.'®®
The timing of the threatened cholera invasion was particularly advantageous to the 
Port Sanitary Authority. A note to Hull, Grimsby, Tynemouth ‘and also Dr. Leslie 
Mackenzie of Scotch LGB,’ from the Local Government Board in London focused 
the activities of the Port Medieal Officers particularly upon migrants, not 
coincidentally, at that time.
You will doubtless have noted in the papers a statement that cholera has 
appeared in Hamburg in the person of an Alien recently arrived from Russia.
A single imported case does not of course, in view of the Paris Convention, 
justify this country in regarding Hamburg as an infected port, but doubtless 
you will be thinking it well to keep a special eye on arrivals from there 
particularly on low class aliens.'®®
' ibid.
' ” 'Monlhly Report o f  the Port o f  London Medical Officer o f  Health, October/Noveniber. 1905'. 
CLRO PSCP, (Sept, -  Dec., 1905).
.Sept.. 1905, PRO MH 19/237/104191/05.
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Simultaneously, correspondences darted between the Port Sanitary Committee in 
London and the provincial Port Authorities, urging them to place pressure on local 
Members of Parliament and other local authorities in order to ensure that ‘the Port 
Medical Officers of Health [were] nominated as Medical inspector under the Bill, also 
[that] members of the Port Sanitary Authority [were] included in the list of persons 
from whom the Immigration Board [was] to be selected’.*®**
By December 1905, only one month before the Aliens Act came into force, the 
Secretary of State finally resolved who was to be appointed as Immigration Officers 
at the ports. The Immigration Officers responsible for all parts of the Act not referring 
to health, such as financial means and registration, were to be appointed from among 
the officers of the Customs Service. The duties of the Immigration Officer were to be 
carried out by Customs Officers in conjunction with their ordinary duties. As they 
ordinarily met every vessel which arrived in British ports, the role of Immigration 
Officer would be ‘performed by Customs Officers as part of their normal duties’.*"***
In relation to health, while the suggested amendment to the Bill had not been included 
in the Act, the Secretary of State ensured that medical inspection under the Aliens Act 
remained within the existing structures of port health. The Aliens Committee, which 
was convened at the Home Office in order to prepare and implement the logistics of 
the Act, ‘stated that they thought it not desirable that two bodies should be conducting 
a system of medical inspection’,*"*' and the Secretary of State declared that,
the Act requires the appointment of a Medical Inspector at every immigration 
port. The Secretary of State concurs with the view of the [Alien] Committee 
that the most suitable person for the post is the Port Medical Officer of Health, 
or, if there is no such officer, the local Medical Officer of Health.'"*®
It is unclear exactly what diseases were referred to in the Act. Evans-Gordon, in a 
memorandum to the Bill in early 1905 questioned whether ‘disease or other infirmity’
Letter iVom the London Port Sanitary Authority to the Town Hall, Hull, Aug. 22, 1905, 
CLRO PSCP, (Sept. -  Dec.,  1905).
Letter from the Secretary o f  State to the Treasury, Dec. 9, 1905, PRO H 0 1 6 2 /1 .
Draft memo, ‘Aliens', CLRO PSCP,  (Sept. -  Dec.,  1905).
' PRO H0162/1 ; see also Letter dated Dec. 9, 1905, CLRO PSCP,  (Sept. -  Dec.. 1905).
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referred only to chronic conditions or also ‘meant to include persons suffering from 
infectious or contagious diseases?""*® What would happen under the Aliens Act to the 
powers already in the possession of the Port Sanitary Authority with regard to 
‘indigenous’ and ‘exotic’ disease? An employee at the Office of Parliamentary 
Council advised that,
it will also be necessary to draw a distinction between infectious diseases and 
chronic diseases. The present policy of the Local Government Board, in 
accordance with treaties, is rather to enforce the landing of persons suffering 
from infectious diseases rather than to forbid it.'"*"*
The ‘treaties’ related to the conventions signed at the International Sanitary 
Conferences of 1897 and 1903, in which Britain had again argued for the landing of 
healthy passengers from infected ships on condition they provided verifiable 
addresses and that infected individuals were isolated. Medical restriction to 
immigration did not strictly contravene these international conventions, nor did it 
interfere with international treaties regarding a state’s right to repatriate foreign 
nationals. However, it did contradict the policy of non-exclusion upon which Britain 
constructed its arguments against quarantine since the 1850s.
The powers granted to the Port Sanitary Authorities in 1896 with regard to the 
treatment of vessels infected with ‘indigenous’ or ‘exotic’ diseases were not altered 
under the Aliens Act. The phrase in the Aliens Act which referred to ‘any disease or 
infirmity...likely to become a charge upon the rates or otherwise a detriment to the 
public’, applied to all infectious disease, both ‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’. The two 
categories of disease were not separated under the Act and the Port Medical Officers 
could deal with cases of either type of disease onboard an immigrant vessel without 
distinction. The duties of the Port Medical Officer of Health at London, as the 
Immigration Medical Inspector were as follows:
On arrival at Blackwall, all immigrant vessels shall bring up alongside the pier 
for purpose of landing’
(1) undesirable immigrants detained by the Immigration Officer,
E\aiis-C}c)i-don, ‘Mcnioraiidiim on the Aliens B il l’, March 4, 1905. PRO H045/1  17267/30.
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(2) ditto detained by Medical Inspector,
(3) Any immigrants that it may not have been found possible to examine 
before arriving at B laekwall’"*®
No examination under the Aliens Act shall take place between the hours of 8 
p.m. and 8 a.m.
Vessels arriving at Gravesend after 8 p.m. shall be examined in the ordinary 
way by the Medical Officer on duty with a view to the detection of cases of 
infectious disease, leaving the detailed examination under the Aliens Act to be 
carried out at Blackwall where all passengers will be landed.
Masters of vessels will be responsible for ascertaining and declaring at 
Gravesend whether any person on board is ill or ailing. Should any case of 
dangerous infectious disorder necessitating disinfection of the contacts with 
the case, be discovered after passing Gravesend, the vessel will be required to 
return to Denton, the Disinfecting Station, for the purpose of thorough 
disinfection. In the case of immigrant vessels coming from ports infected with 
Plague, yellow Fever or Cholera, the medical examination of all persons on 
board must take place at Gravesend before the vessel proceeds to London.'"*®
The law remained the same regarding the way medical officers inspected non­
immigrant vessels which were ‘suspected’ or ‘infected’ with either ‘exotic’ or 
‘indigenous’ disease. The difference in inspection practices at the ports changed after 
the implementation of the Act only with regard to immigrant ships. The Aliens Act 
defined an immigrant ship as any vessel which carried ‘more than twenty alien 
steerage passengers’. Immigration Medical Officers stopped and medically examined 
these vessels under the conditions of the Act, regardless of whether any illness was 
reported by the M aster or ship’s surgeon. This definition of immigrant ships ensured 
that those vessels which were detained and examined under the special authority of 
the Aliens Act were specifically ‘migrant vessels’. These vessels were legally defined
' ' ' Letter from the Office o f  Parliamentary Council to the Home Office, March 13, 1905, ibid.
' ''' Initial inspection o f  immigrant vessels would take place when the Customs and Medical Officer 
boarded the vessel at Gravesend.
Draft memo, ‘Aliens',  CLRO PSCP,  (Sept. ^ Dec., 1905).
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in order to differentiate them from trading vessels. Trading vessels remained under 
the ordinary requirements of the Public Health Acts, and were detained and examined 
accordingly. Thus, the ‘English system’ - which had largely been developed with 
reference to the commercial considerations of the ports - was maintained where 
trading vessels were concerned. The only vessels which were affected by additional 
restrictions were passenger vessels.
Within the first year it was evident that much of the medical evidence to the Royal 
Commission, as well as the predictions of Rothschild and Digby’s, was well-founded: 
the Commission had drastically exaggerated both the seale of the immigrant health 
problem and the reduction medical restriction would produce in immigrant numbers. 
In London, 18 immigrants were deported for medical reasons in the first year of the 
Act, while a further 22 arrivals deemed undesirable on medical grounds were, on 
appeal, permitted to land.*"*® The diseases or ailments which prohibited the landing of 
the 18 unsuccessful immigrants, were not recorded. However, a list from Dover, 
where in the first months of 1906 no aliens were deported, provides some idea of the 
ailments which were not grounds for deportation.
So far we have not had occasion, on Medical grounds, to report to the 
Immigration Officer that any Alien immigrant was in our opinion a lunatic, 
idiot, or suffering from any disease which appeared likely to make such 
immigrant a charge upon the rates, or otherwise a detriment to the public. The 
class of immigrants has been a respectable one, and evidence of disease 
confined to influenza in six cases, one slight impetigo, one eczema, one 
ozoena, one cataract of one eye, one right inguinal hernia, one loss of single 
eye, replaeed by a glass one.'"*®
Trachoma, which was previously absent from monthly and annual reports of the Port 
Sanitary Authority began to be mentioned with increasing frequency. Yet in 
accordance with numerous testimonies to the Royal Commission, it failed to cause 
any notable problems as a disease imported by immigrants. The medical evidence
' Monthly Reports o f  the Port Medical Officer o f  Health for the Port o f London, 1906, 
CLRO PSCP, (ail file boxes 1906).
' Letter to H.M. In.spector o f A liens from Medical Inspector and MOH Dover, May 8, 1906. 
PRO H O 45 /I0327 /132I8I/28 .
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presented to the Commission had not been taken into account in the Commission’s 
report, or indeed in the creation of the Act, and after a year this had become evident. 
The Port Sanitary Authorities, however did succeeded in attaining their requests and 
recommendations for extended authority over incoming vessels. While they could not 
apply greater authority over suspected cases of ‘indigenous’ disease on board non­
immigrant vessels, the Port Medical Officers of Health were granted the power of full 
inspection and detention of immigrant vessels.
Thus, from the first decade of the twentieth century the Port Sanitary Authorities, 
having successfully triumphed over the quarantine system, acquired jurisdiction over 
imported ‘exotic’ disease, and secured a place within the new immigration regulations 
and organisation, were the sole medical authority operating within British ports. The 
medical restriction of immigration was included under the new Aliens Act despite the 
opposition of two Commissioners and the majority of medical witnesses called to 
testify at the Royal Commission. After over fifty years of British opposition to 
policies of detention and exclusion at the ports, it was not a medical panic but the 
combination of a strong anti-alien campaign mounted largely by Conservative 
politicians and the impact of stringent American immigration laws which brought 
about the introduction of medical restrictions to immigration at British ports.
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CONCLUSION
Charles Rosenberg in his 1965 article, ‘Cholera in nineteenth century Europe; A tool 
for social and economic analysis’, argued that the European cholera experience was a 
‘cross-sectional phenomena’ which arose in the particular industrialised urban 
environment of the nineteenth century and was banished by the same material culture 
which had encouraged its presence/ The disease and the way it was treated medically, 
politically and socially was intrinsic to the societies in which it occurred. Yet the way 
it has been approached by historians, he argued, has been as something ‘outside of 
society’ and therefore not related to the conditions he referred to.
There is no human crisis more compelling than an epidemic of plague, or 
yellow fever, or cholera. These phenomena are, indeed, so dramatic and so 
terrifying that most physicians and historians have tended to view them as 
something alien, something outside of society and contending with it.^
Rosenberg’s argument accounts for the devastating spread of the disease during the 
nineteenth century, and its subsequent defeat. However, although it is important to 
examine the disease within existing social structures, it must not be forgotten that 
cholera was indeed ‘alien’ to many of the affected countries. The conditions of the 
working classes in overcrowded urban centres and developments in transportation 
were key to the cholera epidemics, and the ‘medical and administrative advances’ of 
the period ‘inevitably’ banished the disease.^ Yet, contemporary reactions and actions 
towards cholera were related precisely to the ‘alien’ nature of the disease. It, and the 
other diseases mentioned by Rosenberg, yellow fever and plague -  Ackerknecht’s 
‘big t h r e e -  were regarded as ‘alien’, differentiated by the law and in medical 
practice from other infeetious diseases which were categorised as ‘indigenous’.
The debates staged between sanitation and quarantine at the ports were ultimately 
debates about whether or not, as Rosenberg discussed, these three ‘exotic’ diseases 
ought to occupy a place outside the confines of society, or be incorporated into the
' Charles Rosenberg. ‘Cholera in Nineteenth Century Europe: A Tool tor Social and Economic 
A nalysis’. C om parative Studies in Society and H istory, vol. VIII. ( lVb5-66), 452-463 , p. 461,
" ibid.. p. 453.
' ibid.. p. 461.
' Ackcrknccht. ‘A nliconiagionism ’, p. 566.
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mainstream of domestic medical practice and consciousness. Furthermore, it was not 
merely that these diseases were ‘exotic’ due to their foreign origin; the way Britain 
dealt with them also depended upon foreign pressures. It was not sufficient for Britain 
to have incorporated ‘the big three’ into the ordinary methods of disease prevention, 
as applied to ‘indigenous’ disease, and within domestic medical and sanitary 
structures. The policy which determined domestic treatment of the diseases was 
shaped by the demands of foreign countries. The way ‘exotic’, as opposed to 
‘indigenous’ diseases, were dealt with domestically was a matter for international, not 
just national, discussion.
‘Exotic’ infectious diseases were intrinsically linked to Britain’s empire and thus both 
to maritime trade and the foreign ports through which it passed. The way Britain 
responded to ‘exotic’ disease, therefore, was always informed by more than medical 
concerns alone. The implications of these diseases, particularly cholera (so clearly 
linked with the ‘Jewel in the Crown’) went beyond public health. That is not to say 
that public health did not have its own agenda beyond the bounds of economic or 
political interest; but the ports and maritime trade were central to the fabric of 
imperial power. Protecting the congenial operation of British and colonial ports 
without hindering commercial interests was fundamental to the way in which ‘exotic’ 
disease was approached at the ports in the late nineteenth century.
Prophylaxis at British ports was a compromise between the often conflicting demands 
of national and international interests, between ‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’ disease, and, 
later, immigrants and the native population. These tensions -  summarised as the 
tension between ‘dom estic’ and ‘foreign’ - in relation to infectious disease, were 
played out at their geographical meeting point -  the ports. The separate elements 
within the domestic/foreign divide at the ports (which are displayed in TABLE I in 
the Introduction) shaped the development of port health in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. Over the period discussed in this thesis the relationship 
between each of these elements altered, becoming either closer or further apart. The 
separation of ‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’ diseases was emphasised during the period of 
dual authority of Customs and the Port Sanitary Authority. After the repeal of the 
Quarantine Act this separation lessened although vestiges of the divide remained with 
regard to the power of the Port Sanitary Authority to detain vessels carrying ‘exotic’
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disease. The separate categorisation of ‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’ disease disappeared 
only after the introduction of the Aliens Act and only in the case of immigrant vessels. 
Before the 1892 cholera epidemic port prophylaxis was divided between ‘exotic’ and 
‘indigenous’ disease and quarantine and the ‘English system’. From 1892 steerage 
migrants were added to the equation which determined methods of prevention for 
imported infections. The separation of ‘aliens’ in port prophylaxis increased from 
1892 until the passing of the Aliens Act. While the delineation between ‘exotic’ and 
‘indigenous’ lessened considerably from 1872 to 1896 and 1905, the separation of 
immigrants from the native population increased enormously as a factor in port 
prophylaxis from 1892 to 1905.
This study began with the assumption that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, a ‘medical panic’ was focused at the ports on the arrival of hundreds of 
thousands of immigrants. The inclusion of a clause in Britain’s first immigration law, 
the 1905 Aliens Act, which prohibited the entry of immigrants who ‘owing to any 
disease or infirmity appeared likely to become a charge upon the rates or otherwise a 
detriment to the public’, appeared to indicate, as it had in the United States, medical 
concerns about the introduction into the native population of a ‘diseased’ foreign 
population. Yet, by the time immigration restriction began to gain momentum in 
British politics in the years leading up to the Act, the central platform adopted by anti­
alien agitators was not medical but economic, concerned with sweated labour, the 
undercutting of wages and the sale of goods, housing and rent problems. Unlike other 
countries which received immigrants during this period of mass migration, Britain did 
not respond to the arrival of thousands of aliens in the unsanitary steerage holds of 
merchant steamships with the same medical rhetoric of exclusion adopted with 
particular force in countries such as the United States. The health condition of 
immigrants at the moment of arrival, a powerful image in American anti-immigration 
propaganda, did not, particularly after 1900, play a significant role in the British anti­
alien movement. However, the notion that immigrants were the conductors of disease 
was not absent from Britain. Indeed in the 1890s and into the twentieth century they 
were often considered to be the primary vector in the transmission of cholera and 
other infectious diseases. Yet, that immigrants posed a significant threat to British 
public health was never a charge used with great force in the rhetoric of anti­
immigration in Britain.
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Understanding why the potential medical threat posed by immigrants was not a 
significant part of the alien immigration debate at the turn of the twentieth century 
necessarily led to an investigation of port health more generally in nineteenth century 
Britain. Britain had maintained, particularly since the establishment of the Port 
Sanitary Authorities, belief in a system of port health which opposed exclusionary 
practices such as quarantine. Any rhetoric which engendered exclusion with regard to 
port health sat uncomfortably at the end of a half century of fervent anti-quarantinism. 
As a result, this study became an investigation not only about the methods employed 
in Britain to prevent imported infectious disease relating to immigration but, more 
specifically, the development of the new Port Sanitary Authority, as a working 
alternative to quarantine, and the associated protection of maritime trade interests.
The central theme which emerges from this examination of public health at the ports 
is that of the meeting of foreign and domestic. This theme penetrates the entire history 
of port health in Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It was 
central to the maintenance of quarantine in Britain until 1896, and particularly the 
continuance of dual authority at the ports. It was also central to the introduction of 
medical restriction to immigration under the administration of the Port Sanitary 
Authorities. Through a recognition of foreign as well as domestic agency these 
policies, which at first sight appear curious, are more intelligible.
There has been limited scholarship examining port health in Britain in this period and 
as a result it has been assumed that this important aspect of public health in the late 
nineteenth century followed a somewhat linear development as merely an extension 
and ‘virtual completion of the internal preventative structure’.^  While this was partly 
true, the Port Sanitary system developed very much in relation to the specific role and 
importance of the ports. Health issues which affected the ports, while of domestic 
consequence, were also of significance beyond British shores. While relying upon the 
internal sanitary structure of public health for the prevention of the spread of imported 
infections, port health was also reliant upon the health of foreign ports and 
international methods of prevention. It was as much externally as internally 
referential.
Hardy, ‘Public Health and the Expert’, p. 135.
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One of the primary misconceptions in the small amount of previous scholarship 
addressing these issues has been that quarantine played no role at the ports after the 
establishment of the Port Sanitary Authority, and it faced an inevitable and 
uncomplicated decline after the 1872 and 1875 Public Health Acts.*  ^These arguments 
have been formulated on the basis that there were no vessels detained for plague or 
yellow fever under the Quarantine Act in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. 
This point is inaccurate in two respects. Firstly, quarantine was imposed after the 
establishment of the Port Sanitary Authority in the case of the S.S.Neva in 
Southampton in June 1889. It was an isolated case, as it was the only case of plague 
or yellow fever which appeared aboard a vessel in a British port during the period 
1872-1896. Yet, it illustrates that where a case of ‘exotic’ disease (not cholera) 
occurred, quarantine procedures remained in place. Secondly, the absence of other 
vessels quarantined under the Act did not diminish the importance of quarantine 
remaining on the statute books, and hence as a definite presence in the practice of port 
health. While quarantine remained within the law Customs officers were required to 
attend the arrival of every vessel proceeding from a foreign port and give it clearance 
to dock. Until the removal of quarantine from the law, with the passing of the 1896 
Public Health Act, the Port Sanitary Authority never worked independently of the 
Customs Service or the requirements of the Quarantine Act. On most occasions, not 
including the period of the Cholera Order, the Port Medical Officer only attended a 
vessel if the Customs Officer, while asking the ‘Quarantine Questions’, was informed 
of an ‘indigenous’ illness on board. Although, between 1872 and 1896, only one case 
of yellow fever was quarantined, the Quarantine Act still remained at the core of the 
‘first line of defence’, singularly concerned with the interception, should a case 
appear, of ‘exotic’ infectious disease.
Cholera, which in Britain sat uncomfortably between its absence from the specific 
nomenclature of ‘exotic’ disease under the Quarantine Act, and its clear origin outside 
Britain, was at the heart of the quarantine/sanitation debate. It was also the principal 
topic of international discussion about quarantine at the International Sanitary 
Conferences which ultimately bound Britain to retaining a superfluous and much 
hated system of disease prevention at the ports. Although the Port Sanitary Authority,
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under the Local Government Board General Cholera Order, undertook the reception 
and treatment of cholera cases and vessels within the fundamental principles of 
sanitation, it was necessary to retain the Customs Service as the initial boarding 
authority, which then handed cases of cholera infection over to the Port Sanitary 
Authority. Although the ambiguities in the Quarantine Act allowed for limited 
jurisdietion of the Port Sanitary Authorities over cholera, the ‘exoticness’ of the 
disease bound it to quarantine.
‘Exotic’ diseases were categorised and treated differently beeause of their foreign 
origin and because, for reasons relating to this, they were not of domestic importance 
only. Britain was at liberty to impose any preventative strategy against ‘indigenous’ 
disease entering the ports. Generally, those diseases which were regarded as 
‘indigenous’ to Britain were similarly endemic in other parts of Europe. It was a case 
of domestic solutions to domestic problems. International problems such as cholera 
required international solutions, and despite Britain’s singular objection to quarantine 
throughout the century, it was bound by the weight of international demand to 
maintain some form of quarantine, paradoxically, if British vessels were to sail more 
or less unhindered. This pressure was primarily exerted at the International Sanitary 
Conferences. After 1872 cholera was mostly dealt with under the sanitary system. But 
in terms of the health status of British ports internationally it was essential that 
quarantine officers were maintained as a visible component of British port health. 
Although it was widely acknowledged that Britain opposed quarantine and that its 
reasons for doing so were primarily economically based, quarantine remained within 
the structure of port health for more than twenty years after the establishment of a 
successful and more appealing alternative for disease prevention. The ultimate 
success of the sanitary system in preventing the disease from spreading in Britain in 
1892, when cholera’s effects elsewhere had been devastating, eventually permitted 
Britain, not without some hesitation, to abolish human quarantine.
Thus, while it may appear, on first glance, that quarantine had ended in Britain after 
the establishment of the Port Sanitary Authorities, it maintained a significant role, 
albeit essentially as a token, both in the practical workings of the ports and as a 
political tool in British maritime trade.
see Hardy, 'Cholera' ; M acDonald, 'The History o f Quarantine'; and Ackerknecht.
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The second problem found in previous scholarship is the assumption that 
anticontagionism was defunct, medically and politically by the 1870s or early 1880s. 
This is due primarily to the erroneous suggestion that quarantine had no place in the 
operation of port health in Britain in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Working on Ackerknecht’s notable statement that, ‘the whole discussion was ... never 
a discussion on contagion alone, but always on contagion and quarantine''^ while 
there remained a legal recognition of quarantine, there also remained the opposing 
medical and political theory of anticontagion, which was employed by Britain in the 
continuing international quarantine debates. Furthermore, the implications of a 
contagious aetiology of cholera went beyond merely quarantine; it also implicated 
Britain in the importation of cholera into Europe via her strong maritime links with 
India. Although non-contagionism -  a more appropriate term for the late nineteenth 
century - was maintained in India, by individuals such as Fayrer, for longer than it 
was in Britain, the theory retained a significant foothold in Britain, particularly in 
areas relating to the ports, longer than is usually credited. Precisely because of the 
frequent debates with Europe at the International Sanitary Conferences where Britain 
tried to argue for a relaxation of quarantines, especially through the Suez Canal, non- 
contagionist theories of cholera aetiology endured. Non-contagionism was not 
abandoned when Koch presented the findings of the German Cholera Commission. 
Non-contagionist theories, supported by years of clinical and epidemiological 
evidence, were also maintained by a strong political and economic agenda which did 
not disappear the moment the comma bacillus made headline news. On the contrary, 
Koch’s discovery had important implications for Britain both in terms of the 
quarantine/sanitation debate, and Britain’s role in importing cholera into Europe. It 
was these factors which prevented Britain from allowing any discussion of 
bacteriology at the 1885 International Sanitary Conference. Rather, it was maintained 
that cholera could occur de novo, depending on local conditions.^ Well into the 1880s 
and indeed, into the 1890s, Pettenkofean theories of infectious disease aetiology, 
which allowed for the causative influence of a contagious agent only within certain 
conditions of environment and individual predisposition, were maintained in relation 
to port health. Such examples of non-contagionism can be found in medical texts and
‘Anticontagionism '.
' ibid. p. 567.
^Chapman, Cholera C urable, p. 85.
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in political statements relating to port health into the 1890s. As late as 1898 the 
President of the Epidemiological Society stated in his inaugural address,
for the production of an epidemic of any disease, the concurrence of three 
factors or groups of factors is necessary. There must be, first, the presence of 
the specific contagium; secondly, a favourable environment in the form of 
appropriate conditions meteorological, topographical, social, or sanitary; and, 
thirdly, personal predisposition on the part of those who are exposed.^
Once quarantine was removed from the statute books non-contagionism was less 
exigent politically. Although it did not carry the same force it had at mid-century, 
non-contagionism was strongly linked to medical practice at the ports, the existence 
of quarantine, and its consequent economic and political implications. Despite 
advances being made in bacteriological theories of disease aetiology, non- 
contagionism remained within the rhetoric of port health as long as quarantine did, if 
not beyond.
The tension between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ in preventing the importation of 
infectious diseases at the ports continued beyond the abolition of quarantine. The 
reception and treatment of ‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’ disease continued to be 
differentiated in the powers of Medical Officers relating to the examination and 
detention of vessels. This was a remnant of the Quarantine Act, and while British 
Medical Officers attended to individual cases of both ‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’ 
infectious disease ultimately with the same procedures, the distinction remained with 
regard to their authority over a vessel. However, the demarcation between ‘exotic’ 
and ‘indigenous’ disease gradually dwindled once dual authority was removed. This 
distinction was also less marked because a number of diseases became less endemic. 
Vaccination policies meant, for example, that diseases such as smallpox were more 
likely to occur only when imported. The same methods of medical inspection, 
isolation of the sick and sanitary control of the healthy could be applied to both 
‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’ disease. With the exception of some remaining powers 
extended by the Quarantine Act over vessels from ports infected with ‘exotic’ disease, 
very little remained to distinguish the two categories of infectious disease by the turn
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of the century. Instead, the conflict between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ was beginning 
to be transferred from a categorisation of disease, to a categorisation of person. The 
risk was not the imported disease but the person who imported it. ‘Exotic’ versus 
‘indigenous’ disease was translated, after the abolition of quarantine and during the 
period of mass migration which had begun in the early 1880s, to ‘exotic’ versus 
‘indigenous’ persons -  or the immigrant versus the native population.
This transposition of the ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ from disease to the diseased was 
also, as in the case of the quarantine/sanitation debate, both internally and externally 
dependent. From 1892, particularly, migrants travelling to and across Britain were 
implicated as the primary source and spread of cholera. The focus upon migrants as 
detrimental to the livelihood of British workers, the conditions of the inner-cities and 
the health of the nation gradually gathered momentum until it became a significant 
political issue by the turn of the century. Members of the Conservative Party and anti­
alien East-End lobby groups, who represented the views of an increasing proportion 
of the population which called for the restriction of immigration, pushed for 
legislation. The pressure primarily emanated from the East End of London, into which 
the majority of those migrants who remained in Britain settled, yet extended beyond 
the capital. The foremost issue upon which the movement was based was economic, 
although an element of the anti-alien debate focused upon the perceived and potential 
risk posed by migrants as importers of disease and as drains upon public and medical 
relief. While the medical, and certainly the economic, dissatisfactions were a response 
to a threat perceived in the localities into and through which the migrants moved, 
much of the concern pertained to foreign -  namely American -  attitudes to 
immigration. This was particularly the case with medical concerns relating to 
immigrants.
The United States immigration law of 1891 had direct repercussions for Britain since 
it strictly enforced the right to refuse entry on grounds of health. From 1892 America 
had demonstrated its position on hindering the entry of ill and infected immigrants by 
its enforcement of the twenty-day quarantine order. While this was not well received 
in Britain, more because of the extreme imposition of quarantine than its obvious 
nativism, it further highlighted the connection between port health and immigration.
' H. Franklin Parsons, ‘H a ifa  Century o f  Sanitary Progress, and Its R esults’, Transactions o f  the
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In the United States quarantine was increasingly becoming synonymous with 
immigration, yet it was argued that in a much less overt manner the British Port 
Sanitary system, particularly during the period of the Cholera Order, was similarly 
directed at hindering the entry of an undesirable class off immigrant. By refusing the 
disembarkation of immigrants who could not provide a ‘verifiable’ onward address, 
Britain, it was argued, was following a modified version of immigration restriction, 
and indeed quarantine.'^ However, the most influential aspect of American legislation 
was the perception that those migrants who had been rejected from the United States 
on medical and economic grounds, were returned not to their European ports of origin 
but to British ports. The quantifiable evidence did not support the belief that large 
numbers of migrants rejected by the United States returned to Britain. Nevertheless, it 
had a disproportionate effect on British attitudes to immigration and was of great 
significance. This divergence between minimal numbers and great effect first came to 
public attention in the Report to the Board o f Trade on Alien Immigration published 
in 1893 -  the first full report since the American act had been passed. The report’s 
author argued that the problem was minimal. On the other hand, the psychological 
impact of Britain being the ‘dumping ground’ of immigrants unwanted by the United 
States, meant that the issue continued to be used as a strong tool in the increasing anti­
alien debate. It was argued that Britain was a ‘soft touch’, the vacuum into which the 
refuse of diseased and destitute migrants, unwanted by America, would flow ."
The impact of American immigration policy also extended to what diseases British 
medical officers associated particularly with migrants. Although cholera was still a 
concern at the ports, as the 1905 outbreak demonstrated, diseases emphasised in 
American medical inspections were beginning to infiltrate the practice of British port 
health. Trachoma, which did not feature at all in the reports of Port Medical Officers 
in the nineteenth century or occupy much space in medical or public discussion, 
gradually became after 1897 central to the perceived public health risk posed by 
immigrants at the ports and in the slums. In the United States, where the volume of 
immigrants who arrived into inspection centres such as Ellis Island permitted only the 
most superficial medical examinations, trachoma was, as a highly visible, easily 
detectable, and disgusting disease, fundamental to the practice of medical exclusion of
Epidc‘D\iolop,icui Society. 1898-99, pp. 37-38.
/V. V. Med. .hd., 1892. vol. 56, p. 355.
" Tbue.s, .Ian. 30, 1902. p. 5c.
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immigrants. It was highly contagious and spread easily around the close living 
quarters of steerage accommodation. However, as the Medical Officers testified at the 
Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, it was not a disease which appeared among 
immigrants in any greater degree than any other people living under the same 
conditions. Nor was it a particularly overwhelming problem in Britain. It was almost 
entirely a concept of a disease which had been imported from the United States to 
Britain, and became a symbol of Britain’s reception of immigrants rejected from 
America on medical grounds. As in America, trachoma also began to represent the 
idea of the immigrant as a threat to both the public health and the health of the body 
politic.*^ Medical experts questioned at the Royal Commission argued that it was an 
‘indigenous’ infection, common among the overcrowded working classes of the urban 
slums, yet it was perceived as an imported disease through its connection with 
immigrants. What was important in this classification was not the disease itself but the 
people with which it was associated.
Medical exclusion of immigrants was included under the new law in order to intercept 
the introduction of this new kind of ‘foreign’ disease, despite the protestations of 
medical officers, and the two dissenting Commissioners from the recommendation of 
the Royal Commission. Exclusionary methods for the prevention of the ‘exotic’ 
diseases, yellow fever, and plague were brought to an end with the repeal of the 
Quarantine Act in 1896, but were in effect reintroduced for the prevention of diseases 
introduced by a foreign population. However, the fundamental difference between the 
exclusion of immigrants who were regarded as a potential health risk and the 
temporary exclusion of a vessel through quarantine, was that the detention of an 
immigrant vessel and exclusion of immigrants, were not disruptive to trade. This 
separation was clearly illustrated in the Act’s definition of an immigrant vessel -  a 
vessel which carried twenty or more steerage class immigrants; only these vessels 
were compulsorily detained and examined under the Act. These vessels were 
generally more likely to have been specifically passenger vessels. Lengthy inspections 
and carrier liability for passenger vessels was not a hindrance to the trading interests 
of a port. The Act ensured, through this clause, the free movement of trading vessels, 
which were unlikely to carry immigrants.
' Markcl, ‘The Byes Have It’, p. 549.
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Port health was as much about the protection of the interests of maritime trade, 
enabling trading vessels, and their goods, to move quickly in and out of the ports, as it 
was about the protection of the native population from imported infectious disease, 
both ‘exotic’ and ‘indigenous’. Within this context, the inclusion of medical 
restrictions on immigration, in an essentially economically based anti-alien 
movement, after half a century of anti-quarantinism, can be more readily understood. 
After a quarter of a century the Port Sanitary Authority triumphed in demonstrating 
that ‘exotic’ diseases such as cholera, could be incorporated into the same preventive 
methods employed for ‘indigenous’ disease. However, the type of ‘foreign’ disease 
imported by immigrants, could not be so easily incorporated. Without the additional 
imperative of protecting commerce, this category of disease did not need to be treated 
within existing systems of prevention, and it was possible to introduce medical 
exclusion of immigrants at the ports.
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